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PREFACE
Thi s study offers an overview of the peace movement in the Uni ted S ta tes
during the decade prededing the Vietnam War.

This movement, unlike its fore-

runners , was led by liberal s who attempted to reform the system from within.
A coalition of established and new groups was forged, with the major constituencies drawn from world federalists and pacifists.

This seemingly unlikely

combination i s analyzed through historical investigation with some aid from
the political science mathematically-based theory of coalition formation.

The

creation of this coalition was facilitated by their championing of a nuclear
test-ban in a period when the health hazards of a tmospheric nuclear explosions
were becoming known to the publi c .

It was this issue that carried the movement

until its final demi se upon the si gning of the limited test ban treaty in
Augus t of 1963.
Given the generally negative assessment of the achievement of thi s peace
coalition, the study attempts to analyze what the true goals of the various
factions of this movement were and the shortcomings buil t into these objectives.
Furthermore, alternative strategies and tactics are suggested for current and
future activi s ts looking to history for direction and precedent.

Several pit-

falls of the liberal peace experiment should be noticed throughout the study.
The gradual co-opting of the peace movement into the government camp was
possible because of the coalition liberal' s desire to maintain legitimacy,
especially through its anti-communist vigilance.

Secondly, liberal s held a

preponderance of power in the coalition, not the radicals, who were in the
position of outsider so necessary to lead a reform movement to success.
This project began as a paper for Clayton Koppes' Modern American Pol iti cs
seminar in the fall of 1980.

A Jerome Davi s research grant helped cover my
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expenses during the research phase of the project.

Thanks go to the admini s-

tra tors of tha t resource, the cha i rperson of whi ch i s t·Ji 11 iam Norri s.
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work.

Clayton R. Koppes, my faculty advisor, wa s an excellent critical reader
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The staff of

the Swarthmore College Peace Collectfon, particularly its Curator, J. Richard
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Chapter I.

Hi s torical Framework and Introduction to Coalition Theory

A broad coalition of peace activists arose in the second half of the
1950s.

Lawrence

~Jittner ~

in 8ebe1 sAga i nst

~Jar.

the major secondary source

of the post-WW · II peace movement, speaks of a "rebirth" of the peace movement
in the late 1950s as if it was the offspring of the very different activism
of the 1930s, but this interpretation will be disputed here.

The historical

roots of this movement which can be unearthed relate to the assumptions, of midcentury liberalism.

Liberalism is a term fraught with many confused meanings,

but will be used in the context of the mid-century peace movement to indicate
the ideology and practi ce in America which encompas ses a belief in perpetual
progress in the United States through its free enterpri se sys tem. maintained
a vigilant anti-communism, and spoke much of the civil rights of all i ts
citizens.

Liberal peace activism was notably different than the radical

practi ce, which advocated unilateral disarmament by the United States.

Signifi -

cantly. liberals put great emphasis on their own legitimacy in society, choosing
not to endanger their position in private or public life through the championing
of unpopular causes.

Instead, progressive social change was sought through

manipulating the levers of power in the established pluralist system.
The above description of liberal assumptions can not be used for the
radical activism of the pre-World War II years or the years of protest during
the Vietnam war.

The peace coalition of the mid-twentieth century wa s an

experiment in liberal activism.

Surely. not all members of the coalition were

liberal s , but the movement. as we shall see, was born of liberal ideology and
J

broke up on the reefs of those assumptions.
The underlying hi s torical currents which carried through thi s unprecedented
liberal involvement in peace politics can be di.scovered
1

by

exploring the past

2
07

US peace activism.

A

striving for legitimacy i s one of the key themes

which will appear repeatedly,

Especially keen on this strategy were the

l iberals, who sought to change the system through their insider status .

Implicit

in thi s s tra tegy is a second trend, the danger of the acti vi s t program from
becoming indistinguishable from that of the government.
Peace activists seeking legitimacy often emphasized an lIeasy" issue on
which a victory was achieveable or even imminent, hence insuring "success" and
demonstrating their influence.

However, once the battle was won, the issue

which had enabled support to grow was lost and the numbers in the peac e
movement often dwindled.

A third trend which i s noticable in the history of

the US peace movement is the ebb and flow of activism corresponding to the
presence of crisis and war.

In the ·case of domestic or international crisis,

the activists could often take advantage of fear and confusion to increase the
numbers and power of their voice.

However, when war did break out, the coalition

would be stripped barely to sustenance level. with usually only the religious
pacifist core remaining to reconstruct the shattered movement after the peace
treaty had been signed.
The history of religious involvement in the peace movement goes beyond
lonely wartime witnesses.

Ques tions concerni ng rel i gion and the state woul d

often puzzle the clergy, with different analyses splitting religious opinion.
This lack of unity was not, however, confined to the churches.

The hi story of

the peace movement is filled with examples of internal division, especially when
external events demand the most unity.

The search for a common ground. or

IIlowest common denominator" among all members of the peace movement was often
resolved with the championing of a single issue.

For example, an international

crisis could often draw increased membership to peace organizations.

3

The liberal coalition being discussed was especially vulnerable to this type
of internal division since each participating liberal group had a reputation
to uphold in order to maintain its legitimacy .
The members of the peace movement in any given time frame were usually
discernab1e as members of several key groups.
mentioned.

Religious membership has been

Women formed a second group whose activity was vital to the

continua tion and occasional rejuvenation of the peace movement in bad times.
Furthermore, women's involvement was often quite radical in nature . A third
group of potential activists was the student population.

Hardly a factor until

1900, the gradual po1iticization of collegiate youth was evident in the unrest
of the 1930 ·s . Although the 1940s and 1950s are often associated with a period
of "student apathy," the young members of the academic community would 100m
large in the liberal coalition and in the transition to the radical continuation of the 1930s during the Vietnam War.
activists with a large stake in society.

Finally, there were those

Normally, these elements were non-

existent, but when they did arise, only leadership in the coalition would be
considered.

In these phases, the radical components of the coalition--women,

students , pacifists--would fall under the aegis of the liberal s .
I

No liberal contingent exi sted in the earliest years of American hi story .
During the colonial period, the only IIpeace movement was the religious witness
ll

of outcast sects, several of which remain as the Historic Peace Churches-Quakers, Mennonites, and Brethren.

Among these denominations, the Quakers were

the most politically active, according to Peter Brock, historian of pacifism
in the colonial period. because th.ey were English speaking, and therefore not
i.solated from the society. as were many other sects of Germaic origin.

In fact,

4

Quakers were greatly involved in the legi slature of colonial Pennsylvania .
The Mennonites and Brethren were sects which cooperated with the government
in very passive ways.

Satisfied with the freedom of worship granted them,

no political voice of influence arose from these sec ts, and it rarely does
in the present.

In this period, then, the strength of the religious imperative

to resi st the state was already different among the various peace sects .l
The American Revolution brought the issue of religiously based objection
to a head.

Many Quakers, because of their attachment to British culture,

became loyalists and therefore gained unpopular notoriety after the war.
~1ennonites

The

offered financial asststance to the revolutionary cause in the guise

of commutation fees in 1ieu of service. ranging. from £2.10s to £40.

However,

since the cummutation fee wa s seen as a passing along of one'·s duty to another
by the Brethren and the Utopian Shakers, this option was not open to members
of those sects.

Furthermore, refusal to pay war taxes, to take payment for

seized goods, to take loyalty oaths and a general uncooperativeness by these
groups was an early glimpse of religiously based non-violent resistance.

A

schism in the Quaker church caused by the formation of revolution-supporting
IIFree Quakersll in Philadelphia indicated that internal division was present
even within a single denomination.

A final point of interest of the religious

peace movement of the

period was the number of unattached individual s

R~volutionary

taking stands against the war.

A theme which will recur, this individual witnes s

is often an indication of a vacuum in the peace movement.

In this case, the

support of the war by most churches alienated these individual s , whose stances
against war were all based on the New Testament.
Following the Treaty of Paris which ended the Revolutionary War , many Quaker
loyalists migrated to Canada.

The glorification of the war of independence was

5

harmful to the peace witness of the church, leading to a "1 0ss of vitality "
in pacifist circles for many years.

Yet despite this sectarian silence,

a secular movement, initiated, led and
arose in the early nineteenth century.
plethora of volunteer

societies~

poptlja~ed

in a large part by women.

This movement, manifested in a

gave an organlzationa1 framework to peace

work in a rapidly growing society. Many of the debates, strengths. and
weaknesses that would be characteri stic of the peace movement in later years
can be seen in these vo1un~eer organizations. 2
The first peace societies emphasized local activism, American nationalism,
gradual ism, and complete pacifism.

The New York Peace Society and the Massa-·

chusetts Peace Society were both founded in 1815, by David Dodge and the
Reverend Noah Worcester, respectively.

Both these societies were comprised

maninly of res pectable men; primarily merchants, theologians, ministers and
professors.

In 1828, William Ladd founded the American. Peace Society (APS)

based on the constitution of the Massachusetts Peace Society, which, with
the New York organization, became a member of the APS.
that a large number of women first became involved.

It was in this society

Throughout the 1830s a

debate on absolute pacifism, as opposed to a pacifism which admonished only
"offensive wars ,II raged in the APS.

In 1836, a new constitution passed which

both embraced absolute pacifism and welcomed non-pacifists to join APS.

The

factionalism which arose foreshadows some of the most profound problems to
face the liberal coalition more than 120 years later. 3
"I am not,1I wrote one disgruntled APS member, lIa believer in the Quaker
J

principl e of the criminality of defensive war.

I ought not, therefore , to

lend even the poor support of my name to a principle which I think not founded
upon the gospel, not true, and blasting to the prospects of usefulness of a

6

society .. vJhich I hoped would tend to correct the public opinion concerning
An attempt to rephrase the new constitution met with opposition

war."

by society radicals, who formed an "arrangements committee" which would s lowly
transform into the basis for the new "non-resistance" movement in New England. 4
Founded in September of 1838, the New England Non-Resistance Society
(NENRS) featured abolitionist William Lloyd Garri son as its leader. and was
populated by a large percentage of women.

Notable in the ranks were abolition-

ists Sarah and Angelina Grimke, novelist Lydia Maria Child, reformer Lucretia
Matt, and feminist Abby Kelley.

Also active in NENRS were students, indicated

by a strong pacifist movement at Bowdoin College and a chartered branch of
the society all the way west in Oberlin, Ohio.

In addition to a strong pacifist

sentiment, NENRS was marked by its allegiance to higher authority than the US
government--a stance which would evolve into the "third camp" position of the
peace movement in the middle of the twentieth century.

As opposed to APS,

which paid "dearest political affection " to the United States, the Declaration
of Sentiments adopted by NENRS declared;
to any human government,1I

"He cannot acknowledge allegiance

A foreshadowing of post

~~orld ~'Jar

II world federalism

appeared on the masthead of Garrison's

renowned Liberator: "Our country is

the world, our countrymen all mankind."

Significantly, despite reports of

"Knitting, se'.<Jing and embroidery,1I by women during NENRS meetings, women were
5
accorded equal standing in the organization.
The Mexican War of 1845 was the first war which faced the new secular
peace movement, the result setting precedents which have been followed closely.
The NENRS. already faltering due to the extreme radicalism of some of its
members. was harmed by the war and was dissolved as an organization in 1-850.
The war

~caused

a serious upheaval on the leadership level . . . and a

7

reori enta ti on of its pol icy ina conserva ti ve di recti on.

\I

The wi thdrawa 1

of the pacifist membership and leadership of NENRS led to "the gradual withering of its original vigor and inspiration. " Elihu Burritt founded a splinter
group, the League of Universal Brotherhood, in December, 1845.
which will become important are evident here.

Several trends

Radical groups became more

radical and withdrew from legitimate coalition groups during times of war.
More importantly, a proliferation of new groups occurred to embrace specific
quirks in ideology.
The extreme sectionali st conflicts of the 18505 and 1860s led to a
re-examination of religion' s role with the state . William lloyd Garri son
switched his views from absolute pacifism, along with many others, to the
assessment that "war is better than slavery." Scripture was successfully
lntegrated into the current political thinking, well demonstrated by the
following example of antebellum prose by Lydia Child:
I abhor war and have the greatest dread of military
supremacy, yet I have become so desperate with hope-deferred, that a hurra goes up from my heart, when the
army rises to carry out God's laws . . . I am convinced
that this is the great battle of Armageddon between the
Angel s of Freedom and the Demons of Despotism.
During the Civil War itself, the Peace Churches were able to excuse their
members from military service by the payment of a commutation fee, an option
taken by many Quaker meetings, an early example of the Friends' willingness
to cooperate with the rules of the government.

Many Mennonites and Brethren

strayed from the faith, taking up arms in the war.

The most radical opposition

to the Civil War came not from organized religion but from threatened young
men, who rioted in major cities throughout the United States, most notably in
New York City in the summer of 1863. 7

8

The lukewarm support of the Civil vJar by the American Peace Society
was disillusioning to many members, including Albert Love, who in 1866 founded
the Universal Peace Union (UPU), a secular radical group devoted to the
"emancipation of labor" as a solution to the economic roots of war.

A true

radical coalition, the UPU enlisted the support of disgruntled members of
APS, pacifist religious sects such as the Progressive Friends, Shakers,
Rogerences and Bible Christians, members of non-pacifist denominatlons and
lI

una ffiliated religious liberal s ." Fully one third of the active membership

of the soci ety were women .• incl uding impressive fi gures such as Susan B.
Anthony, Lucretia Mott, Belva Lockwood (the first woman to stand for the
US presidency), and Lucy Stone.

Foreshadowing the work of the Committee

for No-n-Violent Action which would emerge in the late 1950s, UPU advocated
that the United States take a moral lead in the -world through unilateral
disarmament.

And, similar to the later work of the Women's International

League for Peace and Freedom, UPU attempted to change the emphasis of the
educational process to a more peaceful view.

UPU never attracted an impressively

large membership and the organization enlisted such bellicose honorary vicepreSidents as Will iam H.
Porfirio Diaz.

Taft~

El ihu Root, and Mexican dictatorial president

However, UPU wa s significant in its message and method.

The

radical call for a conversion of society through non-violent means was in
direct opposition to the policies of the faltering legitimate APS.

Further-

more, the transformation of Garrisonian non-resistance into a Tolstoyian
non-violence is apparent as an undercurrent in the Union's peace literature ,
with UPU even issuing reprints of that Russian ' s work.

Unfortunately for

the future of UPU, the Spanish-American war broke out in 1898. Their immediate
opposition was met by an effigy burning of Love in Philadelphia . The US' s entry

9

into the imperialist club was met with limited and feebl e opposition from
radical and pacifist circles, marking the genesi s of a brief legitimate
coalition of anti-war activism. 9
The centrist coalition which arose can be classified into three groups;
(1) the generalists, who espoused broad, vague plans of negotiated !Jeace.
(2) the world federalists, who urged the end of national sovereignty in favor
of a world government and l egal system and (3) the legalists, who favored
more successful negotiation of international confl icts through a world court .
None of these

refo~ming

trends can be .considered radical.

All were causes

acceptabl e to society taken up by upstanding citi zens, mostly men.

The first

noticeabl e manifestation of this brief centri s t coalition was the Pari s
international peace conference of 1889, where the American delegation showed
an obvious favoring of the English as allies. The 1899 Hague conference,
one
called by the Russian government according to author due to their "sagging
artillery." was aimed at 'the legalist solution to world tension.
provisions for disarmament were made at this conference.

No real

The popularity of

the peace conference movement and legalist philosophy is evidenced by the
establishment of forty-five new societi.es with these goal s in the fir st
fifteen years of the 1900s. l0
Certain problems which faced the legalists in the late nineteenth century
are analogous to situations which would ari se in the mid-twentieth century
coalition led by the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE).
The elitism of the movement was striking.

The establishment of the Andrew

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), based on $10 million of
United States Steel bonds, along with Carnegie's presidency of the New York
Peace Society must have severely limited the level of the coalition ' s social

10
criticism. Many other business leaders were involved in the upper echelons of
the legalist program.

No lip service was paid to true internationalism since

United States nationalism wa s felt and spoken of strongly by members of thi s
early legitimate coal Hion. ll
Despite the 1egitima te route of the majority of peace workers in the
period following the Spanish-American War and preceding the Great War, the
seeds for the future were

bel~ng

planted especially by those Americans influenced

by the writing of Count Leo Tolstoy.

A Tolstoy Club was founded in Boston

in 1899, while several well-known citizens in the US were influenced by and
disseminated hi s ideas.

Both William Jennings Bryan and Clarence Darrow were

examples , although Bryan reluctantly supported the Spanish-American War.
Tolstoyites, including the international lawyer Ernest

H.

Other

Crosby, were critical

of American imperialism , as was Jane Addams, a radical feminist who criticized
lithe pathetic belief in the regenerative results of war.,,1 2
II

It was Jane Addams, Lillian Wald, and other dedicated women who broke
peace activism out of the stagnation of legalism toward a more deep-reaching
critique of society's ill s.

Spurred on by the imminence of international war,

many organizations which still exist today were founded in the 1910s.
new breed of peace groups included the

\~omen ' s

Thi s

Peace Party (1 a ter the Women' s

International League for Peace and Freedom), the Fellowship of Reconciliation
(FOR). and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC).

Although Worl d

l~ar

was a temporary block to these new groups, they emerged 'ill 'surprisingly good
health from the experience.

A continuation of conservative. legitimate peace

activism, the government's use of peace issues to their own advantage, and a
right-wing backlash aimed at the extinguishing of the radical peace witness
are apparent trends in the period 1914-1933.

I
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Thi s was the true beginning of the Modern

Ameri~an

a trial period for the radicalism of the later 1930s.

peace movement and
Peace groups began

to analyze war as a symptom of the greater ills of society.

Attempts were

made to organize many sectors of life in the US by educating the populace
in a new light.

These groups explained that certain sectors of society could

gain great advantage from the war system, while the laborers lost their
possessions and their lives.

In a sense, the new activism waS radical by

definition, since it dealt with overthrowing the existing order of ideas.
The liberal experimental coalition would undergo difficult times due to the
radical nature of the new peace analysis.
Religious peace activism underwent drastic changes in the WWI period.
In contrast to the days when only the peace churches spoke against militarism,
more denominations became involved with the founding of the Fellowship of
Reconcilation (FOR) in November 1915 as an offshoot of a London organization
of the same name.

An indication of the political leanlngs of the original

FOR was the executive secretaryship of Norman Thomas, later the Presidential
candidate of the Socialist Party, USA.

In 1929, FOR decided to put more emphasis

on politics, followed by a 1934 reaffirmation of non-violence as its mean toward
change.

This radicalization and political awakening of religious groups was

not the entire story of religious activity in this era.

For example, Reinhold

Niebuhr. an influential Protestant clergyman. discarded radicalism. switching
his politics away from pacifism in 1934.

The American Friends Service Committee

(AFSC) cooperated with the government' s Selective Service legislation of WWI.
gaining conscientious objector status for Friends while participating in relief
and ambulance work. 13
One pacifist during thi s time commented that women "constitute the backbone
of the peace movement in America. " Indeed, women emerged in this period as a

12

strong radical force with the founding of the

~lomen

I

s Peace Party, the Homen s
I

Peace Union, the American Union Against Militarism , and the Women' s International League for Peace and Freedom.

Henry Ford found enough merit in their

work to finance a "peace ship,1I support he withdrew with the US declaration
of war in 1917.

These womens' campaigns were founded on the basis of radical

social reform, not temporary al liances and treaties :

Some women, rather

than working from outside the power structure, attempted to gain entry.

~JILPF

initiated a Vlashington lobby campaign and the consideration of the women ' s new
vote was strong among professional po1iticians. 14
A reaction to the initial successes of radical peace activism wa s evident
as both radical and legitimate groups came under attack by a right-wing
resurgence immediately preceding World

\~ar

I.

New strength in groups such as

the Ku Klux Klan and the American Legion in the domestic sphere and the
isolationist America First Committee and the Committee to Defend America on
the international scene were challenging opponen ts to peace activists.

Executive

branch actions, such as the censorship of FOR periodical, the World Tomorrow,
indicated that radical opposition to US intervention in Europe would not be a
popular or comfortable stand.

The legislators issued similar sentiments by the

passage of the Espionage Ac t in 1917 and the Sedition Act in 1918 which curtai l ed
civil liberties.

This type of attack on radical elements is certainly not

uncommon during times of war, however, the significance to the peace movement
is evidenced by its own fragmentation.

Without a unified stand on the war and

the social and economic pitfalls which faced the world, th e peace movement stood
vulnerable to the splitting effect of the right-~ing wedge . 15
Developments which harmed the pre-WW I peace movement as much as the
right-wing resurgence were moves by the US government and conservative elements

13

tov/ard a negotiated peace movement which took even more of the sting out
of religious, pacifist and femini st efforts to reform a militarist society.
The interwar period was filled with examples of idealistic treaties, conferences,
and agreements.

The Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921-1922 was

genera lly successful in its goals, yet the reasons behi nd the passage of its
rOesulting treaty were nationalistic, with the US achieving naval parity with
Great Britain and superiority over Japan.

The acclaim the treaty received

from peace workers served to attentuate more radical solutions being considered.
The Locarno agreements of 1924, in which the League of Nations guaranteed
certain frontiers in Europe, seemed a step toward rational international
behavior, yet the breakdown of the League in the 1930s proved that such hopes
were premature.

After some initially approving debate , the Senate finallY

rejected the World Court, indicating the lack of willingness of international
powers to surrender any sovereignty whatsoever.

Finally, in a massive lIinter-

national kiss,1I the Kellogg-Briand Pact formally outlawed war as an instrument
of national pol icy in 1928.

This treaty was approved by the US Senate in

January of the following year by a vote

of 85-1.

The success of such an empty
16
measure in diverting the power of peace activism i s evident.
As conditions worsened in Europe, the US peace movement stepped up its
ac:tivity.
of

Despite alack of response to the 1933 Japanese aggressive invasion

r~anchuria,

by 1935, the !y.'adical peace movement was at its height of pO\,/er .

The theory of non-violence \'/as becoming popular to some Westeners through
studies of Mohandas Gandhi's work in India.

A coalition of pacifists, laborers,

socialfsts, communists, students, women, and blacks arose in the 1930s to work
against war.

So influential was their

mess~ge

and so threatening were the war

clouds ga thering over Europe that ina survey taken in February 1937 asking

J

lI if another war like the World

~Jar

develops in Europe. should America take part

14
again," ninety-five per cent answered "no ."

In The Power oi.NQn.ViQlence.

published in 1934, American Ri·chard Gregg, a western disci"ple of Gandhi .•
provided a working primer for the aspiring non-violent activist.

By employing

"moral jiu-jitsu," Gregg explained, one could convert society rather than
trying to stop war in a society which depended on that foul event for its
economi c well-being.

Gregg was indeed a radical, indicated by his asse rtion

that sedition is morally acceptable if pursued through non-violent means.
Using faith in this new weapon and the general fear of war throughout the
United States, the pacifists were able to form a leftist coalition for several
years in the second half of the 1930s. Although a centrist coalition formed
around the Emergency Peace Campaign of 1935, the pacifist group was both
numerically and mometarily stronger. l ?
A key member of the leftist coalition was the National Council for the
Prevention of War (NCPW), which foreshadowed the Turn Toward Peace effort of
the early 1960s in its efforts to coordinate the work of pacifists, nonpacifists and labor into a coherent peace movement.
loudly in favor of a "united front" against war.

The Communist Party was

The Socialist Party, too,

threatened a "general strike ll if war was ever declared in the United States.
Pacifists such as Devere Allen, who wrote the 1934 platform, and Norman Thomas,
who represented the SP for the presidency were influential in the party.
Although many labor unions were opposed to the work of the leftist peace
coalition, several unions did participate in anti-war demonstrations. l8
Women were actively involved in the leftist coalition of peace work in
the mid-1930s.

Jeanette Rankin, the only member of the United States House of

Representatives to vote against entry into World War II, was the Washington
lobbyi st for NCPW.

The WILPF wa s strong, with over thirteen thousand members

15
in one hundred and twenty local branches in the United States alone.

That

organization's lobbyist, Dorothy Detzer . was largely responsible for the
Nye Committee investigation of the role of the munitions industry in the US' s
entry into WWl--the so-called "Merchants of Death" controversy.
five hundred young women at Vassar

College~

In 1934,

led by the president of that

institution, marched in full academic regalia through the street of Poughkeepsie, chanting anti-war slogans. 19
Indeed, students made up a considerable part of the coalition' s constituency .
The American Student Union , founded in 1935, was the first non-socialist campus
group with a large following.

The Oxford Pledge Movement of 1936-1938 was an

effort to have all young persons swear not to serve in the armed forces .

In

1937, some 500,000 students nationwide participated in anti-war "strikes. "
Although this opposition to miliarism would wane greatly with the onset of the
Second World

War~

the possibility of a strong and radical student activist

movement had been demonstrated.

And it will be the student movement which

forms the tenuou s link between the ' experimental liberal coalition of the 1950s
and early 1960s and the radical anti-Vietnam movement of the later 1960s. 20
A final member of the leftist coalition was the black community.

In the

1950s and 1960s the civil rights demonstrations would help radicali ze young
activists , their new political choices carrying over to anti-war issues.

The

origin of the radical black movement is traceable to pacifist A.J. Huste' s
establishment of hi ,s Harlem "ashram," and continued in the founding of the
Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) in 1942. The first direct acti,on of CORE
was in the White City Roller Rink in Chicago in March of 1942. where black
denomstrators non-violently and successfully demanded the integration of the
facility.

During the second World

l~ar,

some black Americans emphasized that

their condition in society would not be much worse with the victory of Hitler.
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"If we win, I lose," explained one enli sted man, while another offered
his IIDraftee's Prayer

ll
;

Dear Lord. today
r go to war;
To fight to die,
Tell me what for?
dear Lord, I'll fight
I do not fear,
Germans or Japs;
My fears are here.
Americal
The black witness was, as in the more. contemporary period,. waged as a separate
struggle, from other radical causes.

However, the black movement encouraged
radical activism by its striking successes, specifically inspiring youth. 21
Another seedbed for future activism were the locations where conscientious
objectors were incarcerated during the war years.

The Quakers, in step with

their history, cooperated wi th the warring state in order to protect its own
members, helping to draft the section dealing with objection in the Selective
Service and Training Act of 1940, the first peacetime draft legislation in
the history of the United States. The Quakers continued their legislative
efforts through the establishment of the Friend's Committee on National Legi slation (FCNL) in 1943.

Further cooperation came with the setting up of

alternative service programs, namely the Civilian Public Service (CPS) camps.
Although originally praised by pacifists as a constructive alternative to
combat service, the program soon displayed its inadequacies.
research and

"Guinea p'ig "

rural conservation work did not seem to the generally well-educated

pacifists a real service to their country.

Furthermore, the lack of remuneration

for thei r work and the mi 1ita ry disci P1i ne of the camps soon 1ed to ou tri ght
rebell ion. 22
\'lalkouts began in 1942 and greatly accelerated thereafter, with many
pacifists choosing jail as a more effective protest against the wartime state .
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~lassive

non-cooperation was reported in the. camps . Organized work strikes

hit many of the CPS locations after the war.

In the prisons, where every sixth

inmate during the war was a CO. non-violent direct action was practiced. m9st
successfully at Danbury State Penitentiary. where a hunger strike was initiated
in demand of the integration of the dining hall s.
ooperation. the demands were met.

After 135 days of non-

Inspired by Corbett Bishop's remarkable

426 days of non-cooperation, one pacifist look.ed to the future;IINon-vio1ent
resistance . . . can be. the bright. strong me.ans of defeating--without war-imperial oppression and aggression throughout the world." One warden attested
to the effec tivenes s of the CO

I

S

beha vi or: "You CO

I

S

may be glad when the war

is over, but not'half as much as I who yearn for the good old days of s impl e
murderers and bank robbers for prisoners." These young pacifi sts would be
the thoughtful radicals of the pacifist wing of the liberal coalition in the
1950s and 1960s, armed with their ne\'/ strategy of action. 23
The history of peace w'itness and activism in the United States through
the second world war contains several key trends which will recur in the
liberal peace coalition of 1954-1965.

Religious activism . usually the only

contingent active during times of war. was often divided against itself. even
within single denominations.
poignant issues.

Secular movements arose to concentrate on s ingle.

The involvement of women in these usually nationalisti c

pressure groups was significant . Cooperation between these organi za tions was
often lacking. as each championed peace through slightly or drastically different
means.

A brief legitimate coalition arose in the early twentieth century

which placed emphasi s on strengthening the role of the United States in keeping
the peace .
Only after the Great War did signs of the modern peace movement ri se to
the surface.

In this period . as in the first several decades of the nineteenth

18

century, the rol e of women as a moral force was vital .

In the interwar

yea rs, a radica 1 coa 1iti on was able to ga i n support through its advocacy of
basic social change. only to be quelled by the second world war.

Finally,

during the war, religious objectors discovered the Gandhian technique of
satyagraha, a method whi"ch would guide the thinking of the pacifist wing of
the peace movement in the mid-twentieth century .
III

A recurrent problem which faced peace movements in the past and which
would plague the liberal experiment was the establishment of alliances.
Inevitably. several sectors of society are needed to advocate a difficult issue .
although they might do so for different reasons.

14hen several organi za tions

attemp t to forge a unit, the needs and ideals of the organi za tions must often
be put aside in order to achieve their common

pur~ose

For exampl e, if one

organization has greater numbers and· financial support than another, should
the stronger group have more input in policy decisions of the coalition? Or,
should a group with mainstream political ideology join forces with a s trong
organization with an extreme viewpoint? These types of coalition dynamics
have not been emphasized enough in exi"sting studies of the US peace movement .
In order to deal with these types of problems, the pol itical science theory
of coalition formation will be employed as an aid.

Based on the mathematical

theory of games, coalition theory develops model s of behavior which can predict
what types of coalitions are most likely to form.

After a review of the major

theories and counter-currents of coalition formation, an analysi s of the
usefulness of this framework will be offered.

Finally. some of the history

discussed above will be related to the exi sting theori es as an illustration of
their use.
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Certain assumptions were made. in all the early game theori es, namely,
the limitation of the game to two players, the "rati"onalitylt of the actors in
the game, the "constant-sum" condition, in which the players had diametrically
opposed goals , and the conditions of winning. which resulted in some numerical
"payoff."

As we will discover, these as sumptions can severely limit the.

applicability of the theory to actual situations.

"Rationality" refers to

the assumption that the players, given that a certain action will maximi ze
their

II

payoff ," will choose that move.

Al though the theory was soon expanded

from two players to the general case of "nll players, the constant sum condition
was conti nued.

For exampl e, in a three person game, suppose pl ayer A wi ns 2

units in a game, then players Band C must lose those same two units between
them.

Payoffs were originally of two types:

"equidivision," in which all

players of a winning coalition take equal shares of the payoff, and the "parity
norm," in which each member receives a s hare in keeping with its contribution
to the coalition. 24
The publication of The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by john Von
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944 was the first formulation of n-person
game theory.

In their theory, that of IIsimple games." the most likely coalitions

to form were proven to be those which will attain their objective (a majority
of votes in this case) with the minimal possible number of members .

The first

major i nnova ti on on the theory came in 1962 wi th the writi ngs of Wi 11 iam H.
Riker, who derived the "size principle." which dealt with the possibility of
the actors being of different importance; or having different "weights. 1I

To

give an illustrating example, suppose group A has 25 votes, group B ha s 35
h

votes and group C has 40 votes.

Majori ty is defi ned by m=

.~ .l. "'~
c.=1

,

+ d where

the w.1 are the weights and d is larger
than zero and smaller than the small est
.
weight .

In thi s case, then. m=51.

Therefore, al l two group combinations , when
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pooling their votes, will be a winning coalition, but A and B is most likely
to form because of their smaller size. Michael Leiserson further hypothesized
in 1966 that as the number of actors in a game increases, the more. likely
coalitions will be those with the fewest members, a result of the so-called
25
II
•
•• 1
bargainlng
prlnclp
e. 11
In the 19705, the formulators of theory came to grips with the problem
of the goal s of real world players.
be wi nni ng the payoff.

In the past the goal had been assumed to

Now, with the "mi nima 1 range theory, II the actors t

goal became to be included in a winning coalition which had views as close as
possible to the actor1s own policies.

In order to achieve this outcome, a

spectrum of views was constructed, interchangeable with the left-right political
spectrum, in which coalitions and individual actors were placed.

In Robert

Axelrod1s formulation of "minimal connected winning coa1itions,1I no member of
the spectrum was skipped in the formation of a coalition.

However, in the

theory of Leiserson, which has enjoyed wider acclaim, an actor whose weight
was low could be excluded from the coalition.

Turning again to an example,

suppose player A has weight 25, player B is endowed with 19 units and player C
is worth 27, with m-51.

Then A and C form a likely coalition according to
Leiserson but player B must be included in Axelrod1s formu1ation. 26
"Von Neumann and Morgenstern had no intention of describing what people
did do," wrote political scientist A. Mazur in 1968, "but rather what they
s hou 1d do if they wa nted to max i mi ze thei r game ou tcomes . The theory has noneII

theless been applied to many historical and current political events.
reasons exist why this application is a very risky practice.

~1ost

Many

crucial

is the assumption of rationality, where experience tells us that in crisis
situations or even in everyday politics, that such an axiom can easily be false.
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Attempts to reconcile the theory with these considerations were undertaken
in the late 1970s, with no definitive formulation emerging.

The constant

sum assumption breaks down when the coalition i s faced with the requirement
of grea ter than a s impl e majority to "wi n,

II

the exi s tence of a veto, or

even the "bandwagon effect," where a coal ition is imminent to the players ,
who all

fl~ck

to join.

U.S. political conventions demonstrate this latter

phenomenon well .27
The consensus among political scientists seems to be that, an applicabl e
coalition theory will never be found.

One author's analogy of coalition

theory to free market economic theory inspires little hope given the limited
applicability of economic theory to real world situations .

Another team of

authors describe the confusing attempts to test theori es by computer.

Many

authors are quick to admit that the theory exists for itself alone, that
political scientists "are not trying to replicate real world coalitions nor
are we trying to gain 'empathetic understanding' of politi cs in groups. "
Why then, study or even mention this politico-mathematical theory of coalitions?
Despite its apparent limitations, the general conclusions reached by the theory
do lead one to suspect that certain kinds of coalitions will be more successful
than others.

Using these clues and historical insight concerning outside

conditions, the theory can be of some analytical help.

As a demonstration, let

us apply some aspects of the theory to the history of the peace movement as
discussed above. 28
The goal, or payoff to a winning coalition will be defined to be the
II

II

influence of agencies of power, specifically the United States government, to
take policy initiatives which are considered by the coalition to be steps
'.toward peace . The goal of the early peace churches was only the protection of
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their own constituenci es from the warring state.
peace churches achieved some success.

In this objective the

The first peace coalition to strive for

the goal as defined above was the group of volunteer societies scattered in
nineteenth century America, particularly in New England.

Their homogeneity

of economic position, Christian ideology, and northeastern reforming zeal
fits well into the closed minimum range theory which predicts that
form among groups close together on the political spectrum.

coa~tion

will

That thi s coalition

was never able to extend its membership to the midwest or the deep

~outh

led

to its demi se , which was spurred on by the crisis situations which most formulations of coalition theory cannot account for. 29
The legitimate non-pacifist coalition of the early twentieth century
was abl e to obtain some victories because of its great "weight." The cooperation
of industrial entrepr91eurs and influential citizens enabled many peace conferences to be held, with the misleading results those meetings produced.

The

"parity norm" system of payoffs was clearly in force here, evidenced by the
healthy continued existence of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
today.

Conversely, the strength of the radical peace coalition of 1933-1938

was due not to the weight of any of its individual members, but to the vast
cas t of characters.

Again, crisis seems to have been a primary catalyst to

the crystalization of this coalition, and fortunately for historical accuracy,
this paper will not rely heavily on the coalition theory because of its
l imitations in this context .
A final example of the applicability of coalition theory i s the case of
the incarcerated CO's during the Second World War.

Because of their number

in the prisons, CO' s were able to achieve a victory in some federal penitentiaries . Thus, although faced by armed power, the non-violent res i sters ,
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acting as a whole, were effective.

The same would be true in the Southern

states in the early and middle 1950s.

However, the limitations of the

non-violent resistance strategy when used in society as a wh.ole as opposed
to a 1imited setting would become evident in la ter years.

24

Chapter II.

The Birth of the Liberal Peace Witness

After the turbulent World War II years, peace activism would emerge . but
in a remarkably different form than the radical coalition of the 1930s.
Vocally anticommunist and basing its immediacy on the threat of atomic
destruction, this liberal experimental peace coalition had proponents in
many areas of society.

The idea that the advent of the atomic bomb made limited

war obsolete was widespread in the US,
his

r~issouri

Even President Truman admitted to

neighbors that "war in the future would be sensel ess ."

Yet

despite this agreed lowest common denominator, many different approaches
to world

peace arose in the post-war years.

In the dark times of domestic

repression and international tension that would follow, only the most nationalistic options would be considered by legitimate spokespersons and policymakers . Although it was easy to speak of the need for world peace in these
years, specifics often went undiscussed.

A striking exampl e of this political

vagueness is available in the history of the world federalist movement.
Norman Cousins, editor of the liberal Saturday Review, essayist E. B.
White, former Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, labor leader Robert L.
Lund, scientists Albert Einstein, Edward Teller and Harold Urey, industriali s t
Owen D. Yeung, Senator Glen Taylor, Representative Jerry Voorhi s , and writer
Upton Sinclair, to name just a few, were strongly and
the world federation.

publ~cly

in favor of

The diversity in the group of world federalist proponents

is an indication of the lack of concrete policy behind that ideology.

Some ,

like President Truman. never intended to give up any US sovereignty, yet he
remarked to one audience that "it will be just as easy for nations to get
along in a republic of the world as it is for you to get along in the republic
of the United States. " Others, like Congress person Helen Gahagan Douglas,
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who claimed that "Hiroshima made me a pacifist, " profoundly changed their
politics in the nuclear age.

Despite the vagueness of world federalist

r hetoric, by 1949, seventeen state legislatures had passed resolutions calling
for moves by the United States to bring about such an arrangement.

A Senate
resolution to the same effect was co-sponsored by seven members in 1947 . 1
United World Federalists (UWF) was the organizational result of the new
ideology.

The members of this organization would later be the first to become

involved in the liberal peace coalition experiment and the National Committee
for a Sane Nuclear Policy '(SANE).

UWF was founded by ex-marine and summa

cumme laude Yale man Cord Meyer, Jr. in 1947 as an outgro\,/th of the National
Planning Committee of the American Veteran's Committee.

This organization

not leftist, evidenced by its rejection of a membership bid by Ronald
Reagan due to that actor's "radical" po1itics. 2

\'/as

UWF, by 1948, had over 40,000 members located in 659 local chapters
nationwide.

Despite a Madison Square Garden rally which attracted over 8000

participants, the organization was not successful in-. attracting radical elements
into its ranks due to its extreme US nationalism.

On a radio interview, for

example, UWF president Meyer advocated world federalism, but also spoke of the
rearming of the United States in the interim period.

The UWF continued to

play both sides of the issue, including an excited endor?ement of the Korean
War as a "police action," until 1950 when they were cited as a "subversive"
organization by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The growing tensions

associated with the Cold War had made cooperation of any kind with the Eastern
bloc unthinkable.

By 1951, all the .states which had passed world federalist

resolutions had repealed them.
the current wisdom:

A 1952 Connecticut newspaper headline spoke

"World Government Means Communism. u3

United World Federalists became an anti-communist hot bed for liberals
looki,ng for a, road to peace.

Led by editor Norman Cousins, who assumed the
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presidency in 1952, UWF worked its way into anonymity during the darkest
years of the Cold War.

Cord Meyer, Jr . left the organization in 1953 at

the urging of Allen Dul l es to become a CIA agent, thereafter experiencing
one tragedy after another in both his professional and personal lives.

The

rise and fall of UWF and Cord Meyer. Jr . was an early example of how activists
who work closely with established power in the US quickly become indistinguishable from government spokespersons.

This
suffered by SANE in the next decade. 4

co~opting

would be the same fate

I

Religious pacifism after the world war took on a decidedly liberal tone.
Inspired by the Steps toward legitimacy al l owed by the awarding of the Nobel
Peace Prize to Emily Green Balch of WILPF in 1946 and to the American Friends
Service Committee in 1947, the religious groups increas,ed their activity in
traditional methods.

The Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL)

was bu sy lobbying against the 1948 Selective Service Act (to no avail), implanting that group as a permanent fixture in Washington as the first religious
lobbying organization.

FOR was able to turn toward liberalism and go on

record against the tactics of civil disobedience due to the withdrawal of
exhausted CO' s.

FOR's part in the anti-Universal Military Training campaign

of 1947-1948 was significant.

Later, thi s effort was described by pacifist

A. J. Muste as lithe only case where really effective coordination of pacifi st
force s and near-pacifists was achieved." 5
An early coalition of religious groups was the Consultative Peace Counci l
(CPC).

CPCwas an offshoot of the conservative Foreign Policy association in

the post World War I years, a group which was broken up by "bloc tactics"
among certain organizations . Further demise wa s inspired by the departure
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of their dynamic leader, James

~1cDonald.

The Peace strategy Committee con-

tinued on, meeting in Quaker hotels in the Poconos and Atlantic City, until,
at the urging of AFSC, the more permanent Consultative Peace Council was formed.
Enjoyi ng a very short heyday, CPC "boil ed down to the meeting of the executives
of the most interested organizations.

II

The significance of CPC is mainly as

a trial coalition of groups which espoused generally the same policy
tives.

Unfortunately, thi s period of practice would not make the

alterna~

parti~ipa

ting groups more adept at cooperation during the hard times of the liberal
coa lition to come . 6
Although many religious bodi es were content to fall into the growing
liberal ideology, there were notable waves of radicalism in the religious
world , especially prior to 1948. Many graduates of the CPS camps and the
federal prisons shunned the more traditional FOR and cast their lots with
the War Resisters League

(WRL) ~

This influx of young radicals led to the

resi gnation of the executive secretary and ACLU member Abraham Kaufman.

WRL

soon published literature openly advocating non-registration for the draft
and non-payment of war taxes.

Socialistic pacifism was the intent of the

Commi.ttee for a Non-Violent Revolution (CNVR) of which one member, David
Dellinger, suggested, lIa mass invasion of A&P supermarkets by housewives with
hungr y fami 1i es, for the express purpose of emptyi ng the shelves [as] a good
way of keeping down the profits of the masters,,,7
An organization which was less Marxist in its outlook whil e maintaining
its

radicalism was the Peacemakers, founded in late 1947 and devoted to

tactics of resistance and civil disobedience . Tax refusal and draft non"r egistration were the most common forms of action by this group.

A. J.

~1uste ,

a Dutch reformed minister who was a founding member of the Trotskyis t Worker' s
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Party, USA, in the mid 1930s, and who converted to Quakerism in 1936, was
an influential Peacemaker.

His essay Of Holy Disobedience, written in 1952,

was an early call to non-violent direct action in order to achieve broad
social change.

Urging pacifists to lead the way by refusing cooperation with

the state, Muste queried: "why should they {the state] think there is any
reality, hope or salvation in peace advocates. who when the moment of decision
comes also act on the assumption that they "have no choice" but to conform?1I
Although

~1uste

was writing in a time darkened by the draft legislation of 1948,

the final defeat of Henry

~Jallace's

politics, the advent of NATO, the Korean

War, and a period of domestic suspicion and persecution, his call would be
listened to and referred to often in the years to come. S
If the pacifists had a powerful witness but no

audience ~

of the time had an anxious audience and a mixed opinion.

then the scientists

Although many con-

cerned scientists, particularly the physicists who were involved in the Manhattan project, organized to advise the government to internationalize atomic
energy, an equally vocal and inflential scientific contigent adopted the
government's anti-communist line.

If any group had the legitimacy, progressive

political leanings and numbers to rallyan anti-war movement, it was the
scientists.
The first organized effort by scientists in opposition to the bomb was the
issuance of the Franck report by three physicists, three chemists and a biologist at the Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory urging the United States not to
employ the weapon militarily against Japan.

An lIinterim committee" appointed

by President Truman to study the Franck report presented the White House with
an opposed viewpoint.

IIWe can see no acceptable alternative to direct military

use,1I concluded the report.

A survey taken at the Chicago faci l ity indicated
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that the majority of scientists there agreed with the views of the interim
The bomb fell, and those with strong anti-bomb opinion, struck
with moral pangs, became more active. 9
committee.

Led by Eugene Rabinowitch, the periodical Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
made its first appearance in 1945 .

In November of that year, the Federation

of Atomic Scientists was formed lito promote the use of scientific discoveries
in the interest of world peace and the general welfare of mankind."

Its first

fight was against the May-Johnson bill pending in Congress which would have
given control of atomic energy to a military committee . Spearheaded by physicist
Leo Szilard, the scientist's campaign gained a hearing against the bill, which
was eventually defeated . Scientific politically oriented organizations grew
widely once the ice of public speaking had been broken by Szilard, including
the Federation of American Scientists, and the Association of Los Alamos
Scientists.

The government, in an effort to keep the "eggheads

in the fold,

II

established various basic research funding agencies, most notably the National
Science Foundation and the Office of Naval Research. 10
Despite this flurry of activity, pacifists were outraged at the scienti sts '
col l usion with the national security state . A. J . Muste urged the scientists
to refuse to manufacture atomic weapons at all.

He hoped that they would IItake

upon themselves the awful responsibility of being prophets, conscientious
objectors, persons, whole human beings, and not technicians or slaves of a
war making state, albeit a heavy-hearted and unenthusiastic one.

1I

Some scien-

tists attempted the non-cooperation which Muste suggested. Mathematician
and missile expert Norbert Wiener of MIT publicly refused to give information
to a major aircraft corporation.

Albert Einstein stated that "non-cooperation

in military matters should be an essential moral principle for all true scientists. lfll
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Overall t however t thi s opposition wa s the minority view.

W. A. Higinbotham t

chairperson of the FASt felt that uif sc ientists were to walk out on all
military -projects they would be taking the law into their own hands just as
surely as the Ku Klux Klan. II

Hans Bethe, later a vigorous proponent of a

nuclear weapons test ban, was afraid that a scientists IIstrike would put
ll

those citizens in the role of dictators of national policy.

Physici s t

Loui s Ridenour felt that although it was udeplorable that our nation is preparing for war,lI he promi sed Unot to attempt to impede such preparations. 1I
This passive agreement carried over to the deci sion to develop a IIsuper-bomb,1I
or hydrogen nuclear explosive.

Edward Teller, dubbed the IIfather of the

H-bomb due to a technological breakthrough of his invention, felt that the
ll

scientists' job was to create the weaponrYt not to decide if and how it would
be used.

The fact that the government felt similarly was made evident by

the security hearing of former head of the Los Alamos laboratory Robert
Oppenheimer.

Many felt that the reason for his prosecution was hi s outspoken opposition to the development of the H-bomb. 12
Divison within the scientific community and increasingly politicized
empirical observations attenuated that potential force, their downfall demonstrated by the development of the H-bomb and the withdrawal of Robert Oppenheimer's security clearance by the Atomic Energy Commission . Although many
members of the scientific community fell into line during the Cold War years
of tight internal security, an opionated anti-military core remained, awaiting
the opportunity to use their uprestige. 1I In 1954, thermonuclear tests were
accelerating in both pace and megatonnage by both superpowers, al though
quietly.

Then came Bravo, a US bomb which was far more powerful than any

exploded before, far exceeding the calculations made.

And on the cloud of

radioactive dust which encircled the globe floated the hopes of the liberal
peace movement coalition.
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The peace movement prior to 1954 was comprised almost exclusively of
re1 igious pacifists who carried their fl ickering 'torch thr'Qugh -cri-ld and dark
times.

The intensity of cold war fears and jingoistic investigations made

imposs ible any broad-based support for programs of disarmament or even
detente.

Fortunately for these persistent pacifists, several events of the

early 1950s made possible a renewed surge of peace thought and activism,
both by the pacifists themselves and later, some liberal-based groups.
Internationally, the death of Joseph Stalin and the ensuing conciliatory
policies by his successor, Nikita Khrushchev, eased frayed U.S. nerves.

The

end of the Koreah war in the early months of Eisenhower's first term also
helped make talk of peace acceptable once again.

Domestically, the fall of

Senator McCarthy in 1954 eased the tensions associated with blacklisting and
enabled civil libertarians to release a sigh of relief.

For the peace move-

ment, however • .the most significant events. occurrences which would determine
the direction of peace activism for the next decade, were the events leading
to the fall-out scare of the mid-1950s.
The realization of the frightening and possibly unnecessary risks of
atmospheric thermonuclear weapons testing was facilitated by a slow awakening
by po1icymakers and citizens to the realities of nuclear war.
MacArthur said of such a war:

General

Jllf you lose you are annihilated, if you win,

you only stand to lose." A top;,..secret report issued in 1955 by the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) of the President's Science Advisory Committee
)

evaluated the nuclear-based defense of the United States and the threat from
the Soviet Union.
.,

."

Urging the President to maintain "a sense of urgency

without despair," the TCP indicated that bombs of almost unlimited size, up
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to liane-thousand megatons or

SO, II

could be developed by both powers.

The

real challenge was to develop weapons small enough to become easily
deliverabl e.

Testing was necessary to achieve this end, concluded the panel,
yet these tests were potentially dangerous to US and world health. 13
Unfortunately for the public, the President and the AEC did not choose
to reveal these potential dangers.

However, appalling facts, newly dis-

covered by the US public, led to calls fora ban on nuclear weapons tests.
The importance of the discoveries was recalled by FOR executive secretary
Alfred Hassler who reminded that lIuntil Vietnam the Bomb was central to all
peace activities." The 1956 democratic presidential campaign by Ada1i E.
Stevenson gave a needed legitimacy to these early demands.

The astonishing

facts about the nature of the radioactive debri s from the ever-increa sing
tests were withheld by the AEC until some mishaps in the Pacific associated
with their Castle test seri es l ed to their discove,.14
The first thermonuclear device being tested in the Castle series, codenamed Bravo, gave a much larger yield of energy than was originally calculated,
a whopping 15 megatons, or the equivalent explosive power of 15 million
tons of TNT.

This was by far the largest hydrogen bomb yet tested, a blast

which was later described by Representative Chet Holifield as 1I0ut of control.1I
Due to unexpected wind patterns and the tremendous amounts of radioactive
pulverized coral released to the atmosphere, 236 Marshall Islanders and 26
Americans had

to

be evacuated from the islands of Rongerik, Ronge1ap, A1inginae

and Utirik, all having received large doses of radiation, some close to the
J

theoretically fatal limit of 200 roentgens.

The AEC was able to dismiss the

incident as relatively harml ess and did nothing to change i ts plans for the
rest of the test series. 15
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On the morning of that same Bravo bl ast. r1arch 1, 1954, the Japanese
fishing skiff, Fukuryu Maru, translated Lucky Dragon, had been prowling
the waters less than 100 miles east of ground zero, well outside of the
announced AEC limit.
later~

The crew spotted the flash of light and a few minu tes

experienced the blast and shock waves.

Although the thought of

il pikadon," Japanese slang for an atomic explosion, entered their minds, they
soon dismissed the idea and resumed their work.

However, many of the crew

fell s ick soon after, and upon anchoring at their home port of Yaizu, all the
men had the classic symptoms of· radiation poisoning,

Their catch, over

16,000 pounds of radioactive tuna and shark, had already been di s tributed ,
causing a national fi sh market scare in Japan. accompanied by a

shortag~

of

The incident prompted a strong protest by the Japanese
government and a public apology by the US ambassador. 16
geiger counters.

In the United States, the nation was presented with extensive medi a
coverage of the incident.

The AEC reported that radiation levels had risen

in the US mainland as well as in Japan, but that the levels were well within
safety standards.

Although the AEC stated that the danger of being harmed

by fallout was about as great as being hit by a meteorite while driving on
the highway, the public heard President Eisenhower admit', that something
had "happened that we have never experienced before," while Secretary of
Defense Charles Wilson reported that Bravo was "unbelievable."

Expecting

reassurance from AEC Chairperson Lewis Strauss, the public became more
shocked when it was revealed that a single H-bomb could "destroy a city."
The situation was further worsened by the release in April of color photos
7
and black-and-white film of a thermonuclear expl os ion.1
The response of the public was immediate and intense.

Respected individual s

throughout the nation urged the government to reconsider its defense polici es .
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A Gallup poll taken in April showed that 33 per cent of respondents believed
there was a good chancel! pf their city being attacked by an atomic bomb,
11

while 54 per cent of residents in cities with populations over a half million
agreed.

However, 54 percent felt that H-bombs made war less likely and 71

per cent opposed the unilateral suspension of testing.

Despite the furor

in some circles concerning the tests, most Americans were content to leave the
defens e strategy to Ike. 18
International response to the Bravo incidents and Strauss · statements
were more emotional and demanding than that in the US.

Indian Prime Minister

Jawaharlal Nehru spoke for Asia, so far the only major victim of the nuclear
age, calling for an immediate end to the tests by both superpowers.

The

United Nations made Nehru s claims even more valid by announcing that the
1

Asian diet made that sector of the world's population more susceptible to
health problems assocated with radioactive fall-out.

Dr. Albert Schweitzer

called on fellow intellectuals , to speak out against the tests.

In April,

Pope Pius XII spoke on the issue of atomic testing, although not making any
specific proposals.

In Great Britain, Parliament commenced a great debate

on a possible summit meeting with the Soviets. Although a resolution to this
effect was defeated by the Conservative majority, aging Prime Minister Winston
Churchill agreed to seek such a conference. 19
Perhaps the most intense area of debate over the advi$bility of continuing
or banning hydrogen bomb tests was carried out in the scientific arena.

Anti -

testing proponents such as Ralph E. Lapp pointed out that although all agreed
)

that the effects of local fallout are very harmful. no one was really sure
about the possible effects of global

fallo~t,

the particles that escape the

atmosphere. only to rain down allover the earth in subsequent years.
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Professor A. H. Sturtevant of Cal Tech predicted that over 1800 birth
defects would occur in the world as a result of the Bravo blast alone .
The most frightening long-term effect from the tests was the increasing
amounts of Strontium-90 in the atmosphere.

This isotope, which structurally

resembles calcium, is taken up by plants and eaten by animal s.

When in the

human system, the substance enters the bone tissue, especially in young
children, causing bone cancer and leukemia.

Many scientists felt that the

amount of Sr-90 in the atmosphere was already dangerous, but the AEC felt
otherwise. 20
As a result of the scientific evidence being made availabl e to the public,
the AEC and its chief scientist, Dr. Willard Libby, released a report on the
effects of radioactive fallout in 1955.

Intended to calm fears, the report' s

late rel ease and admissions of possible long term genetic effects led to a
minor hysteria.

As if to make things worse, the US soon announced a new test

series for early 1955.

Scientific advisor George Kistiakowsky recalls that

these tests were needed to overcome the danger of "single-point initiation"
in the thermonuclear bombs, which might have caused them to explode whil e
enroute to their targets.

The tests, staged in the Nevada desert, gave rise

to a cloud of radioactivity stretching halfway across the continental US,
with many citi es reporting levels of radiation many times higher than normal .
The admi ni s tration and its scienti s ts then unl eashed a m3.ssive publ i c rel a ti ons
campaign to calm the fears of the American public over weapons tests. 2l
.

n

It was after this series that the first of many misleading statements aimed
at a lay public were made.

The Nevada tests were explained to be less dangerous

than wearing a luminous dial wristwatch.

United States News and World Report

claimed that "an H-bomb explosion could be conducted every week for an indefinite
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period without raising the level of thi s substance [Sr-90] ta dangerous
level s . Testimony at the JCAE hearings in April of 1955 minimized the dangers,
f1

prompting one magazine to state nYour Health? No Risk . . . The Weather?
Not Affected.

II

Lewis Strauss's articl e entitled liThe Truth About Radio-

active Fallout" advised persons in a fallout area to "dig a foxhole," remain
there for several hours, followed by a complete bath making sure to "sweep
away radioactive dust . " In general, many scientists were undecided about the
potential dangers of radioactive debri s, s ince much of the evidence was
classified or not yet discovered.

Most preferred to err on the side of
national security at this point, waiting for more evidence. 22
The first surprising piece of new evidence to arrive was discovered by

Japanese physicists who had noticed that the high level of radiation from
the most recent tests indicated that these devices were of a new type: the
so-called fission-fusion-fission bombs.

In thi s device. an added ca sing of

common grade U-238 was added to the more expensive and rare core of U-235
making the size limitation on deliverable thermonuclear weapons obsolete .
In a veiled reference in June, Willard Libby confirmed these suspicions,
prompting the media to entitle yet another weapon, the "U-bomb.

1I

Because of

the increased radioactivity of these bombs, the issue of global fallout
became in vogue once more among scientists, who insisted that more evidence
on the maximum permissible amount of Sr-90 was essential.

The Federation

of American Scientists, a polticially-oriented group formed just after
called for a UN sponsored

~tudy

of the fallout issue.

I~WII,

In December of 1955,

the UN Scientific Committee on Radiation was established, charged with filing
a report by July 1,1958.

The Indian delegation proposed that this committee

be enpowered to issue new maximum limits on the key isotopes, while the
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USSR proposed an outright ban with no inspection.

What resulted, however,

was the US proposal which gave no pol itica1 powers to the committee and
whose report was due so far in the future that the US could virtually set
its own course.

23

A more immediate study was initiated under the auspices of the National
Academy of Sciences in 1955 and was completed on June 12, 1956 . The results
were a great relief to theAEC, since the report minimized the danger from
the tests.

However, the possible genetic effects and the still mysterious

Sr-90 were stressed as dangerous.

Willard Libby insisted in a speaking tour

and articles that the dangers of this radioactive isotope were negligible,
since by the time the substance returned from the stratosphere, its potency
had greatly reduced.

Ralph Lapp disagreed and stated that the level had

already reached the 15 percent satuY'ation point.

Unhappy evidence to his

claims came upon the death of a Brookhaven National Laboratory scientist when
hi s autopsy revealed 1000 times the maximum level of Sr-90.

The swaying opinion

of qualified scientists at this point was demonstrated by Hermann J. Muller,
a Nobel laureate in radiology, who although starting in the AEC camp, .
gradually came about to be concerned about possible long term genetic effects
of radioactive fallout.
had come. 24

The time for an authoritive government investigation

Thi s investigation came in the form of hearings before the newly formed
Senate subcommittee on disarmament under the chairpersonage of Hubert Humphrey.
The committee, comprised of six democrats and six republicans, convened in
)

January of 1956, with special assistant for disarmament Harold Stassen opening the testimony.

Stassen, dubbed IISecre tary of Peace by the media upon
ll

his appointment. spoke of the need for continued testing due to the necessity
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of deterrence as a strategy. the existence of a deliverable Russtan H-bomb,
and the successful propagandizing of the issue thus far by the Soviets.
Secretary of State Dulles enunciated the diplomatic line that a test ban
without comprehensive and fool-proof inspections would never be accepted by
the United States.

The Soviet Union ' s response to this argument was that

the US re'fused to link the test ban with long term goals of disarmament. 25
A summary of the many bomb tests that were taking place during these
years may help put the debate in the perspective of the time.

Each year.

both the superpowers set off at least one seri es of thermonuclear explosions
The early ones were especially damaging with respect

in the atmosphere.

to fallout yield since they were generally detonated on towers not far
from the surface of the earth.

Later, when the devices were dropped from

planes in high altitude air bursts, the amount of debris sucked up from
the earth was reduced.

In the spring of 1954, the fateful Castle series

took place, initiated by the Bravo blast of 15 megatons.
series in the fall.

The Soviets had a

From February to May of the following year, the US

proceeded with the Teacup tests in Nevada, designed to test small "tactical
nuclear weapons.

The Russians detonated several bombs in the summer of '55,

including a device estimated at 2-4 megatons which was delivered from an
airplane.

Thus the Soviets were the first to demonstrate an immediately

deliverable thermonuclear device.
Operation Redwing was announced by AEC Chairperson Strauss in the spring
of 1956 as a Pac ifi c-1 oca ted tes t of "defens i ve wea pons. " The tes ts were
highlighted by a 10 megaton bomb dropped from an airplane.

Simultaneous

Soviet tests demonstrated their possession of a 20 megaton explosive.

They

resumed testing in the summer, unannounced, and upon completion of their
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series called for a test ban.

A possible US propaganda victory was reversed.

The testing issue approached a boil in 1957.

The Soviets commenced

detonations in January that yielded very heavy fallout in Japan and throughout the worl d.

Khrushchev announced the Sovi ets now had a bomb that "coul d

melt the polar ice cap and send oceans spilling all over the world . "
US Plumbob seri es was only atomic in nature, with very low fallout.

Th~

The

highlight of this series was the first underground detonation ever, codenamed Ranier.

The data from thi s test would be important to the upcoming

Geneva test-ban negotiations .26
In May, 1957 Great Britain joined the nuclear club with an H-bomb
detonation on Christmas Island.

The earth's atmosphere was filling with

radioactive dust, the superpowers were increasing in number and showed
no signs of decreasing their rates of tesing, and the scientists were just
not sure about the possible effects of these events.

Certain investigators

went so far as to recommend that all citizens should carry a pocket-sized
radiation meter at all times .

If the time for a peace movement ever
existed, it was in these years of testing. 27

III
Despite the favorabl e conditions for a renewed peace movement in the
early 1950s, the activist groups that existed were not yet ready to come
together as a coalition.

The peace movement in 1953, the year of the first

Soviet H-bomb detonation, was a splintered group of religious pacifists
J

issuing occasional statements on the ethics of US foreign policy and involved
in some educational programs.

The most pressing problem for these groups

was to escape from being labelled "communi st" or "subversive " in their
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activities and to gain some legitimacy tn US society. The Fellowship of
Reconciliation (FOR) was occupied in thi s period with their Food for China
Program, which sent small bags of grain to the White House, urging that the
USsurpl us, which threatened to rot in storage, be used to save the faminestricken mainland Chinese . . Al Hassler, Executive Secretary of FOR,later
theorized that although the Eisenhower administration did not release the
surplus to the starving, the appeal made Ike reconsider a preventive nuclear
strike against the Red Chinese. Such activities led to the red-baiting of
this group, and later threatened its tax-exempt status.

Pacifist leaders

such as A. J. Muste were outspokenly in favor of civil· liberties for
communists, although against forming coalitions with them.

Muste insisted

on a hearing for communists "and all others who dissent from the prevailing
views and increase our opposition to all the various instruments for securing
conformity which are being used so generally today.1I28
Other groups faced similar problems

an~

were devoted to fighting the

same set of injustices, yet Muste and other influential pacifi sts felt that
the time was not ripe for cooperative action.

'IiUnited action' and 'united

fronts' should not be proposed at this juncture,11 wrote Muste in 1956.

"There

is no mutual confidence on which to build such action • . . This means that
essentially discussions should involve individuals rather than organizations
as such." Muste went on to express the concern that a coalition of fragmented and ridiculed extremists "would not impress or engender attractive
power.

II

What the pacifist groups had was faith and perseverance, what they

needed were allies with respectibility and legitimacy.29
The United World Federalists, a group in great vogue immediately following the Second World War, came under vicious attack by Senator McCarthy and
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others after him . World government was often equated with communist domi nation.

In 1952, a congressional rider denied groups advocating lIone-world

government all federal funding.
ll

Norman Cousins, a long-standing member and

president of the organization, sadly stated in that year, IISeven years ago,
when world law was mentioned, people said it was too soon, now when it i s
mentioned, they say it is too late.

1I

Slowly, the group drifted towards

the right where the haven,of consensus and legitimacy awaited them.

Thi s

tactical turn would later be advantageous to the pacifists, who would
successfully form a coal ition with members of · this group to form SANE. At
this time, however, the UWF was not a viable candidate for a peace movement
coal ition. 30
The scientific community was also not yet available for a role in a
potential coalition, despite their findings concerning the effects of lowlevel radiation on human health.

The security hearings of former head of

Los Alamos Robert Oppenheimer in 1954 sent shock waves through the scientific
\'Iorld which not only outraged its members, but essentially informed them to
stay in line with the government. An appeal by Bertrand Russel and Albert
Einstein in 1955 included signatures by eminent scientists in both the US
and Great Britain . Thi s petition warned that the species' "continued
existence is in doubt." A concurrent meeting of Nobel laureates in Switzerland brought forth a similar document.

Yet the scientists, despite their

prophecies and individual statements, were not able to cease doubts about
their own role in the development of these weapons in the first place, and
J

the many confl i cti ng reports on the.; r dangers.

Until further, more con-

vincing, evidence was available, evidence which was accepted by virtually
all scientists, thi s group was not eligible to be' part of a credible coalition. 3l
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Perhaps the best prepared group was the Friends, who had over the years
developed a bold, insightful critique of the world problems of violence through
their tradition of the peace witness.

Speak Truth to Power, published in

1955, and inspired by Robert Pickus, was one of the first statements of
what was to become called the "third campi! analysis of foreign policy.

In

t his view, communism was not absolved from blame for cold war tensions, but
the US was challenged to free itself from the shackles of twentieth century
violence, embracing a new non-violent strategy of defense and freedom
. 32
retentlon.
Pickus challenged al l members of the human community, whether from east
or west, to make moral choices on what he or she could or could not do for
their government.

Again, as in the writings of Muste, the call for individual

witness resounded . To this call there were a variety of answers.

Perhaps

the most imaginative was that of Lawrence Scott, a member of AFSC.

In a

series of open letters addressed to President Ei senhower in 1955, Scott
satirized the deterrence strategy of the US, using the upcoming civil
defense drill in his native Chicago as a springboard:
And what of local city officials? Headline says, "Chicago
city officials ran the wrong way," (They are gone-with the
wi nd as it were.) The Weather Bureau announced that "Wednesday s
Mythical H-bomb would have wiped out the emergency city government which fled to suburban LaGrange Park." Even city boys
ought to know enough to wet their finger and hold it in
the air to find out which way the wind's blowing. I' m not
much of a hand to write complaining about things, but the
loss of 1,321,000 consumers, even if city official s are
expendable, could affect our whole economy.
I

Statements like these could very well alert and amuse the small circle that
it reached, but it could not, and had no intention of, influencing the
President or the government.
wou l d start rolling again. 33

When these became goal s , the peace movement
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Despite. the apparent ineffectiveness of Scott's methods, the issue he
chose to address was becoming a widely discussed one in the mid-50s.

From

the early post-war years, the US had undertaken a civilian defense program
parallel to that of Great Britain during the Nazi blitz .

In the event of

an attack, all civilians would blackout their residences and go inside or
underground.

There they would hose themselves down, bury their clothing,

and resume life as normally as possible.

Mock drills practiced around the

country, like the one described by SC9tt, seem farcical today.

In Beaumont,

Texas, for example, a phone call informed the chief of police that the city
had just been decimated--the number of casualities was placed at 250 out of
the 20,000 residents.

Even with that unrealistically small estimate, it

Has over four hours .before doctors arrived on the scene of the temporary
emergency hospital.

Delays were due to traffic. a confused hierarchy of

command, and a key doctor who could not be reached .

In another drill in

Urbana, Illinois, a man disguised as a downed Russian pilot turned himself
in to the county jail. A national panic ensued, only to be calmed by the
Air Force admi ssion of the "drill. II

It

became apparent that such cl umsy

attempts at preparing civilians and authorities for the eventuality of
a nuclear attack had to be replaced by effective and realistic plans . 34
As early as 1953. the AEC requested more money for civilian defense
than the IItoken $49 million appropriation.
ll

Many spokespersons agreed,

especially the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which called for the need
of evacuation plans for all major cities and industrial centers.

Further-

more, and more drastically, the Bulletin advocated the permanent decentralization of US population centers. The director of the Federal Civil Defense
Administration (FCDA). Val Peterson, told the nation that he could evacuate
the cities, but needed anywhere from 2 to 6 hours to achieve that end.
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~1ost

informed sources knew tha t ICBM technology was in the very near future

and that such time would simply not be availabl e.
associated with the

evac~ation

Even if it was, the panic

of a city, especially if it was a false

alarm, could do great damage to the morale and confidence in government of
the populace.

This type of reasoning led many people to believe that civilian

defense was nonSense, that its only purpose was to persuade the American
population to quietly accept the
thermonuclear exchange. 35

possibility~

In 1953, the War Resisters League

indeed the eventuality of

distribut~dleaflets

to

th~

few who

would take them during the semi-annual New York City air raid drill.

Such

demonstrations continued, including fairly large contingents of students,
until 1956 when 27 pacifists were arrested for their actions.

During their

trial, the demonstrators, members of WRL, FOR, and the Catholic Worker, took
a tongue lashing from the magistrate, who denounced them as "murderers, "
giving them suspended sentences.
during the New York City drill.

Later that year, in July, 19 were arrested
Included were A. J. Muste of Peacemakers

and Dorothy Day of the Catholic Worker .. This time they received less harsh
treatment, with Commonwealth urging that, although they did not approve of
the action, the pacifists should be allowed their voice, in the spirit of
the current CO laws . These demonstrations were an example of the "cutting
edge" aspect of radical pacifist theorY.

By setting the example of non-

conformity and challenging government policy, the pacifists opened up the
issue of civil defense to public debate .

In later years their position would
be accepted by many liberal s and holders of public office . 36
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IV
The event that truly brought the test-ban debate to the level of a
national issue was the democrati c candidacy for president of Adl ai Ewing
Stevenson in 1956.

In April of that year, in an address to the American

Society of Newspaper Editors, Stevenson proposed the unilateral cessa tion
of US H-bomb tests,with no system of inspection, stating the current
scientific belief that any thermonuclear explosion could be detected by
existing instruments.
inherent in

The reasons given for his proposal were the dangers

Strontium~90

from global fallout, the genetic risks to the

human race, and other humanitarian points. Stevenson ins.i sted that he was
not in favor of weakening US defenses, in fact, that thi s proposal was
risk-free since if the Soviets did not follow US's initiative, the US could
start tests again in IInot more than eight weeks . " This step, he continued,
could be the first initiative toward the disarmament that even administration
officials had called for.

The proposal met with charges of irresponsibility

from the Eisenhower administration and IIcolossal indifference " from the
public.

The issue faded somewhat during the pre-convention jockeying and

the democratic primaries .

In August, :despite a last minute withdrawal of

support by former President Harry S. Truman in favor of Averell Harriman ,
Stevenson Won the democratic nomination on the first ba1lot. 37
The Soviet Union kicked off the 1956 American presidential campai gn on
August 24 with an unannounced thermonuclear detonation in Siberia.
J

On

September 5, before the American Legion in Los Angeles, Stevenson made two
seemingly drastic proposals:

one to end the draft in order to strengthen

US defenses, and the other a reaffirmation of his April test-ban proposal .
The draft proposal was misunderstood and created such a furor that the H-bomb
issue received little attention.

The proposal came back into the national

spotlight with the September 14 release of a letter from Soviet Premier
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Nikolai Bulganin offering terms similar to thos e of Stevenson for a test
ba n. This opened Stevenson for vicious attack by Republicans who pointed
out that his proposal was not only backed by the Catholic Worker, but by
the Soviets themselves.

Vice-President Nixon called the Stevenson plan
Eisenhower disliked the democratic candidate's

IIcatastrophic nonsense. 1I
IIpie-in-the-sky promises,

II

reminding the nation that tests took many months

to prepare for, making immediate resumption in case of a Soviet viola t ion
.
"b,1"1 1"ty. 38
an lmpossl

Stevenson was hurt by the strong rebuttal s which he felt distorted hi s
plan into one of unilateral disarmament, when in fact he favored the
strengthening of US defenses. Accusing Eisenhower of "putting dollars over
defense" in his first term, Stevenson spoke .against relying on the H-bomb
for our safety:

IIWe should not put too many of our eggs in the atomic and

hydrogen basket." . Against the advice of his associates, Stevenson pushed
the issue in his October tour of the West Coast, reaching what in retrospect
was the high point of support for his candidacy.

Working with this momentum,

he prepared a nationwide television address entitled liThe Greatest Menace
the Worl d Has Ever Known," to be presented October 15. Appeari·ng wi th the
candidate, and speaking in his favor, were Senator Clinton Anderson, chairman
of the JCAE, and Senator Stuart Symington, noted for his expertise on defense
issues.

Stevenson noted the dangers from Sr-gO and the support in a ban

we would receive from our allies, England and France.

The Stevenson campaign

began to put the incumbent on the defensive in the issues of peace that had
i n the past belong exclusively to Eisenhower. 39
Stevenson's victory was very brief as the Soviet Union again interrupted
the campaign.

On October 19, 1956, a letter from Marshall Bulganin was made
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publi c , restating his favorable view of a test ban while making a thinlyveiled favorable refe.r e.nce to the candidacy of Stevensan . Chief Soviet
delegate Arkady Sokelev made a simultaneaus statement to the United Nati.ons.
This intentianal bad timing met with a stern response from Eisenhower who
resented the Hinterference by a foreign nation tn our internal affairs."
As for Adlai Stevenson, the Soviet' s support of his plan practically ruined
his bid for the presidency.40
International influences continued to be important in the 1956 el ection
as the Suez crisi s developed during the summer.

With the exchange of nuclear

threats by the superpawers, the world became aware of the real and immediate
possibility of total annihilation.

Eisenhower' s past as a military leader

must have helped him during this crisi s , which gave him a chance to. show
his leadership qualities.

Furthermore, the. Soviet's violent crushing of

the Hungarian uprising made the thought of cooperating with that nation a
rarity in American thought.

Stevenson was all but finished.

When the votes

were counted, Eisenhower came aut an top in forty-ane states in a landslide
victary.41
Neither Adlai Stevenson nar the issue af nuclear weapons testing vanished
from the news media in the earlymonths ofEis.enhower' s second term.

In a

February 5, 1957 issue of Look magazine, the loser in the election claimed
that the National Security Council had suggested a test ban plan similar to.
Stevenson ' s in the September
program.

precedin~

the April articulation of his awn

He hinted that Eisenhower's opposition to his campaign plan was

)

political expediency taken at the risk of world health and possibly increased
world security.

Stevensan appeared to the nation again on a May 5 "Heet the

Press" where he criticized the Republican's policy of "contamination without
representation. II

In the summer of 1957, both the rel ease of a JCAE heari n9
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on the effects of radiation and s tatements by several internationally
influential figures gave added credibility to Stevenson's stance.

The

Soviet announcement of a reduction by 1.2 million of their army gave the
added impression that it was high time for someone in the US to act in
favor of nuclear disarmament. 42

v
The group to s.o speak was formed by the needed merger of pacifists
and liberal s a t the initiation of Lawrence Scott.

Scott arranged a small

meeting in Philadelphia in the spring of 1957 to put an end to "radiation
suicide . "

Organizations represented included CCCQ, Methodists, FCNL, WILPF,

Mennonites, FOR, and the Baltimore Peace Center.

Many of these organizations

were already fnvolved in tes t-ban work, the nature of which they revealed
at the meeting.

Influential liberals attended subsequent meetings at the

Overseas Press Club in New York City.

The organizational result of these

meetings was the Committee to Stop H-bomb Tests.

Scott's "Memo One-Shared

Thinking," of April 30 set the tone for both SANE and CNVA in future years.
A three prong a ttack was proposed:

an educa ti ona 1 dri ve, lobby; ng efforts

in Washington and the UN, and direct Gandhian action against the tes ts
themselves.
Scot~
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expressed that both pacifists and non-pacifists should work toward

the common immediate goal of a cessation of the tests, noting that such cooperation would be necessary to achieve the necessary end of a test cessation:
)

For years we pacifists have been members of an unacceptabl e
minority, not to mention the occasional repression or
persecution. Now we have come into the pacifist age and
era. We enter that era with an inferiority complex which
i s not the same as the spiritual grace of humility. This
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infertority complex manifests itself in at least two
ways. In some it takes the form of i.nner obe; sance to
men of power and prominence, particularly if these men
be liber~ls whom we cari conscientiously admire. In some
it manifests itself by lack of appreciation, and even
contempt in some cases, for men of prominence who are
liberals. In the one case it results in a false humility
which causes us to betray the deepest insight men h.as
been granted--the relevance and power of love and nonviolence. In the latter we just as surely betray our
deepest by the resul tant bitterness and functional
ineffectiveness.
He therefore suggested that the leadership of the group should be able to
work with advocates of both methods, while also pointing out that a separation
of the methods was advisable.

By May 7, the dual chairpersonage of liberal

NOrman Cousins, UWF member and editor of the Saturday Review, and pacifist
Clarence Pickett, Secretary Emeritus of AFSC, was established . The group.
which was .to be working with the traditional methods of political lobbying
and education, was renamed the Nationa1J Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy .44
The first actions and statements of SANE; as it became known. demonstrated an American nationalism which would mark its entire existence.
Despite some hinting of world federalism--"the sovereignty of the world
community comes before all others"--SANE1s true patriotic colors shone through.
Co-chairperson Norman Cousins editorialized in hi s magazine that 0ur best
1I

chance of keeping a [nuclear] war from starting i s by maintaining a position
of real leadership in the world.
advertisements in the New York
II
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In the first of its many full page newspaper

Tim~s

and in other cities SANE claimed that

what the world expects of America is not just bigger and better inter-

continental missiles and hydrogen bombs.

The world is looking to us for the

ideas that will make this planet safe for human habitation.

1I

The ad con-

cluded with. a call for a nuclear weapons test ban. signed by many prominent
citizens. the majority of whom were non-pacifist . Thi s group would come to
be known as the IInuclear pacifists ."45
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The November 15 ad was received so well that the response was described
at an early SANE meeting as "almost unbel ievable." Al though SANE wa s never
intended to be a membership organization, by June 1958 the group was
represented by 130 chapters throughout the nation , gi ving a total of over
25,000 members.

Sanford Gottlieb, political action director of SANE, writing

in retrospect in 1962, remembers that "SANE gave anxious citizens from
varied backgrounds a single, meaningful issue on which to act--the cessa tion
of nuclear testing." The overwhelming response, he continued, "was evidence
of a vacuum in the American peace movement.

II

Indeed the successful binding

of liberal, pacifist, and world federalist leadership made possibl e the
first broad-based peace movement in two decades. 46
This prospective coalition was not received without opposition, however,
and many of the negative commentaries were in the red-baiting category.
Despite the fact that Cousins warned that SANE and the US "must deal effectively
with the threat of Communism,1I SANE1s efforts to bring a test moratorium to
the world before the oncoming US test series seemed to 'Time lI what the sworn
enemies of religion, liberty and peace itself were telling them to do. 1I

In

fact, concern with possible communist influence within SANE was widespread
in its membership.

Psychoanalyst Erich Fromm, historian Howard K. Beale and

AFSC member Stephen G. Cary all expressed this type of concern to pacifist
and vigorous civil libertarian A. J. Muste in the formative years of SANE.
The overwhelming response to the initial call wa s pointed out as misleading,
since the large majority of respondents were from a honogenous group of urban
middle class citizens.

Fully eighty per cent came from the states of New York,

New Jersey, Connecticut, California, Illinois and Pennsylvania, while 25 per
cent of the total came from New York City alone.
received litt1,e or no response. 47

Ads in southern newspapers
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SANE. from the outset. was intended to be a coalition forming organi zation. based on the single issue of ending the weapons tests:
We felt strongly that this moral demand could not be fulfilled by asking that the US Gov.ernment continue tests
while they negotiated with other governments for a universal
agreement on a testing ban. Such negotiations would become totally mixed with the whole question of disarmament,
inspection, and political settlement. as it is at present.
and might take several years while the atmosphere would
continue to be poisoned for the living and the unborn by
radiation.
.
In order to have enough influence to make such demands of the government,
a search for support from all types of influential citizens and groups was
undertaken.

Norman Thomas . who at 1east at one time was pol i ti ca lly respect-

able, was chosen to write to President Eisenhower for an appointment, at the
same time. lI efforts should be made to talk to the Pope on this issue, lI read
one set of early minutes.

All the traditional peace churches and organi-

zations were involved, with the addition of many more clergypersons from
various denominations .

Television and radio contacts were sought out.

Thi s

group. with its inherent respectability. could actually "speak truth to power"
more effectively than any unaided pacifist group at the time. 48
Lawrence Scott. meanwhile, was more concerned with the satyagraha type of
action at the nuclear testing sites . . His faction of the original Committee
to stop the H-bomb Tests was organized, renamed Nonviolent Action Against
Nuclear Weapons, and allocated a budget of $6000.

CCCO leader George

Willoughby served as chairperson of the new group. while Scott took on the
role of coordinator.

Several proposals were made for the first action .

which eventually took place at a Nevada testing site.

On Hiroshima Day,

August 6,1957,11 pacifists trespassed on government property at Camp
Mercury and were arrested.

Theirs

\'/as

a new type of action, as evidenced by the

response of one on-site official who incredulously asked A. J. Muste, "You mean
there really isn ' t going to be a riot?,,49
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The pacifists ' statements in the Beatty, Nevada courtroom gave a good
idea of the strength of their moral witness and the nature of their assumptions
about the United States and the world.

Lawrence Scott claimed "I have been

led by the Spirit of God in entering the test area," while affirming his
"l ove for America and the ideals for which it stands. II

Bryce Babcock took

more the world citizen approach as he claimed that "no individual or nation
has the right to do thi s [poison the atmosphere], II while Jim Peck. later the
author of a book describing his experiences as a CO during WWII, firmly
stated that the creed of their strategy was lithe spirit of non-violence and
friendship.

II

Although it i s true that

NVAAN~J

advocated criticism of east

and west, the group specifically barred communists from its actions and
frequently spoke of the necessity of US world leadership . 50
Encouraging signs from other quarters made both SANE' s and NVAANW' s
futures appear even brighter.

Linus Pauling' s petition calling for the end

of H-bomb tests was s igned by over 11,000 scientists in 49 countries, including
almost 3000 Americans and 36 Nobel laureates .

The document cited the dangers

of radiation and of nuclear proliferation as rational es for the call.

Despite

efforts by the AEC and the Eisenhower administration to disprove claims of
these dangers, by August 1958. in a poll by the Psychological Corporation,
53 per cent of respondents felt that "radioactive fall-out from the testing
of atomic bombs is likely to injure health.

II

...

Nineteen per cent disagreed and

28 per cent classified themselves as "uninformed. 1I

The percentage of yes

answers was higher in the western United States, the location of the conJ

tinental tests, at 58 per cent.

To the question "if you were given scientific

evidence that 50,000 people might die as a direct result of fall-out from the
testing of atomic bombs. woul d you favor putting a s top to the tes ting of
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of atomic bombs throughout the world? 1I 64 per cent answered yes. with 14
per cent answering no. and 22 per cent lIunsure.

II

It seems as though the

apparent disagreements within the scientific world were delaying a resolution
to the spectre of bomb tests. 5l
An effort to alleviate the international disagreements in science were
the Pugwash conferences in Nova Scotia, the first of which convened in
July of 1957.

Here scientists from both sides of the iron curtain were able

to freely discuss many previously taboo subjects.

The newness was s'ummed up

in the exchange between a Soviet scientist who remarked.

"If~his

meeting

had been held five years ago, Senator McCarthy would have l(tcc6S!ed you 'of
being disloyal and you might have lost your job,1I and the American who assented
and replied. "if it had been held four years ago, Stalin would have had you
shot.1I

Further rumbling from the world of science came from the 18 German

physicists who declared on April 13,1957 their unwillingness to produce
nuclear weapons.

At ' this point. the vital scientific debate was on the side
52
of SANE. NVAANW.• and the newborn coalition.
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Chapter II I - Forming the Grand Coalition
Shifting scientific opinion and subsequent public fears enabled a Grand
Coalition of peace activism to bloom in the late 1950s.

Led by the liberal

National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) and the radical pacifist
Non-Viol ent Action Against Nuclear Weapons (NVAANW), the coalition was formed
specifically to seek an end to nuclear weapons tests by both the US and the USSR.
The cho,i.ce

of a single goal approach was understandabl e in light of the anti-

testing sentiment and information which was disseminated in those years.

In the

time between the bombing of Hiroshima and 1958, stated one report, lithe mega tonnage exploded was equal to the "total body weight of the entire human population of earth.

II

Using the reali za tion of the fall-out menace as a springboard,

the SANE and NVAANW-led coalition was able to pursue a common goal whil e employing different methods to insure that goal

IS

implementation. l

The two leading groups gathered the support of many exi s ting organizations:

SANE through correspondence and 1iterature and NVAANI4 through the moral

imperative of non-violent civil disobedience.

Although the two wings of the

grand coalition cooperated effectively through the first years of their existences, underlying differences began to become painfully apparent . The immediate
and seemingly reachable goal of a test-ban strengthened the tenuous welds
between the wings through the 19505, especially when their work was supported
by government and scientific findings.

The hearings before Chet Ho1ifie1d l s

Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the JCAE made a detailed examination of
liThe Nature of Radioactive Fallout and its Effects on Man" in the summer of
1957.

These hearings featured more than forty scientific witnesses from both

sides of the debate, papers submitted by many others and discussion sess ions
in whi ch open deba te a ttempted to inform the Congress persons of the "facts.

II
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The result of these extensive hearings was to put the burden of proof
on the AEC in order to continue its unchecked rate of testing.

Scientists

from -both sides agreed that "any quantity of radioactive fallout is undesirable. "
The debate focused instead on the necessity of testing in order to maintain
national security and the possible peacetime uses of atomic energy.

The

concept of a "clean" weapon was discussed and generally dismissed by both
independent scientists and those of the AEC.

Such weapons would rely more

heavily on fusion for their heat and blast effects, reducing the
I

inducing fission trigger to a bare minimum.

All

fall~out

agreed that radioactive

yield could be substantially reduced, but never eliminated.

The AEC further

admitted that the "consequence of further testing over the next several
generations at the level of the past five years could constitute a hazard to
the world' s population."
The history of the government' s knowledge of the hazards which were
just coming to light was describe.d, revealing the newspeak term of "sunshine
units" coined by the AEC in 1954 for levels of Strontium-gO in human bone.
Although there was no convincing evidence to set a new dangerous level of
Sr-90, all agreed that a limit on megatonnage per year by all powers would
be advisable.

A 1955 top-secret report issued by the Offi ce of Defense

Mobilization's Technological Capabilities Panel gives evidence of early and
extensive knowledge of fall-out dangers.

Admitting that fall-out "may over

a prolonged period lead to decreased life expectancy," the panel does not
recommend complete disclosure of the potential hazards to the citizens.
Rather, "the public will need to be indoctrinated to accustom themselves to
the fact that low level s of radiation can and must be lived with." The
realization that the AEC was aware of the hazards being discussed at the
Holifield Committee's hearings spurred the Democratically-control l ed Congress
into action against the irresponsible admini stration.
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The most controversial point of the hearings concerned whether or
not a threshold of radiation ex i sted under which injury did not occur.

The

opposing theory, that of "linearity, " reasoned that all exposure was cumulative,
that in fact there was no "safe" level of radioactivity that could be released.
A heated debate between the proponents of the viewpoints ensued, making it
clear that the evidence was not yet complete or understood.

"This is the

broad realm of ignorance which I think we all agree we are in," surmised Dr.
Ernest Pollard, biophysicist at Yale,
great deal of work.

lI

and to escape which we have to do a

I merely suggest again that the conservative thing to do

in obtaining that knowledge is to assume linearity and therefore no threshold."
Dr. Edward Lewis, biologist at Cal Tech, agreed, urging the committee and the
AEC that "the percentage or the number who are expected to be damaged shoul d
be stated, instead of implying that there i s no danger from fallout or that
the permissibl e dose will cause no damage. ,,2
The hearings, despite the remaining disagreements and lack of reliabl e
evidence, were seen by observers as a victory for the spokespersons of a
test ban, since now scientists and legislators were in favor of erring on
the side of reduced fallout, not human health.

Both the Gallup pol l and the

White House mail indicated a shift in public attitudes towards a cautious
backing of a test ban.

Not all were frightened by the new findings, notably

those Hawaiian residents who held "bomb parties" to "latch the atomic fireworks 700 miles away.

The climate of fear of not only testing but of

nuclear catastrophe, was exemplified by the remarkable success of Nevil Shute' s
novel of atomic apocalypse, On the Beach.

In Shute's scenario, the detonation

of some 4700 cobalt bombs had rendered the atmosphere unfit for life, with
the last remnants of human existence gathered in Australia, awaiting their
radioactively induced deaths.

The movie version of Shute 's novel was so
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startling that Karr Harr, deputy assistant secretary of defense, recommended
that cabinet members not see it.

In a backhand way, the novel helped the

government's position, which held that testing was a necessary evil in order
to avoid such a scenario of disaster.

Concerning fallout, for example, the

Technological Capabilities Panel held that lithe resul ts would only be to
add a

m~rginal

number of casualti es to those immediate, direct effects."

However, the work Shute undertook in educating a slowly awakening public was
helpful to the developing coalition of peace workers. 3
Internationally, the never ending creation of amazing and frightening
technology threatened the existing machinery of collective security, enabling
the peace coalition to be heard.

In August of 1957, the Soviet Union

announced a successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
The launch of their Sputnik on October 4 quieted any doubters of their technol ogical expertise.

Meanwhile the US' s rocketry program appeared to be

stalling, with two Atlas mis siles exploding during test flight.

The US would

eventually develop thi s technology in even better form than the Soviets , however, and its existence put the danger of accidental or hastily considered
nuclear warfare at a new high.

Although the development of ICBM's allowed

the Eisenhower administration to emphasize the importance of testing in order
to compete with the Russians, the increasing awareness of the public to the
immediate dangers the world was facing gave a needed credibility to peace
... 4

ac t lVlsm.

I

Cri ses and opportunities faced the infant SANE in 1957 . Strategies of
action had to be decided on concerning not only its own course of activism,
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but the behavior of groups cooperating with SANE or operating under its aegi s .
One item clear from the start was SANE' s policy of exclusionism,particular1y
against corrununists.

SANE's national board urged against cooperation with

any pinkish organization or conferences. In July 1957, for example, the steering committee decided to send uinforma1 representation u to t~e Japanese conference on Nuclear Tests only upon assurances that the meeting was "not a
communist-inspired affair."

These measures were understandable and most likely

advisabl e at the time, when SANE was still an upstart group working against
the grain of accepted liberal thought.

In later years, however, thi s remnant

of cold war policy would prove the undoing of the SANE coalition as a viabl e
political force. S
The importance of the coalition aspect of peace work was stressed by
SANE' s actions during these the vibrant years of 1958-1960.

The vo1umtnous

correspondence of Sanford Gottlieb, SANE's political action coordinator, reveal s
feeler s being sent out to a diverse variety of groups and individual s, not all
of whom were receptive.

Gottlieb wrote to Donald Keys of UWF explaining hi s

work with AFL-CIO in the past and his reasoning that labor was a natural ally
for peace work.

This might have been the case in Europe, but in the US, labor

remained suspicious of what they saw as left-wing activism.

Unlike the peace

coa l ition of the 1930s, labor would not be a part of the liberal-based coalition.
The expanding middle class theory of the US economy as es poused by leading
intellectuals kept labor a conservative force.

Whil e identifying themselves

as members of the middle class consensus, labor was too blue-collar for membership in the largely professional ranks of SANE.

Attempts at rallying support

from the working cl asses resulted in an initial acceptance of sponsorship of
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SANE' s 1958 disarmament conference by the Cooperative League, followed by
a refusal due to lack of funds.

The Committee for a National Trade Policy

declined such a sponsorship.6
The financial concerns of the Cooperative League were echoed by several
other potential sponsors.

Leonard A. Herzenberg of the Federation of American

Scientists wrote that his organization "will be happy to give you any help,
other than financial, to the success of thi s meeting." The Church of the
Brethren, an historic peace church, felt unable to sponsor the conference
until they received more information, and even then were unabl e to contribute
any financial support.

SANE did, however, fare well with religious organi -

zations in this appeal for support.

Organizations such as the United Christian

Missionary Society, Council of Churches, Presbyterian Church, and the Unitarian
Church accepted roles as sponsors.

It is important to note, however, that SANE

did not receive unanimous support from the clergy, as a refusal from the
American Lutheran Church indicates.

In May, the Reverend Daniel Poling used

his pulpit in New York to attack SANE in its works. charging them, predicably,
with communist-inspired activities.

The sponsorship of denominations such

as Unitarian and Presbyterian does speak to SANE' s ability to organize parts
of the religious es tablishment that pacifist groups had had no influence
over.

Conversely, the refusal of sponsorship by the Brethren was due to the

inclusion of non-pacifists in the coalition.?
SANE had mixed response in these early years with more established
organizations.

Jay H. Cerf of the Foreign Policy Clearing House did not

accept SANE's offer of sponsorship, a situation that group had in common with
both the American Association of University Women and the League of Homen
Voters.

The acceptance of the Na tiona 1 Women's Conference is avail ab 1e

evidence to indicate that SANE did, indeed, have some female supporters.
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Many of the female activi sts in these years were involved in the Women' s
International League for Peace and Freedom.

Early SANE was marked by a lack

of female adherents and a use of a sexist language that seems generally accepted
in mid-century political prose. 8
SANE sought out nearly every available ally just right of the Communists.
It appears that no such limit was put on the right side of the pol tical spectrum,
as long as the sponsoring organization was able to embrace the concept of a
nuclear weapons test ban.
The search for SANE alli es by Sa nford Gottlied as undertaken in 1957,
when analyzed in the confines of coalition theory, seems bound to lead to
problems.

Although SANE wished to establish a "winning coalition," or' one

with influence on government, the concepts of the "minimal winning coalition"
and the "closed range" theory predict that SANE' s reach was too broad.

In

the case of the Foreign Policy Clear.ing House, the legitimacy that organi zation enjoyed seemed threatened by a sponsorship of SANE.

If that organization

was to join the coalition, considerations other than peace would alter its
ability to cooperate effectively.

In the case of the Brethren, on the other

extreme, active membership in the peace coalition would be limited by that
sect'sabsolute pacifism and governmental non-resistance.

According to coalition

.

theory, SANE should have sought the cooperation of only those groups closest
to its own liberal stance on the political spectrum, and of those groups, as
few as possible in order to achieve results.
The first National Conference of SANE was held in September, 1958.

Major

events of that year which altered SANE's outlook included the undertaking of
new test series by both superpowers, followed by a test moratorium in the fall
and the resignation of Lewi s Strauss as AEC Chairman, succeeded by John McCone.
The early policy decisions of SANE indicate their desire to gain allies and
legitimate power in thi s time of change.

A debate developed at the conference
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over the role of SANE as a long-range or short-range organization.

James

Warburg and Dr. Hugh Wolfe, members of the executive board, indicated their
desire to see SANE become a foreign policy association, transcending the
testing issue.

A statement by Harrison Brown showed his disagreement, noting

the progress being made in the direction of a lasting international agreement
and the need to press further for a comprehensive system of inspection.

The

Rev. Donald Harrington agreed that the short-term goal was both more effective
in its influence and more likely to avoid lIoverorganizingll and IIduplicating
the work of other organizations." Robert Gilmore of AFSC added that SANE
was an outlet for those who did not choose to join existing organizations
with which they were not totally in agreement.
The policy statement adopted by the first national conference indicated
a broadening of SANE' s goals past an immediate cessation of tests, which was
to occur with the bilateral moratorium in the fall, toward a stand on di sarmament which would justify that committee's existence lIuntil international
control of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved." SANE
' stopped short, however of becoming what Warburg had called "a committee for a
sa~e

foreign policy,1I instead "encouraging established organizations in taking

primary responsibility" in that field of interest.

The other major part of

the first policy statement concerned National SANE' s control over the local
committees. A1though one del ega te had expressed the importa nce of "ferment
of the grass roots,1I the committee felt opliged to demand approval of actions
before undertaken by locals using the SANE name.

In this way, the national

group could keep control over their coalition on the local level, especially
against subversive infiltration by communists. 9
When SANE convened its second National Confere.nce in October of 1959,
the world had experienced its first full year without a nuclear explosion
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since 1944. However, the Ibeat-the-dead1ine" blasts of late 1958 filled
the atmosphere and stratosphere with radioactive debris, causing another worldwide fall-out scare.

The Geneva conference, charged with negotiating a test

ban treaty, was faltering.

Meanwhile, SANE, inspired by the blast-free year,

extended its goals beyond all recognition of their original purposes in an
a ttempt to further its power and i nf1 uence over its growi ng coa 1i ti on.

The

second national conference completely overlooked the controversial local
committee issue in favor of grandiose policy statements.

Whereas a year earlier

talk and agitation for a general disarmament was left in the hands of "existing
organizations," in 1958, the committee felt that "we must make our objective
total di sarmament down to police 1eve1s."

"We have also got to take on a holy

war against poverty," continued Norman Thomas.

"There are other organizations

for this purpos e, but there are no organizations, except this organiza tion,
which are popular, which are made up of people who are interested in peace"
[emphas is Thomas] . SANE now felt obliged to become the savior of the peace
movement through its rapid rise to national prominence.
Robert Gilmore had even bigger ideas for SANE.

Although as a pacifist,

he had to "adjust his views to SANE," Gilmore' s goals were still quite
ambitiou s : "Under supportive action we should take this year I would li st:
(1) universal disarmament (2) universal membership to the UN (3) disengagement
to meet crises (4) conversion to peaceful economies ."

Furthermore, "SANE should

be the catalytic thrust" of the peace coal ition, possible recruits of which he
listed as WILPF, AAUN, AFSC and UWF.

SANE believed that they had gained so

much influence and legitimate power that they could undertake these programs
and be successful.

Norman Cousins summed up the optimistic mood of the second

conference by noting "never before have the people been so responsive,"· and that
SANE "cou1d take proper pride for at least some of these changes (in the world
situa tion) . ,,10
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The year before the third national conference was chaotic on the world
scene, and much of the climate that gave SANE such appeal deteriorated.

The

failure of the Geneva conference to deal with new scientific evidence concerning detection of tests put the successful conclusion of that meeting in
serious doubt.

Eisenhower declared an end to the test moratorium although

promising that the "United States would not resume testing first.

I!

The French

joined the nuclear club with the first atomic detonation in the world for over
15 months.

Finally, the U-2 incident over Russia and Khrushchev's subsequent

tantrum broke up the pending Paris Summit conference between the heads of
state of the United States, the Soviet Union, England, and France.

As if to

tack on the punchline to thi s bad joke of a year, a Senate investigation of
alleged communist activity within SANE was undertaken by Senator Thoma s Dodd' s
Internal Security Subcommittee in the summer.

For the time being, only

policy and coalition decisions of SANE which took place before the communist
~ncident

will be considered, since the Dodd investigation is an issue of a

different phase in the peace coalition , one which will require close examination further on. 1T
At the third conference , held in Chicago in October of 1960, despite
the cataclysmic occurrmces of the previous year. SANE codified the lofty
suggestion made at the second annual conference. unable to cease the momentum
toward a sweeping generality.

liThe best hope for a world without war," read

the policy statement, "lies in the achievement of universal, total disarmament
with adequate inspection, down to the levels required for maintenace of
internal order." SANE stated its belief in including the People's Republic of
China in all such negotiations.

A call for a restructuring of the world' s

economy insi s ted that "a share of the resources hitherto wasted i.n the arms
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race mus t be channelled into the satisfaction of human needs.

1I

Finally ,

lIat the international level, economic and technical assistance should be
channelled through the United Nations to help wipe out poverty, disease and
ill i teracy among the 1ess fortuna te peop1 es of the wor1 d. II SANE made all thi s
policy while fully aware of the changing international climate for the worse
and its own internal problems stemming from finances and local disagreements.
This decision seems to be based on the momentum of successes achieved during
the year, exemplified by a congratulatory memo sent to the locals upon a minor
concession made by the US during the Geneva talks:
where have contributed to a major breakthrough!
point of no return.

II

"You and SANE people everyHopes were raised beyond the

The SANE third conference" seemed to disregard the six

months immediately preceding the convention, choosing instead to ride the
cres t of their initial successes . 12
A report on finances at the third conference described SANE as IIdeeply
in debt" and II strugg1ing on a week to week basis." During the year, s imilar
sentiments were reported in a memo entit1 ed liThe Cri sis Facing SANE.

II

These

financial problems were analyzed as stemming from SANE's unique system of
fundraising at the local level, instead of nationally.

Only one-third of the

quotas from the chapters had been fulfilled in fiscal 1959-1960, leading to .
a call for a "revi ew of the effectiveness of our 1oca 1s ." A 1ack of communi cation between chapters and the national office was indicated, along with a
lack of responsible action among the leadership of the locals. A mimeo communi cation known as InterSANE was established as an attempt to alleviate some of
these problems.

SANE was attempting to relocate the majority of their power

in the national executive board, which although clearly more efficient. took
away some of the force of grass-roots enthusiasm that had given rise to SANE
in the first place.

Slowly, the vitality of SANE was being sapped and replaced
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by an institutional machinery which could perpetuate the organization' s
existence. 13 '
An overview of the techniques and strategies of SANE in these successful
years can give further indication of that group's desire to be at the forefront
of a legitimate powerful coalition.
of SANE.

Education was the most stressed activity

In 1959, the organization had distributed over 40,000 pieces of

literature dealing with disarmament,·nuclear tests, political candidates, and
other information which SANE considered vital.

SANE, then, . worked as a clearing

house for ideas which they embraced as articulated by other organizations.

SANE

was also involved in preparing background papers for political candidates on
issues of concern to' the organization.

Newspapers, magazines, televi s ion and

radio space were filled with "SANE Comment." Contact from the early years with
professional advertising agencies indicates SANE' s awareness of the importance
of public relations.
A second major tactic of SANE was an involvement in electoral politi cs .
Thi s method is best demostrated in the 1960 pol itical campaign.

SANE was then

at the height of its power in a year of a national election which assured a
new administration.

In order for SANE to maintain power and political

legitimacy,

Sanford Gottlieb'recommended that"we must have a clear and dominant voice in at
least one of the major parties." Gottlieb's preference was clear: "Kennedy's
statement of October 9 on nuclear testing and disarmament was the most positive
one made until that point in the campaign." SANE was not interested in presenting its own candidates, but merely in "soliciting responses to key questions
on disarmament and circulating them." Other techniques employed by SANE included
door-to-door canvassing, street meetings, letter-writing campaigns and films,
the latter technique assisted by the establishment of Hollywood SANE in 1959
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under the leadership of Steve Allen.

Thi s emphasi s on traditional and non-

controversial methods is indicative of SANE ' s desire to maintain legitimacy
through its activism.14
If SANE was at the forefront of a growing and mobile peace movement,
who were its subordinate allies? To the press, Larry Scott's infant NVAANW,
while as old as

SAN~.was

a subordinate group.

Coverage of one of their first

actions, which sent five pacifists to the Soviet Union, was given coverage only
in the context of a SANE demonstration at the United Nations.

Other pacifist

activities, notably the Walk for Peace Campaign, which set its sights on
Washington D.C., were cast in the role of SANE offshoot activities.

A major

indication of the power of SANE and its program was the switch of emphasis by
many established groups toward anti-testing activism.

SANE distributed a survey

of established organizations to observe if thi s switch was oCCUrting the results
of which proved that "many organizations have started major educational action
projects against nuclear bomb tests."

Other memos reported that WILPF, AFSC,

FCNL, and FOR were all engaged in tes t-ban work.

~~ILPF

was earnest in its work

in the test-ban field, calling it lithe most critical question facing all
humanity.

II

~1any

religious denominations were active in this area through the

efforts of the Consul tative Peace Council.
announced that
England.

test-ba~

The National Board of SANE proudly

movements were active in Japan, West Germany and in

AFSC was able to cooperate on an equal basis with SANE, a justifiabl e

privilege for an organization a half century its elder . A co-sponsored gathering
of 600 in 1958 in New York City featured pacifists A.J. Muste, Baya'rd Rustin, and
ffiavid Dellinger as speakers.

However, a full page ne\'Jspaper ad entitled liTo

the Men at the Summit," co-sponsored by SANE, AFSC, FOR, FCNL, WILPF, and UWF,
asked that checks be made payable to SANE, indicating adherence to the "parity
norm" method of payoffs, with SANE as the most powerful member of the coalition. 15
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The local committees, for all their lack of communicativeness and fiscal
responsibility, were able to draw important speakers and respectable sized
crowds to their events due to the prestige and legitimacy of national SANE.
Representative Charl es O. Porter, Cemocrat from Oregon and sponsor of a testban bill , addressed Greater New York SANE and 1000 1isteners before flying to
Eniwetok in order to protest the current US Hardtack I test series.

James

Wadsworth, head negotiator at the Geneva conference appeared for the same
local in April of 1959.

Linus Pauling. always available for SANE speeches.

addressed a Brooklyn SANE. enlivening crowds with his estimate of some 75,000
US nuclear weapons already in the stockpile and hi s appraisal of the AEC as
"schizophrenic.

1I

Local originality was apparent in the march of 100 mothers

up Broadway by West Side SANE.

The women pushed carriages and walked with
infants carrying signs protesting irradiated milk and food. 16
National SANE was equally impressive in its list of friends.

A SANE

originated petition sent to the Geneva summit urging the successful negotiation
of a test-ban was signed by Albert Schweitzer, Bertrand Russell. Eleanor
Roosevelt. Martin Luther King, Francois Mauriac, and other 1I1eading world
figures."

A night at Carnegie Hall with Linus Pauling attracted an overflow

crowd of over 3000 in late 1959 . Here Pauling, never the optimist, predicted
that l ess than one million Americans would survive a nuclear war.

SANE was so

legitimate in late 1959 that it used the pro-moratorium positions of President
Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon to offset calls for resumed testing by
Nevi York Governor Nelson Rockefeller and former Pres ident Harry S. Truman.

Nixon proved that he was not the friend of all SANE's policies by announcing
hi s plans to eat possibly irradiated cranberries for Thanksgiving . SANE was at
the height of its power in early 1960, demonostrated by . 1 t~ call for a
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Department of Peace and

a supporting

statement by Nageeb Halaby in that regard.

The extent of their influence was exemplified in a pro-ban statement issued
in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and signed by members of the business,
labor, intellectual, and world federalist communiti es . 17
II

The pacifi st action group NVAANW did not strive, as did SANE, for a sense
of legitimacy.

This organi za tion1s purpose was to provide a positive moral

witnes s to the immoral and amoral policies of the world powers regarding nuclear
weapons and specifically the testing of these devices.

As with SANE, when thi s

original intense goal had been temporarily achieved by way of the bilateral
test moratorium, NVAANW sought to justify its existence by extending its goal s
to those of disarmament and world peace.

NVAAN~J

was also a coalition-mind.ed

organization, although in a very different way than SANE.

Rather than gaining

a large membership and speaking with the voice of a multitude, NVAANW chose to
be voices in the moral wilderness, setting exampl es which would inspire others
to take some kind of action.

NVAANW, like SANE, was never intended to be a

membership organization, but unlike the liberal wing of the peace coalition,
the pacifists succeeded in this goal. 18
Since the issue of legitimacy was not as vital to this pacifi st organization, whose tactics and beliefs were so extraordinary, the question of cooperation with communists took on a different light than with SANE.

While all the

pacifists in NVAANW would have agreed with the civil libertarian views of A.J.
Muste quoted earlier, communists were not permitted to participate in the actions
of the group.

The rationale was that by definition, communism did not embrace

the philosophy of nonviolent resistance as a catalyst towards change.

One of

the bases of the technique of non-violent resistance is solidarity in purpose
and behavior.

If one demonstrator was to incite violence, unprotected and

unsuspecting fellow protestors or innocent bystanders could be injured.

Hence,
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no communi sts allowed . The rule against Communi st participation would become
somewhat more flexibl e in the middle of the 1960s.
indirect endorsement of the Communi st Party.

Care was taken to avoid even

For example, in a letter to CP

leader Gus Hall offering condolences on the death of CP National Chairperson
Eugene Denni s , A. J. Muste hastened to add:

III trust you understand that thts

was a truly personal communication and not one addressed to the Communist
Party, USA. 1I19
An early NVAANW document, IIAction after Nevada,1I written by Quaker Robert
Pickus of California, indicates the coalition-formation by example strategy of
the pacifist IIcutting edge organization.
ll

In an effort to build an lIorganiza-

tional frame,1I Pickus suggests that participants and witnesses of the Nevada
action seek out newspaper editors and reporters, radio personalities, etc., to
gain support and influence others.

"Your purpose," reminded Pickus, lI is to

urge that those who share the concern act to express it." Lawrence Scott added
a footnote to the report which set NVAANW in the role of supplementing the work
of existing peace organizations such as AFSC, FOR, WRL, FCNL, WIL, Peacemakers ,
and others who would not act through civil disobedience.
attempting to IIgo it alone

ll

Thus NVAANW was not

in the jungle of peace activism, although the organi -

zation kept a distance from the other peace groups, even other pacifist groups.20
The philosophy of the original NVAAMW under Larry Scott was one of lithe
application of the power of nonviolence in reference to a limited, politically
realizable goal on which most of the peace movement was working

coopet~atively. "

Its tactics were natura l outgrowths of those used by Gandhi in India, American
conscientious objectors in federal penitentiaries during WWII , and those involved
in the southern sit-ins in the mid-1950s.

Yet these tacti cs had to differ slightly

when the injustice being protested was the testing of nuclear explosives.

Unique

and creative civil disobedience on a massive geographical scale was called for. '

The opportunity came with the Hardtack I H-bomb series in the Pacific
and the voyage of the skiff Golden Rule. 2l
liThe idea was an act . . . an act that could not be bypassed, could not
be brushed aside, could not be ignored, an act that was a symbol ," wrote Albert
Bigelow, skipper of the ketch.
the bomb-test area.

1I

liThe idea was to sail a vessel of protest into

Bigelow was a lieutenant commander of a destroyer escort

during WWII who was morally aghast at the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
In 1952, he resigned from the naval reserve just one month before he became
eligible for a pension.

Converting to Quakerism, Bigelow and his family took

in two of the much publicized "Hiroshima maidens" who had been brought to the
United States for cosmetic surgery.

Bigelow was involved in NVAANW from the start,

being one of the eleven pacifists arrested in the Nevada Action at Camp Mercury.
The crew of the Golden

Rule~

a thirty foot ketch, consisted of Bigelow,

William Huntington, mate, George Willoughby, officer, and Orion Sherwood, who
at twenty-eight was the youngest member of the crew.

After being turned back to

California by a storm, the Golden Rule successfully set sail for Hawaii, the first
leg of the journey, on March 25, 1958.

Upon arriving in May, the crew was served

with a federal injunction which prohibited them from proceeding to the testing
area.

After legal consultation which advised that the injunction was possibly

illegal, the crew decided to sail in defiance of the federal government.
of these actions were undertaken in secrecy.

None

Part of the technique of non-

violent resistance was to inform the powers in charge of all actions that would
take place.

A mile and a half from Honolulu, the four men were arrested, brought

back to land and placed on probation.

Again they sailed, this time the judge

sentencing them to sixty days in jail to prevent a recurrence of their persistent
action. 22
A happy coincidence enabled the saga of the Golden Rule, which received
extensive press coverage, to be transformed from a disappointing episode to a
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pacifi st legend.

Anthropologi st Earle Reynolds and hi s family had just com-

pleted a circumnavigation of the earth in their ketch, the Phoenix.

Intrigued

by the newspaper accounts of the trial of the pacifists of the Golden Rule,
Reynolds attended the hearings, taking notes and consulting lawbooks.

The

Reynolds' found themselves in legal and moral agreement with the pacifists,
with Earle commenting, "If the Quakers can convert a Navy man, they really must
have something!" Convinced by his wife Barbara, Reynolds decided to undertake
the journey into the test site in the Phoenix.

This action by the Reynolds,

Earle a former employee of the AEC, a non-pacifi st and "just not the law-breaking
type," was living evidence of the power of nonviolence and the pacifists' witness.
On July 2, 1958, the Phoenix entered the testing zone and was boarded by a
Coast Guard vessel bearing a warrant for the arrest of Earle Reynolds.

Sentenced

to a two-year prison term, his conviction was eventually overturned by the
Supreme Court in December of 1960 due to the AEC' s l ack of jurisdiction over
the Pacific Ocean. 23
The continuation of the pacifist voyage by the Reynolds family got spectacularly positive press coverage and popular sympathy.

It seemed that the giant

federal government could be defeated by a small band of devoted pacifi sts and a
family of conscientious citizens.

Reynold .became much in demand for interviews

and speaking engagements, while the embarrassed AEC hinted at a possible communi st conspiracy.

This successful action by NVAANW gave it a leadership role

in the grand coalition quite different than that of SANE.

Its heroic acts

would challenge the moral s and imagination of the American public, convincing
them to become involved in the struggle for peace in whatever capacity they
felt comfortable.

More often than not, this outlet was the local SANE group.

As a team with the existing peace organizations, student groups and women groups;
the two groups were able to recruit more peace advocates than the United States
had seen in many years. 24
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Other groups took a similar strategy to that of NVAANW on a smaller
scale, yet the power of their moral witness was very strong indeed.

Ammon

Hennacy of the Catholic Worker, for example, undertook and completed a forty
day fast in front of AEC headquarters in Washington, D.C. lias a penance for
our sinfulness in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.1I Hennacy made the
papers again when he led a picket at Cape Canaveral, Florida, in protest of
the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems . An intriguing and civilized
protest was lodged against the three major nuclear nations when the Berkeley
Society of Friends sent a case of irradiated asparagus each to President Eisenhower, Prime Minister McMillan and Premier Khrushchev in 1958.

Such action by

individuals and small groups seemed to reap results when Nikita Khrushchev
sent a 1597 word telegram to a British housewife who had written complaining
of the nuclear tests. 25
This type of inspired activism, coupled with -its own success, caused
NVAANW to reconsider its structure and purposes in a meeting in Westtown,
Pennsylvania in the fall of 1958. Realizing the importance of a continued
witness of the Golden Rule type and the need for s teady financial support,
NVAANW reorganized itself at this meeting.

Calling itself by the more general

title, Committee for Non-Violent Action (CNVA). the group became the radical
action wing of the existing pacifist organizations . Sponsors of the group
now included FOR, WRL. and the Friends Peace Committee.AFSC refused to sponsor
the group due to its disapproval of CNVA's methods of civil disobedience. 26
Differences in philosophy and tactics began to emerge in the organization.
Larry Scott. founder of NVAANW and coordinator of CNVA went into retreat for
two weeks to write a theoretical treatise.

"In the fall of 1958 it seemed to

me that if the gains of the two previous years were to be held and a further
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step taken towards the building of a peace movement of power we must present
a constructive alternative to the Cold War which people would generally accept.
Moral protest and a step toward disarmament such as the cessation of nuclear
testing would not be sufficient base for a peace movement unless we would
follow it up with steps toward world community under the rule of law." Scott1s
proposal met with favorabl e reviews from CNVA but it was soon IIput aside,
with almost no discussion." The new youth of CNVA felt that moral witness and
civil disobedience tactics were the life blood of the organization and that the
issue of world disarmament under law, while extremely important, was better
left to the more traditio.nal peace groups.

Unfortunately, the new CNVA provided

moral witness against almost intangibl e evils, those without the "immediate
political relevance" which would enabl e CNVA to work with other organi zations
. a V1a
. bl e peace coa 11. t'10n. 27
1n
The first of these new series of events was Omaha Action, which was designed
as a witness against the cons truction of an ICBM base in Nebraska, urging workers
there to resign their jobs and find non-military work . A statement by CNVA
member Ross Anderson laid out the ideal s and strategies behind this new generation of direct actions:
Preparation for war now means preparation for mass
extermination. More than half of our immense federal
budget goes to produce the chemical, bacteriological,
and nuclear means to wipe out the ea.rth's population.
And we have the foolishness to speak of this as defense.
So we show our bankruptcy both of ideas and morally
guided conduct. This cuts to the heart the person who
loves his country and wants her to pass on to all men
the great values entrusted to her.
Anderson' s statement indicates the continued nationalism of the radical pacifi sts;
the agreement to let America lead the way to righteousness.

He goes on to

speak of the other major component of CNVA' s philosophy, that of open, nonviolent resistence linked, if necessary, with acts of civil disobedience.
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"I am as king permission to enter the gate at Camp Mead, July 1st, to hand
copies of this statement to the workers.

If permi ssion i s not granted, I

must seek to ente.r without it . 11 28
CNVA, predictably, did not receive permi ss ion.

Led by seventy-five

year old A.J. Muste, three pacifists climbed over the newly constructed
barbed-wire fence, were promptly arrested and given suspended sentences.

Despite

television and other media reporters on the scene, the action did not receive
as much publicity as the Golden Rule action.

Both the citizens and the clergy

of Omaha were unreceptive to the pacifists' witnes s , leaving the participants
in Omaha Action with no housing or speaking platform.

The mood was made even

gloomier by the arrest of several of the demonstrators for viol ating their parol e
by returning to the base, and their subsequent sentencing to six months in the
local penitentiary.29
Omaha Action' s lack of success led the leadership of CNVA- to again reconsider its priorities.

Under the current status of the Westtown agreements,

individuals could initiate projects, and once given clearance- by the executive
board, were on their own at the demonstration s ite . The executive board,
in turn, was responsible to the wishes of the sponsoring agencies, who often
disapproved of the uses of civil disobedience.

The problem became (1) whether

to continue CNVA as an agency at all (2) how much control over the activities
should be given to the individual s at the site or to the executive board and
(3) what sort of actions should be undertaken.

These considerations were to

be discussed at a major CNVA meeting in Pend1e Hill, outside of Philadelphia,
in September of 1959. 30
Possible courses of action to be taken at the upcoming meeting were
enumerated as follows :

(1) "Lay CNVA down," (2) Continue CNVA as it was,
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without a paid s taff and "where the most CNVA might do on that basis would
be as a consultative body of sharing fellowship on problems of direct action,"
(3) Continue CNVA in the present mode with a $500 annual a.11otment from the
sponsoring organizations and (4) Continue CNVA IIwithout formal sponsorship.1I
Funds would be raised upon the announcement of specific actions.

This way,

no sponsoring agencies reactions would have to be considered, giving more
freedom and spontaneity to actions of civil disobedience.
meeting, the final proposal was chosen.

At the Pendle Hill

A statement of "guiding principles"

was adopted which affirmed CNVA's major purpose as a direct action group,
participating in civil disobedience if it deemed such action necessary.

"In

all its work and projects," moreover, "CNVA should make a special effort to
cooperate with other peace organi zations. "
In retrospect, this decision was vital to the successful continuation
of CNVA as the cutting edge of the peace movement.

Under the sponsorship of

the older, established peace organizations, CNVA's actions would have eventual ly
been attenuated beyond recognition.

Furthermore, CNVA's decision to work closely

with other organizations and to avoid duplication of their work incre.ased to
overall vitality of the grand coalition. 3l
The Committee emerged from the Pendle Hill meeting with a new statement
of policy and a new organizational framework, but with many of the same problems.
The two plans of action that were under consideration at that time were the
Sahara project, aimed at the i nternational protest of the French tests, and
Polaris Action, which sought to influence workers in New England submarine
yards to find new employment in the spirit of Omaha Action.

The Sahara project

met with disapproval with much of the executive board including Orion Sherwood,
a crew member on the Golden Rule,: \'tho quipped, "sounds artificial, or perhaps
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just desperate.

II

In general, the overwhelming financial and logistical

mrriers to be faced in the Sahara Project made the second project more attractive to the committee. 32
The unfolding of Polari s Action showed CNVA's new preoccupation with
ci vil disobedience as a tactic . This development led to the res ignations of
George Willoughby and Larry Scott in 1959 and of Albert Bigelow in 1960.

They

complained that actions of CNVA were being undertaken just to do something,
with no real thought or intelligence behind the projects.

A second complaint

concerned the lIinstitutional i zation" of CNVA, making civil disobedience not an
individual witness, but a meaningless show,

Thoughts of hiring a public relations

representative in 1960 seemed to be indicative of the move toward institutionali zati on.

To take the place of the resignees in a l eadership role was the young

and energetic pacifist Bradford Lyttle. who would steer the organi za tion for
the next several years through its most radical stage.

It

was this change in

leadership that, on CNVA's side, hastened the demise of the grand coalition of
an influential force in national affairs . CNVA under Lyttle's leadership became
less concerned with "political relevancy" and coalition formation, casting the
organization into increasing isolation. 33
III
If SANE and CNVA were the stock and wine of the grand coalition sauce,
then the scientific community was the liaison, or binding, of the sauce,
giving it cohesion and vitality.

For it was these experts that government,

media and the public turned to in the age of the manipulation of the atomic
nucleus.

Often, however, the scientists' views and opinions on politics

shaded their empirical and "objective" calculations . Hence, an impurity in

.....

~-

the metaphorical sauc~D'was present which, however slight, could caus e thi s
politico-culinary creation to break. 34
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Some members of the sc ientific community were available and extremely
desirable for the peace movement coalition due to their insider's position
in government.

On November 7. 1958, in the wake of the Sputnik launch.

President Eisenhower announced the appointment of the first special assistant
for science and technology. James J. Killian, the president of MIT.

Further-

more, the Science Advisory Council of the Office of Defense Mobilization was
reorganized under the executive branch as the President's Science Advisory
Committee (PSAC).

"For the first time since the fallout debate began," com-

ments one historian of the period, "the President had access to a broad spectrum
of scientific opinion." One sign of a changing of the scientific guard in
Washington was the Senate's refusal to confirm the appointment of Lewis Strauss
as Secretary of Commerce in 1959.

This action was regarded by many as a

l egislative backlash against the prosecution of Robert Oppenheimer by the AEC
in 1954. 35
During the period of the grand coalition, the sc ienti sts played a vital
role in the negotiation of a test ban.

While the Phoenix was en route to the

South Pacific testing zone and SANE was counting the receipts in response to
its first ad, Eisenhower and Khrushchev were attempting to begin serious
negotiations of a test ban treaty.

Khrushchev, upon the completion of a winter

Soviet test seri es . announced a uni l ateral suspension of tests on March 31.
1958.

Eisenhower, avoiding a propaganda defeat. and working under the advice

of Ki l lian and against that of the AEC. on April 28 called for a conference of
sci entific experts to meet at Geneva to discuss the feasibility of aninspected
ban.

Meanwhile. the Hardtack I series in the Pacific commenced.

Khrushchev assented to Eisenhower's technical conference plan.
the Geneva meeting of scientific experts was underway.36

On May 9,
On July 1.
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The United States' delegation was refresh_ingly balanced in its political
assumptions . Joining Ernest O. Lawrence of Berkeley, a known opponent of a
test ban, were Robert Bacher of Cal Tech, who slightly favored a ban, and
James Brown Fisk, an executive vice-president of Bell Laboratories, who was
considered neutral and was described as "level-headed." After intensive
bri efi ngs wi th several government agenci es, the tota 1 del ega tion of 18, whi ch
did not include a high-level diplomat, headed to Geneva.

The Soviet delegation

included Semyon K. ("Scratchy") Tsarapkin, an experienced diplomat who was
able to take a firm line ,on the political realities that the scientists were
unaware of. 37
The negotiations included discussion of the various methods of detection
of nuclear weapons tests, especially seismographic evidence.

A system of

650 control posts was suggested by the Americans, but the Soviets, not wanting
foreigners on their soil, would allow only 110. The British delegation offered
a compromise of 170 land posts supp1emented by 10 shipboard listening stations,
an arrangement which was mutually acceptable to the superpowers.

The fi.nal

report issued on Augus t 22 was vague on the key issues of the na ti ona 1ity and
frequency of on-site inspections.

Nevertheless, the conference announced

that an inspected ban was "technically feasible. " It was on this conclusion
that President Eisenhower empowered the State Department to enter test ban
negotiations with the Soviet Union.

On August 22, Eisenhower announced that

at the end of the current Hardtack II series in Nevada, the United States
would put a moratorium on ali tests for one year, beginning October 31. 38
The Conference of the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests proceeded
slowly, but was proceeding, with the major disagreements developing over the
composition of the inspection teams, yet it was the scientists who put up the
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insurmountabl e barri er to the negoti a t;ons . Chi.ef negotiator James Wadsworth
was informed during the Christmas break in the conference that evidence from
the underground explosions in the Hardtack II series indicated that information
from the first underground blast, Ranier, was misleading.

The agreements

reached at the technical conference were therefore obsolete.

Now, to be able

to detect tests down to the 5 kiloton level, some 500 inspection posts would
be required.

Eisenhower, realizing the trouble this. would lead to in the

Geneva negotiations, appointed a committee headed by Lloyd V. Berkener to
investigate the new evidence.

James Wadsworth confirmed the President's fears,

1a ter recalling tha t the new evidence "spread a pall over the negotiations from
which they never recovered.

1I

At home, many legi slators called for the adoption

of Senator Albert Gorels proposal of an atmospheric ban. eliminating the
techni.cal problems of underground detection.

Senator Humphrey spoke in favor

of the comprehensive ban, presenting the testimony of Cornell physicist Hans
Bethe, whom he compared to Socrates, as evidence of hope. 39
The report of the Berkner panel applied what was to be the fatal damage
to the Geneva negotiations.

Based on a tip from Dr. Albert Latter of the

RAND Corporation and work done by Dr. Edward Teller of Berkeley, the panel
investigated the so-called IILatter hole" theory in which an atomic explosive
was detonated in a large underground cavern. Such an arrangement would
theoretically IIdecouple" the resulting seismic force anywhere from ten to
300 orders of magnitude.

Thus, a bomb as large as 1.5 megatons could con-

ceivably be clandestinely exploded and not be detected under the proposed
J

Geneva agreements.

Despite the immense cost and technical difficulty of actually

constructing such a cavern, the implicit agreement among US negotiators
that the Soviets would cheat, if they could, made this evidence devastating.
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In fac t, the Latter hole theory and the fi.ndings of the Hardtack II series
were not all that persuaded the powers to disagree.
that a ban was a danger to national security.

In the US, many felt

AEC Commissioner Thoma s E.

Murray, for example, later recalled that lithe imperative of our test program
had no t nearly been achieved."

Stientists~

The B.ulletin of the Atomic

one

of the original vehicles of information concerning the dangers of fall-out,
editorialized that lithe call for cessation of weapons tests has lost its
rational justification--at least, for some time to come. 1I40
Edward Teller had a lqng history of scientific and political influence
on government.

Known as the "fa ther of the H-bomb II because of a key break-

through of his invention, Teller did more than any other scientist in the
following years to ensure the healthy and proper growth of his brainchi1d .

A

bitter hatred of the Soviet Union probably due to his past as a Jewish,Hungarian
immigrant helped to influence his political thinking.
knack for controversy.

Teller seemed to have a

When Linus Pauling released hi s petition of scientists

calling for a test ban , Teller and co-author Albert Latter responded with a
widely-read article in
Tests'"

~

Magazine entitled "The Compelling Need for Nuclear

Continuing their literary assault on the test-ban advocates, the team

published Our Nuclear Future in the early months on 1958.

This book did its

best to relieve tensions and fears associated with fallout, claiming among
other things, that II world-wide fallout is as dangerous as being an ounce overweight or smoking a cigarette every two rlW.nths." Speaking of the effects of
radioactivity on human health, Teller insisted that "for practical purposes,
this danger does not exist. "

His ability to influence channels of power with

his opinions was well known.

A diary entry of George Kistiakowsky, Special

Assistant to President Eisenhower on Science and Technology, noted that, flit i s
quite obvious that Teller has done a good job in the Pentagon . "41
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In June of 1957, Teller and Ernest Lawrence informed first the JCAE and
then President Eisenhower of the possibility of developing "clean"

nuclear

weapons , that i s , those producing a relatively low level of radioactive
fallout.

This news sparked heated controversy in the already tense fallout

debate.

Norman Cousins was especially aghast at the use of the word "clean"

to describe a nuclear weapon, calling such usage "the language of madmen."
"-

Noting a bit of inconsist ncy in Edward Teller's scientific arguments,
Cousins found it "most difficult of all to comprehend why it should be
necessary to spend billions of dollars to develop a bomb to get rid of a
radioactive hazard that is supposed to be negligible in the first place."
The British periodical Punch echoed this type of sentiment:
To call an H-bomb 'clean'
Makes sense and sound divergent
Unl ess itls meant to mean
The Ultimate Detergent.
Some scientific opinion was also startled at Teller's belligerency, with
Kistiakowsky convinced that "Teller is the most dangerous scientist in the
United States. ,,42
Tellers emotional, psuedo-scientific s tand for continued testing met with
a worthy opponent in Linus Pauling.

Pauling, a Nobel Prize winner in

chemistry, published No !"1ore War! as a response to Teller and Latter' s volume.
Refuting Teller' s sc ientific arguments one by one, especially with regard to
his us e of statistical information, Pauling injected his own pol itical views
in stating that "we are truly forced into abandoning war as a .method of solution
of world problems, the method of resolution of disputes among nations."

That

the controversy was embedded not only in sc ientific realities, but in personali ties and deeply held politi ca l convictions is evidenced in this head-on confrontation and others during the debate.

The effectiveness of the scientists '

political voice was recognized by many, including peace movement analyst
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Nathan Glazer, who surmised that the power of scientists who substantiated
their political opinions by "science" was far greater than any exi s ting
. t'10n. 43
peace organlza

Indeed no purely scientific eVidence can be presented in the discussion
of national security in relation to the bomb tests, yet the scientists spoke
as with fluent expertise on the subject. · Although the. Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists felt it "inevitable--and legitimate--that their interests should
extend also to moral aspects as well as to worldwide implications,\! scienti s ts
often overstepped the 1imits of their knowledge,

speaking on "matters for

which they have no particular competence." Teller, Willard Libby, and Ernest
Lawrence were the most outspoken advocatesof the view that a move to cease
testing would lead to the outlawry of nuclear explosions .

Such an event, it

seemed to these scientists, would open the door to Soviet aggression due
to their large standing army, deny the human race the benefits of possible
peacetime uses, such as canal building, and set a precedent of stifling
scientific inquiry.
expressed by SANE.

The test-ban scientists took the view that was often
The US should take the moral l ead in the world by stopping

the tests, since while real dangers of fallout already existed, more were likely
to be discovered.

Henry Kissinger, then a professor of government at Harvard,

summed up the situation of the scientists by noting that the experts used
"whatever statistics of effects of radioactive fallout they can find to fit
their political positions . 1144
Despite the confusing testimony of the scientists, and the fact that
they knew "virtually nothing about the dangers of low-intensity radiation, "
the group as a whole was genuinely concerned with the po's sible effects of
fallout from the intensive testing of 1957 and 1958.

Thi s concern and the
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overwhelmingly convincing evidence to back up claims of possible long term
health problems gave a credibility to the work of the SANE and CNVA-led coalition.
Regardless of how a particular scienti st balanced the concerns of human health
and national security, no one disagreed that testing presented dangers.

In

this context, the political work of the peace organizations was able to take on
added significance, esp-ecially when many pro.minent scientists shared the testban view.

Thus the very confusion and disagreement of the scientific community

was an aid to the peace groups who worked with this emotional and intellectual
displacement to convert formerly apathetic citizens into working advocatesof
peace. 45
IV
Sc ienti sts were not the only members of the intellectual community to
take a role in the test ban controversy and the peace movement in general .
Groups such as the Boston Area Faculty Group, the Committee for Correspondence,
the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, the Universities Committee
on the Problems of War and Peace, the Council for the Gradualist Way to Peace,
and the Council for a Livable World were founded by, funded by, and foundered
in primarily 'by academicians.

These organizations, it has been noted by

Donald Keys, of SANE, were "elitist and hi 'erarchi-c:a l , " a description which,
in 'turn, has been applied to Key's affiliations.

Some university faculty chose

to participate in campus demonstrations with the students, but these professors
were mainly "young and without tenure." 46
An effort for the academic world to be activist in its own realm was the
advent of the peace research movement.

This movement is generally conceded

to have started with the publication of the Journal of Conflict Resolution,
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a periodical spurred on by University of Michigan Economist Kenneth Boulding
in 1959.

The fi rs t editori a1 exp 1a i ned the purpose of the effort:
Our belief in the fruitfulness of an interdisciplinary
approach in this area is based on the conviction that
the behavior and interactions of nations are not an
isolated and self-contained area of empirical material
but part of a much wider field of behavior and interaction.

The es tablishment of a peace research community met with mixed reviews in
the rema i nder of the peace movement.

Donald Keys, for one, hoped tha t such
an.academic endeavor would not become a substitute for IIgenuine li action.
James R. Flynn, a pol itical scientist, saw peace research as a form of
activism which attempted lito move the administration just as surely as
ll

CNVA members IIclimbing aboard Polaris submarines. II All agreed, however , that
the increasing involvement of the academic world in peace activism could
influence other groups to join the ranks of the peace coalition.47
One of the biggest and potentially powerful groups to be so influenced
was the massive student body of the Unite9 States.

Prior to 1957 only a

handful of pol itica 1 student organi za tions exi sted-. The most notabl e seems
to be the Intercollegiate Society for Individualists, apparently a right-wing
libertarian organization.

The issues that awakened the adult community in

the mid-1950s also influenced the students, and by 1957 several groups were
established across the continent.

The overwhelming majority of the student

peace groups that developed during the years of the grand coalition were
related to IIparentli organizations.

The major groups that fit this description

were the Students for Democratic Action (SDA) which was closely associated
,)

with the liberal Americans for Democratic Action and National Student Council
for a Sane Nuclear Policy (Student SANE), which was allied, financially and
ideologically, to the liberal leader of the peace coalition.

By 1958, SANE and

its cohorts had mobilized students nationwide, though especially in the east.

84
110st activity was at Cornell University, with notabl e representation in the
New York schools of Columbia , City College, Brooklyn College, and Bronx
Community College. 48
Student SANE was entirely dependent on the parent, National SANE for
their livelihood and inspiration. A memorandum from the first student national
leadership to the parents was notably polite and deferential in tone :

liThe

largest amount of political expression in a long time took place during the
1957-58 school year in favor of a nuclear test cessation.

Thi s activity was

made poss i ble by the leadership of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear
Policy." Apparently in awe of the SANE campaign, the authors of thi s memo
overestimated the future of SANE which was "supported by a group of sponsors
with so much authority to speak on these matters and so much esteem in publi c
l ife, that the campaign was quite sturdy enough to weather the storms of
red-baiting through which it had to pass." Such hardiness would not always
be the case . 49
The initial successes of these organizations was quite impressive . A
3000 strong "student power" demonstration at Cornell was only overshadowed by

marches of 10,000 and 20,000 in Washington, D.C. in favor of school desegration
in 1957 and 1958, respectively.

At Oberlin, the SDA chapter was outspoken

agai nst Dull es' strategy of "massive retal iation" because of the negative
light it cast the US in throughout the world.

Oberlin Student SANE was able

to get Hans Bethe to speak to the college community in May of 1958. Support
for pacifist causes was apparent in the 600 demonstrators, "mostly students "
who 1i stened to A. J. ~1uste speak on "Acts for Peace" in New York City. 50
The first policy statement of Student SANE was a sort of elementary
regurgitation of the parents

I

rhetoric.

"We drift toward ' the moment,

II

lamented the two-page statement, "when the pressing of a single button may
signal the end of life on thi s planet.

1I

Specific policy proposal s included

•
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universal membership to the United Nations, cessation of the nuclear tests
"\'Iith full provisions for control and inspection," and international control
Strategies included "study and political 'action" using

of outer space.

techniques such as letter writing, petitioning, and other traditional methods.
Concerning coalition formation, Student SANE treated its locals as did National
SANE:

any policy advocated under the organization's name was subject to

approval by the executive board.

However, Student SANE left themselves open

to work with other groups, offering to publish their material in the Student
SANE newsletter.

An early example of this type of cooperation is cited in

an ADA document which indicates Student SANE's working with WRL and other
"pacifist organizations," but without accepting pacifist ideology.
51
on to urge its student branch to cooperate with Student SANE.

ADA went

However helpful the student wing of SANE might have been to the furthering
of the

parent~

objectives i s unclear, but the young activists seemed to be

inexperienced, aping the actions of the adults, playing the game of politics.
A postscript to a communication between an Antioch local and National Student
SANE read:

"P.S.

To those of you who open my mail for the F.B.!.:

to J. Edgar Hoover."

Regards

This cavalier spirit indicates alack of serious individual

thought behind peace work that the pacifist groups deemed as so necessary to
the vitality of the movement.

One pessimistic student in Redlands, California

protested the lack of homework done by Student SANE and requested the publication of "a book dealing with all aspects of the question [of nuclear testing]
since the question was raised."
"Stunts 1ike sending a raft into a partitioned ocean may be good, " he
continued, confusing the action of NVAANW with that of SANE, "but they do not
i nfluence government l eaders.,,52
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The evolution of the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID)
i s a demonstration of the motion away from parent-controlled student organi zations toward autonomous, creative student activism.

SLID was the student

branch of the inveterate and hopelessly ineffectual League for Industrial
Democracy, estab1 ished after World War I as a labor organi 'zing group, but
which had receded into liberal anonymity by 1950.

In 1958, SLID characterized

itself as a liberal organization, was involved in anti-communist demonstrations
and distributed anti-communist literature.

In these years, SLID did not attract

large numbers, with an estimated national membership of 200 and a total of 13
delegates at its 1958 national convention.

In 1960, SLID was renamed as Students

for a Democratic Society, (SDS) the very organization that would become
synonomous with

th~

New Left movement of the mid 1960s.

Escaping the ti es of

LID., SDS chose as its new leader A1 Haber who assured that "pessimism and
cynicism have given way to direct action. ,,53 .
The establishment of the Student Peace Union (SPU) in 1959 i s furtherindication of the new autonomy and turn to the left of the student movement.
By 1961, SPU could boast 120 chapters and thousands of members.

SPU was

financially supported primarily by the radical pacifist War Resister's League
and embraced policies of autonomous. local independence from adult organizations.
internal organizational democracy and "free and open discussion."

Its program

was characterized by the "third camp" strategy of equal criticism of the policies
of east and west. its insistence of not committing members "to a preci se statement of policy," its assumption of the greatness of American society and its
)

encouragement of the US to lead the world to peace and justice.

SPU was a vital

force in the new stage of the coalition that was to come, since its views were
more responsive to the awakening students! tastes. 54
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The student movement, by the end of the period of the formation
of the grand coalition, 1958-1960, was too radica l for the liberal adult
peace groups to accept.
by pacifists.

Many of their activities were sponsored and attended

A two day "Student Institute on Nonviolence and Social Change,"

featuring Norman Thomas, A. J. Muste and Bayard Rustin as speakers, was cosponsored by the leftist foursome of the FDR Four Freedoms Club, SDS, SPU
and the Young People's Socialist League.

Other radical student organizations

began to crop up around the nati on's campuses.

SLATE a t Berkel ey, TOCSIN at

Harvard and the Progressive Student's League at Oberlin were examples.

The

influence of Oberlin's SPU group was great enough that a protest it sponsored
against a 1961 civil defense drill led to its cancellation.

Creativity and

college spirit combined at the University of Wisconsin in the "Anti-Military
Ball" in protest of mandatory ROTC, subtitled "The Street Where You Lived"
and "Dig You Later Atom Crater."

Even Student SANE came around to the new

way of working, evidenced by a letter to WRL spokesperson David McReynolds from
one Student local complaining of the dullness of the "inactive" group and
asking McReynolds to make a speaking appearance. 55
The real power behind the student movement and the ticket to the students'
entrance in to the grand coal ition was in their numbers and their youth.

"For

the first time in the history of any nation," remarks Kirkpatrick Sale, his torian of SOS, "there were more students than there were farmers."

Besides this

numerical reality, these activists had no real quest for respectability or a
fear of the loss of a hard-earned stake in the society that they so freely
criticized.

This was a generation that had no vivid memories of Hitler or

other figures and events that so influenced the thoughts and actions of the
adul ts in society. And so it was the free-thinking students that enabl ed the
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pacifist movement to move into the next stage of the coalition by lending
their support.

The movement was to be to the left, against the grain of

society, creating heat by friction.

Unfortunately, the liberal portion of

the tenuous coalition sauce would prove to be unable to take the increase
in temperature. 56
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Chapter IV - Prema ture Fall of the Grand Coalition
The prospects for the growth and sustained health of the grand coalition
peace movement shone brightly in the early months of the decade of -the 1960s.
Yet by the end of the first year of that peri'od, the liberal wing of the
coalition, led by SANE, had been badly discredited by an anti-communis t
assualt and the pacifist wing had turned away from the coalition, pacing
quickly to the left. Although external conditions were increasingly hostil e
and militaristic, SANE and CNVA had both been born of cri ses.

Despite the

fact that SANE was purged of communists and fellow-travellers from within,
tha t organi za ticn had a1ready wi ths tood several bou ts of red-ba iti ng and had
emerged 1ike a knight in the annor of sanity.

Furthermore, pacifists had

been isolated from mainstream politi cs in previous years yet remained a vital
force in the peace movement.

The ans\'Jer to the puzzl e of the breakdown of

the peace ocoalition lies not in any singl e explanation, but in an intangible
combination of factors whose effect, taken as a group, far exceeded their sum.
The conditions facing the peace movement in the summer of 1960 were, to
say the least, challenging.

President Eisenhower was scheduled to participate

in a spring summit conference in Pari s with the heads of state of France,
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.

SANE had placed great emphasis on the

potential importance of such a conference, and given this opportunity,
responded with a full page newspaper advertisement throughout the country
urging its successful completion. A further press release urged the superpowers to "deal at the Summit with the problem ..of the survival of mankind while
there is still time." However, a shocking and embarrassing event occurred
which cast a pall over the conference.

On May 1, a United States U-2

reconnaisance plane was shot down over Soviet territory and its pilot, Gary
Powers was captured and imprisoned.

Despite confident reports that the
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Soviet Union would never publici ze such an event, Khrushchev did so on
~lay

5.

SANE, commenting on the collapse and subsequent confusion offered

a disturbing analogy to the events. i.n Europe duri'ng the late summer of 1939.
However, the organization offered its congratulatlons to SANE members for
the 5000 letters and telegrams received at the American Embassy in Pari s ,
urging continued pressure on the Geneva negotiators and on candidates in the
upcoming national e1ections. 1
Ei senhower arri ved in Pa ri s for the summit conference on May 15. At
the first meeti ng, Khrushchev "1 aunched on along diatdbe, speaking from
a prepared text. II The gist of hiS statement was that, given the flagrant
violation of Soviet territorial rights by the United States, the Soviet
Union could not participate in the conference.

Eisenhower felt that the

U-2 incident was used as a device by Khrushchev to renege on his invitation
of the US president to the Soviet Union.

Th~

pres ident felt that the Soviets

feared an exposure of the Soviet people to the high living standards of the
United States by Eisenhower' s television address .

III

think the Paris summit,

had it been held," writes Eisenhower in his memoirs, "would have proved to
be a failure and this would have brought the Free World only further di sillusionment.

1I

Indeed, the breakup of the Paris summit and the impending

failure of the Geneva conference were disappointing to peace

advoca~son

the

international scene, but possible hope lay in the world of domestic politics
with the election of 1960. 2
The campaign and election of John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts may have,
on the surface, seemed a victory for devotees of peace. but actually, his
peace rhetori:c and defense policies were damaging to liberal peace activism.
One of the bases of SANE's existence was the eventual banning of nuclear
explosives . Although their program had been ambitiously expanded to include
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disarmament down to police level s , the s ingle issue of the test ban had
begun their growth and sustained it for three years . Now Kennedy was
campaigning on a platform that emphasized a conventional rearmament, promising
to close a mythical IImi"ssile gap,1I while reducing the United States' dependence
on nuclear deterrence.

Kennedy was in agreement with SANE's call for a con-

tinued halt on testing and a negotiated treaty since IIby the time the next
president' s term of office had come to an end, there may be ten, fifteen, or
twenty countri es with atomic capabil ities." How all these goal s were s imul taneously reachable is unclear, yet SANE and the liberal peace forces supported the Kennedy campaign.

Sociologist Nathan Glazer in 1961 pointed at

Kennedy's peace policies as one of the facts contributing to the lack of
influence by peace organizations. Although Glazer indicates that this fact
is a good sign concerning the Kennedy administration, a more valuable lesson
for the peace movement lies in the ease with which SANE was taken in by
carefully calculated political rhetoric. 3
Kennedy's inaugural address emphasized hi s views on defense, virtually
ignoring domestic issues.

"On the Presidential Coat of Arms, the American

Eagle holds in his right talon the olive branch," said the new president,
II

while in ni s left he holds a bundl e of arrows.

We intend to give equal

attention to both." The new president eventually 1ived up to this aspect
of hi s campaign and inaugural promises.

IIIn the past three years," said

Kennedy in his final speech, delivered to the Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce,
"we have increased the defense budget of the United States by over twenty
J

percent . . . the balance of power is still on the side of freedom.1I

During

his administration, combat-ready army divisions were increased from eleven
to sixteen, while Air Force tactical wings were increased from sixteen to
t\'ienty-one.

Annual procurement of conventional weapons and ammunition nearly
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doubled.

One hundred thousand recruits were added to the army.
increases in personnel and funding were also undertaken. 4

Other

Kennedy's successful responses to crises with impressive showings of
force did harm to the pacifists ' vision of non-violent resistence as a
catalyst toward change.

During the Berlin crisis, a parade of lSOO US

troops down the autobahn was lIa reminder of our commitment to the
ll

Berliners.

~lest

A face off of tanks across the newly erected wall resulted in

the drawing back of Soviet armor. The brinksmanship of the Cuban crisis was
further evidence of the aggressive military diplomacy of Kennedy that proved
successful.

IIWe agreed in the end, II remfni seed Robert Kennedy, then Attorney

General, IIthat if the Russians were ready to go to nuclear war over Cuba,
they were ready to go to nuclear war and that was that.
have the showdown then as six months later. II

So we might as well

Support for such a seemingly

bellicose administration by SANE was a credit to' the co-opting power of the
government and a debit on the National Committee's account of effectiveness.
SANE's liberal assumptions not only left that organization open for anticommunist counter-punching, but for the attenuation of its message by the
liberal administration.

SANE would continue to prove its vulnerability to

co-optation by the government until the limited test-ban treaty of 1963
and that organization's self-laudatory statements would finally demonstrate
the emptiness of its message. S
I

The event that could have marked a resurgence of peace activism, had it
not been for internal divisions carved in earlier years, was the resumption
of atmospheric testing by the Soviet Union in September of 1961.

IIEven the

-'/

professional ban-the-bomb groups, II red-baited Time, IIwhom the communists have
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busily encouraged and who normally save their ire for th.e United States,
were up in arms against Russia." After the third shot in Siberia, President
Kennedy announced the United States' resumption of underground testing,
ominously warning that lithe foul winds of war are blowing," The Russian
series raised fallout levels to new highs in the American South. leading to
a scare, which, in the past, had given new sources of support to SANE and the
peace coalition . This time, however, the absence of US fallout increased the
anti-communist sentiment which had ruined SANE as a viable influence. 6
"I must report to you in all candor,1i said the President in a nationwide
television address on March 2, 1962, "that further Soviet series. in the absence
of further western progress, could well provide the Soviet Union with a nuclear
attack and defensive capability so powerful a"s to encourage aggressive designs."
The moratorium on US atmospheric tests, after 3 years, 5 months and 26 days was
to come to an end. The Dominic series commenced on April 25. 1962. 7
In short, the election of John F. Kennedy brought a sense of newness to
the nation.

Through a stylish first lady, bold economic plans. tough dealings

with the Soviets, and a general vitality, the Kennedy administration indirectly
pull ed issues away from the peace coal i ti on.

SANE and CNVA had called for a

rethinking of priorities, a new critique of foreign and nuclear policy, and a
return to the classic American moral values.

Kennedy succeeded in achieving

these ends through traditional political means.

The response of the nation

indicated that Americans would rather wear convention straw hats or lapel pins
than to demonstrate in fron t of government buildings or climb aboard "atomic
submarines. 8
In addition to outside forces. internal strife decreased the power and
legitimacy of the peace coalition.

Perhaps the event that did the most lasting

damage to the coalition was the anti-communi st assault and subsequent purge
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of SANE.

In May of 1960, SANE attracted some 20,000 persons to a rally in

the new Madison Square Garden in New York City.

Speakers included Walter

Reuther, Eleanor Roosevelt, Alf Landon and Norman Thomas. After the rally,
more than 5000 citizens joined together in a march of solemn solidarity
across Manhattan to the United Nations to conduct a midnight prayer.

Follow-

ing the rally, Senator Thomas J. Dodd, a vigorous opponent of the test ban
treaty negotiations, revealed to the Congress and press that one of the chief
organizers of the rally, Henry Abrams, was a communist.

IICommuni s ts were

responsible," charged Dodd, IIfor a very substantial percentage of the overflow turnout.

1I

He proceeded to serve subpoenas to 37 SANE members before his

subcommittee on internal sec urity of the committee on the judiciary.9
Doddls timing could not have been worse for SANE, which had been debating
a resolution similar to the one used by the ACLU to prevent communist membership.

This resolution would require that members employ the same standard of

judging the policies of all nations.

Now Senator Doddl s interference would

force SANE to either take a stand against the Cold War policy of blind anticommunism or to adopt their resolution under pressure from a Senate subcommittee.

Dodd, an old friend and UWF associate of Norman Cousins, announced

SANEl s decision:

IINot only did t4r. Cousins act immediately to suspend Henry

Abrams," he told the Senate, IIbut when he saw me in Washington, he asked for
the subcommittee's assistance in ridding the Committee for a Sane Nuclear
Policy of whatever communist infiltration does exist.

He offered to open

the books of the organization to the subcommittee and to cooperate with it in
every way. II 10
Cousins denied the Senator' s claim.

Although he had questioned Abrams

concerning
his political affiliations and demanded his resignation, he saw
,
to it that SANE release a civil 1ibertarian response to the Dodd Committee.
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liAs a matter of principl e and practice, 1I read the statement released to
the press," we resent the intrusion of a Congressional Committee into the
affairs of an organization which during its entire life has acted only in
accordance with its declared principles. 1I However, the SANE committee also
adopted the exclusion clause which stated that IIpersons who are not free
because of party discipline or political allegiance to critici ze the actions
of totalitarian nations with the same standards by which they challenge other
nations will not be welcome as members. " The national leadership was fully
aware that its decision. would alienate certain sectors of SANE's membership,
especially the pacifists, yet their reasoning had been well described by SANE
member and journalist Barbara Deming:
II

"If one wants more support," she noted,

pub 1i c i rra ti ona 1ity mus t be deferred to. II 11
As a result of the new language in SANEl s principl es , all SANE local s were

required to renew their charters, including the new policy.

Twenty-five locals

in New York State, the area with the most activity, chose not to renew.

Their

displeasure at the infringement of civil liberties taken by SANE was expressed
by Robert Gilmore, a pacifi st member of the executive board, who offered hi s
resignation:
SANE should recogni ze that one cause which contributes to
the possibility of mass annihilation is the condition under
whi ch one . . . group of men regards another . . . not as
fellow human beings but as alien creatures. If SANE contributes to the spread of this disease within its own ranks,
it contributes just as surely to the human condition leading
toward destruction it ·was founded to battle against. 12
A. J. Muste also resigned from SANE, admitting that communist infiltration
)

was a potential problem, but disappointed that SANE had not taken a stronger
stand.

He feared that activists who had perhaps once embraced communistic

or socialistic values (as had Muste) would be lost as an addition to the
coalition.

"If they find in a peace organization the same kind of dogmatism,
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suspicion, and obsession with orthodoxy that finally drove them out of the
communi s t party of its fronts, II Mus te spoke from experi ence, II they wi 11
stop working [for peace].11 Moreover, Muste felt that the Dodd investigation
had offered SANE the opportunity to become a truly vital independent force
in national politics.

The reaction by SANE seemed as harmful to American

ideals as past travesties despised by those very liberals.

"What need is

there of the bruta1iti'es of outright totalitarian regimes,1I asked Muste, "or
even the crudities of McCarthyism , if conformity can be obtained by such
gentle pr:essures?1I13
Resigned pacifists Gilmore, Muste, and Stewert

Meacham~

chairperson of

AFSC, offered the fo 11 owi ng dra ft of SANE's response to the Dodd Committee:
IISANE has not and will not trim its sails to suit opponents of a sane nuclear
policy whether they be members of Congressional committees, private citizens,
or anonymous . . . SANE has not and will not be controlled by the Communist
Party nor any outside interest or organization. II Thus the resignees were not
denying the evil of communist infiltration, only demanding that the duty of
avoiding such a possibility be left to the organization. 14
Not all members of SANE disagreed with the actions taken by the national
committee.

N()rman Thomas, for one, did not want to see SANE IIdiverted into

being primarily a civil liberties agency.1I

Nathan Glazer characterized

Cousins' actions in response to the Dodd Committee as "political wi sdom.

1I

Some pacifists also stayed on with SANE to weather the storm, most notably
co-chairperson Clarence Pickett. SANE, meanwhile, informed the locals of
the continuing response of the national committee, assuring the members that
no names would be turned over to the investigating committee nor would those
called to testify be forced to have their names made public. 15
Despite these comforting words, national SANE used the crisi s to assert
absolute control and authority over the local committees, enforcing the
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orthodoxy that Muste referred to.
equilibrium.

"These matters involve a precarious

Impulsive or imprudent action can jeopardize the careers of

the individuals involved and do serious damage to the organization." Therefore, demanded a patronizing executive board, tlNo new releases or advertisements or public comments, director indirect dealingwithany phase of
the Senate inquiry are to be issued Stlocalchapters except on specific
authorization from the National Office." [emphasis in original]. National
SANE strongly advised those called before the subcommittee not to take their
fifth amendment privileges although "this in itself will not be automati c
cause for dismissal from SANE. ,,16
At the third National Conference, co-chairpersons Cousins and Pickett
attempted to pas s a resolution in support of their leadership during the
crisi s.

The resolution passed, but only after being amended to mean that

such support was offered concerning polici es "having to do with substance
and not wi th organi za tion."

Furthermore, the resol uti on concerni ng the

exclusion from SANE of certain groups, now extended and specified to include
"communi sts, fascists or individuals who are not free because of party di scipline or political allegience to apply to the actions of the Soviet Union
or the Chinese Government the same standards by which they challenge others, "
passed by a bare majority of 29-2'8 with "several abstentions."

SANE, at this

point, was demanding orthodoxy from its members, and was teetering on a shaky
organi za tional foundation. 17
The group that resigned in protest from SANE was left with no organization
to carry forth their programs for peace and disarmament.

A meeting in the

New York Statler Hotel was cal l ed to remedy this situation.

An organization

was proposed which would have a pol icy "largely the same as that of SANE," but
which would practice a policy of non-exc l usionism.

FOR executive secretary

Alfred Hassler indicated hi s disapproval with thi s arrangement, which threatened
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to increase "interorganizational rivalry and competition" in the peace
movement.

Hassler could not imagine "that an organization whose core con-

sists of people like Henry Abrams and Corliss Lamont, together with a lot
of others who have been expelled by SANE, can have any influence in this
country at all for peace." The editorial board of the pacifist publ ication
Liberation also rejected the idea of an opposition committee. 18
Linus Pauling was to serve as chairperson of this new group, a development which Hassler was not pleased with.

"His tremendous competence in his

own field," mused Hassler, "did not seem to me to be matched by an equal
sophistication on the political level ." Hassler closed his letter to Muste
by inviting him to work for FOR in a greater capacity than his current role
of secretary emeritus.

Hassler' s offer is indicative of a general withdrawal of the various peace forces into their respective corners. 19
The overall effect of the Dodd investigation was the effective dismantling
of SANE ' s elaborate structure of ideological support.
seems to have slipped as well.

Their financial base

One contributor tempered his apparently

unusually small gift of $25 with the comment "I have to confess that my faith
in what SANE will be able to do has been seriously shaken.

I find it difficult

to escape the belief that Norman Cousins virtually surrendered to Senator Dodd
and the committee on UnAmerican (sic) Activities.

1I

Despite this gentleman's

confusion concerning Dodd's committee assignment, his words demonstrate that
the disillusionment with SANE was not unique to pacifists and communists. 20
The Soviet Union's favorable attitude toward SANE increased that organization's vulnerability to red-baiting.

For example, three Soviet scientists

addressed a letter to SANE urging them to adopt a policy of universal disarmament.

This communication received publicity in the Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists. Acceptance and approval of SANE's actions also came from a higher
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source in the USSR.

Semyon K. Tsarapkin, ranking diplomat at both the

Geneva technical talks and the actual negotiations, asked that SANE be given
a hearing at the Geneva conference.

Such help from the Soviets did even

further damage to the battered 1iberal and anti -,communist skin of the coal ition
1eader. 21
II

When the smoke began to clear from the Dodd-set fire of anti-communism ,
SANE did not appear to be in serious trouble as an organization.

The fourth

national conference was well attended, with 183 delegates from 60 local
committees.

Yet the policies of coalition-formation which became unveiled

during the spring peace marches and other joint effort indicated the malai se
of SANE compared to its condition in pre'-Dodd days .22
In its policy statemen ts, SANE indicated that its role at the "vital
center of the peace effort" had become a partisan backing of the "peace race"
policies of President Kennedy.

For example, frequent references to the

"peace race" in the under-developed countries which arose during the first
plenary session of the fourth national conference were obviously in approval
of the Kennedy administration's efforts in that realm.
more direct in his approval:

Norman Thomas was

"We are now in a position of supporting the

President' s stand that a settlement on Berlin i s negotiable." Homer Jack,
executive director of national SANE, addressed a New York gathering with
the admission that "the political dimension i s the very frontier of our
organization," while reaffirming "our desire to convert the arms race into
a peace race." Specific proposal s that year included opposition to civil
defense programs, investment in United Nations bonds and a gradual multi lateral disarmament.
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The aims of post-Dodd SANE may not have been drastically changed. but
the methods by which they cooperated with other wings of the peace movement
were.

Dr. Jack chose to stress some points about SANE that had been glossed

over previously.

"SANE is not pacifist, was one such statement, "we are
II

pragmatic, not absolutist."
conti gent
community.

This backhanded swipe at the departed pacifist

i s evidence of the growing rift in the once coherently woven peace
Certainly SANE' s legitimacy was done irreparable harm by the Senate

investigation, as what small influence it had became unusable.

For example,

Homer A. Jack s 1etters to the heads of s ta te of the four nuc 1ea r na ti ons ,
I

urging renewed attempts at a summit meeting received an answer only from
Chairman Khrushchev.

President Kennedy apparently wanted to afford no

pub 1i city or encourageent to the disgraced 1i bera 1s. 23
In an attempt to score victori es similar to those of the Aldemaston marches
of the British organization Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, SANE planned
a nationwide series of 1961 Easter marches throughout major cities in the US.
"We know that if a broadly-representative mobilization for peace is to be
undertaken in America," read a confident announcement of the action, "it will
probably have to be sparked by SANE.
the sites.

II

Yet there was fear of other groups at

In the days before the purge, SANE would have rejoiced at such

opportunities to coordinate a multiple-group action.

Now, the organization
was struggling to maintain what legitimacy it still had. 24
The task of eliminating unwanted elements from a demonstration was not
easy.
J

David McReynolds, who exhibited notable political savvy, knew that

"it i s utterly impossibl e during a demonstration or on a picket line to ask
everyone on the line for his political credentials." The national committee
warned the locals of simultaneous demonstrations by the AFSC, in \oJhich the
emphasi s might be on unil ateral disarmament, prayer vigil s , or even civil

•
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disobedience.

"If there are parallel activities in your community and your

SANE group i s unable to find a common, unifying formula,1I advised the national
office, "we hope your local SANE' group will conduct its own activity .
There is no need to hide the fact that there different approaches to peace. "
Indeed, cooperation at joint demonstrations became increasingly rare . At a
Times Square rally in the

~pring

of 1961, for instance, a group of Friends

engaged in a Ifpeace vigil" refused to join a SANE march . Both the liberal
and the pacifist wings of the coalition felt repugnance of each other Js tactics
of action. 25
The issues advocated by SANE had become so compl ex that its role as a spearhead to a powerful coalition was severely damaged.

No longer were the days

when any uncommitted or unaware, non-communist citizen was free to join or
cooperate with SANE in any way possible.

Orthodoxy and uniformity became the

desire of the anonymous and arbitrary national committee.
"Folk singers, sloppy dress, and beards should be discouraged.

They spoil

the image and provide ready handl es for those observers who are ready to label
any peace demonstration as composed of "crackpots" or "beatniks . " Other
memoranda to the locals warned of the negative effects of "beards Inl banjoes, 1I
during the peace walks of 1962.

Further recommendations included that al l

signs be "uniformly painted" and slogans cleared first with the national
committee.

The issue of who sponsored the march in which community was partially

settled by the advent of "the operational umbrella,"

Turn Toward Peace (TTP),

yet "only organizations which are members of Turn Toward Peace will be allowed
to march." SANE had come from coordinating the peace movement to attempting
to dictate its activi tes. 26
Before the spring peace walks of 1962 could take place, the US resumed
testing in the atmosphere, an event which met with a demonstration sponsored
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by SANE in New York City.

Here, a disaster occurred whi.ch would be the

catalyst for the final break of the fragile coalition between law-abiding
liberals and pacifists who answered to a higher authority.

During the

march through Times Square, a group of pacifists protested some rough
treatment by pol ice of g demonstrator at Duffy Square by sitting down on the
busy thoroughfare. blocking traffic at one of the busiest intersections in
the world.

New York City police forcefully arrested the pacifists. who had

locked arms in a circle, inspiring protests and chants of "shame. shame.
shame" from the SANE marchers.

Mounted police charged through the crowds.

with several injuries to non-pacifists occurring. 27
Police later justified their actions by recalling that the pacifists
"struggled, kicked and resi sted arrest."

Furthermore. the credibility of

the march, which_ involved the cooperative effort of Women Strike for Peace
(~/SP),

General Strike for Peace (GSP), WILPF, WRL, SPU, SANE, and CNVA was

challenged by the fact that lIa few of the marchers had beards and were
described as 'beatniks'." A CNVA protest outside AEC's New York headquarters
the following day was discredited by the same accusation.

At the trial,

held on April 6, of the 26 marchers who had been charged with resisting arrest,
testimony of police brutality was countered by charges of non-cooperation of
pacifists and the presence of beatniks. 28
SANE attempted to dissociate itself from the actions of the pacifists,
while condemning'the police for their "unbelievable brutality" in a letter
to New York Mayor Robert F. vJagner Jr.

Executive director Dr. Homer Jack

)

ca lled for "an independent fact-finding investigation by an impartial group
of 1eadi ng ci ti zens.

II

"We do not condone the behavi or of a sma 11 group of

persons who violated the demonstration discipline,1I wrote Jack. IIhowever, the
vast majority of the thousands of demonstrators present in Duffy Square
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were instructed to behave in a di sc iplined manner and remained disciplined
throughout."

Try as they might, SANE was unabl e to cast off associations

with pacifi sts and unilateral ists in the ensuing media storm.
similar helplessness with regard to

CNVA expressed

the media, lamenting that "no newspaper

carried the facts, as CNVA presented them in a news release.

1I

CNVA expressed

further concern over a loss in leadership in the peace movement, the "deterioration" of relations with the New York City Pol ice and other municipal authorities, and the 1inkage of the Duffy Square viol ence and the fundamentally
pacifist CNVA.

SANE's letter to Wagner is evidence of the frustration SANE

was feeling as they lost their grip over the coalition.

The two groups

were ready to head in separate directions without intending to look back. 29
Coalition theory can be employed here to analyze the purge of SANE ,and
its subsequent attempt to meet its detractors on the right.

The assumption

of "rational actors" breaks down in the debate between Norman Cousins, with
his cooperation with Senator Dodd, and A. J. Muste, with his "Crisi s in SANE"
series in Liberation.

Both these men were rational, had strongly held con-

victions, viewed the same set of events, and wished to be members of a "winning"
coalition, that is, one that could 'a ffect decision-making within the government.
Yet each devised different policy alternatives for SANE.

Hence, policy dis-

tance theory is an attractive choice of models in this case . SANE was the
actor who wi shed to be included in the winning coalition which is as close
as possible to its views.
party!

In thi s case, that coalition was the Democratic

Concern with legitimacy and national strength overshadowed SANE ' s

desire to be working with traditional "peaceniks" or pacifists.
The pacifists, on the other hand, had no des ire to work with the es tablished
political parties, instead preferring to work within the universe of their
spirituality.

Although they had compromised their ideal s somewhat by entering
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the liberal coalition in 1957, the exclusion policy adopted by SANE was
too amoral to accept.

Their reality was different than that of SANE.

The

decision was made to pursue the pacifist tdeal--a path down the road of
radicalism.

As will be seen. SANE's choi ce to meet the challenge from the

right rather than from the left would leave that liberal orgariization in the
dus t of a new storm of radical activism led by students l ater in the decade.

III
CNVA was in the process of s ta.lking into the misty left of the American
pol itical spectrum, "drifting slowly toward becoming a sect," a path which
\lieu 1d dull their rol e as "cutti ng edge" of the peace movement pyramid.

The

actions that the CNVA would undertake, following the new leadership of
Bradford Lyttle, would be on a larger scale. more physically demanding, and
more reliant on civil disobedience than ever before . This new monolithic
rel iance on the tactic of "holy" disobedience as an end in itsel f was the
development which would complete the changing of the guard at CNVA. 30
Polari s Action, the first CNVA activity in which Brad Lyttle had a major
role, was a moral witness staged in New London-Groton, Connecticut.

Over

a period of several months, workers fo.r the United States Submarine Base
and the General Dynamics Electric Boat Division there were urged to relocate
themselves to a peaceful sector of the economy . The constant prayer vigils
and pamphleteering which CNVA was patiently employing at the site were not
reaping results in the mind of Lyttle.

He

submitted in 1960 to the national

committee a "Prospectus for Civil Disobedience in Polari s Action,1I which
meticulously outlined the possibi l ities by land and sea, the 'possible legal
penalties faced, and the expected response from the community.

Despite the

serious tone of thi s document, Lyttle' s enthusia sm with the method of

t
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satyagraha was cl ear:

"I do not know how the publ ic in New London-Groton

will respond to an announcement that some of us intend to non-violently
roard the Patrick Henry (an atomic submarine located at the base),
Lyttle in his Prospectus.

\1

concl uded

"Any person planning to join Polaris Action during

its civil disobedience phases should be prepared for

any~hing . 1I31

The civil disobedience occurred by sea when several pacifists rowed to
the submarines and climbed aboard, promptly being arrested.
were eventually violated in this way.

Three submarines

The action met with some limited success,

including a reluctant acceptance of the pacifists ' presence by the local
inhabitants, the offer of several workers to quit their jobs if CNVA would
find alternative employment, and significantly, the participation of several
college students in the civil disobedience phase of the action.

In contrast

to these successes was the disapproval of the action by certain old-guard
CNVA members. 32
In his letter of resignation, Albert Bigelow, the skipper of the Golden
Rule in 1958, questioned the sagacity of Polaris Action. asking if the project
VIas undertaken solely "so there would be a sumner activity." Calling the
civil disobediences to be committed as "attention-getting devices," Bigelow
ana lyzed the project in terms of the theory of Gandhian satyagraha .
The innuendo regarding J.B. Osborn, Captain of the U.S.S.
George ~Jashington, in the box on the first page of the
promotion leaflet is deplorable . Is this non-violence a
proper beginning toa satyagraha appealing to Osborn's--and
all men 's--nobler nature to convert them from a gravely
mistaken but none the less sincerely-held error?
Perhaps part of Bigelow's indignation was due to his history as a navy officer
holding the same errors, yet his point was clear.

He concluded his letter with

the unfortunate reality that in order to disassoctate himself from Polaris
Action in particular, he was forced to resign from CNVA.

Larry Scott also

expressed concern over the use of Gandhian methods, referring especially to
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the current CNVA practice of "going limp" when arrested, instead of accepting their fate.

liThe practice of going limp when arrested is not civil

disobedience--·it is passive resistance, II wrote Scott, "Gandhi knew that and
did not practice it himself, or allow it i'n the Gandhian action discipline. 1I33
A. J. Muste quickly sent a long response to Bigelow, urging him to
reconsider.

Mustel s theoretical analysis is valuable in that it illustrates

the basic changes that CNVA was experiencing at this juncture.

A concern i s

expressed about the "sponsorship" of various actions . Muste bel ieved that
establishing a new support base for each project was a wasted effort and
therefore favored a more formal organization or "institutionalization.
III

donlt regard organization as a necessary evil

,11

1I

he wrote to Bigelow, III

think it is necessary. Period." More important was the new emphasis of CNVA
from single, tangible, and popular issues to a frontal attack on practically
invi s ible weapons delivery systems.

Muste continued:

I have noticed that some who opt strongly for selzlng on
the popular issues are also strong on insisting that the
literature shall educate people on the need of basic economic
change, although that is not what bothers the masses in an
"affluent society.
In otherwor<is) there the emphasis is
on what people need to know, not on what they are at the
moment fired up about. [emphasis in original]
II

Muste was playing conciliator between the old guard, personified by Bigelow
and Larry Scott and the young blood of Lyttle and his increasingly scholastic
foll owing. 34
Muste continued to play the middle by refuting Lyttlel s extreme of insisting "that the missile i s the focus of the nuclear deterrence pattern and
J

should be the sole focus of radical pacifist action." Some kind of compromi ses
should be drawn, he urged, s ince both strategies have reaped success, and CNVA
needed all the help it could muster.
indispensable,1I concluded Muste.

"Both sponteneity and organization are

"Those of us who lean toward one have our

particular blind spots and temptations, and those of us who lean toward the
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other, theirs. 1I The Lyttle-led forces of organization would'. loom large in
the future, however, and Bigelow would not reconsider his resignation. "I am
tempted to say that Brad i s really uninterested in other people's idea s , 1I
said Thomas Olson in 1961, "but the rest of us have been so backward in
presenting alternatives that he may simply never have encountered a \'Jorthwhile alternative tb his own type of thought.1I Olson concluded that III don ' t
expect to put much effort into a CNVA organized as poorly as we are at
present. 1135
Other citizens, pacifi st and non-pacifist, expressed similarly negative
sentiments in reference to CNVAts new monolithic reliance on civil di sbedience.

Arthur Harvey, a pacifist, refused an offer of membership into

CNVA in 1962, citing the irresponsible use of Gandhian tactics as hi s reason.
Liberal observers tended to be less than kind .

Robert Martinson, writing

in the Nation, explained that "civil disobedience i s a responsible and
appropriate response for the civil rights struggle in the South, but may
become gauche and self-defeating when carried over uncritically to the peace
field."

Despite such criticism, which was widespread, CNVA continued in its

radicalization, with Brad Lyttle exerting greater influence than ever before . 35a
Lyttle's first project as the unofficial, yet uncontested leader of CNVA
was the San Francisco-Moscow Walk for Peace. After years of hearing "tell it
to the Russians" from citizens at US action sites, and after a failure in 1958
to gain entry to the Soviet Union, a group of demonstrators, pacifist and
non-pacifists, left San Francisco, unheralded, in 1960. A $6000 donation from
Unitarian Scott Herri ck and the anonymous donation of a used Buick convertibl e
made the trip possible.

On May 28,1961, the demonstrators reached the

United Nations in New York City.

Pacifi st Ed Saunders added to the witness

with a 66 hour standing fast in front of the AEC in Washington .

In the press
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coverage the walkers did receive. which was slight. A. J. Muste was cast
as the 1eader of the group, but as the march continued, Lyttl e emerged as
the spiritual head of the group.36
After a flight to London on June 1, the demonstration took on an
international tone with walkers joining from several European nations . The
walk continued under the auspices and strategy of CNVA, however.

In the end

of June, the group entered Belgium, with Lyttle claiming that they would enter
the USSR whether or not permission was received.
entered the communist block in East Germany.
the Russi.an border .

On August 7, the walkers

On September 19, they crossed

Finally, on October 3, after crossing Europe at the rate

of 40 miles per day., the walkers staged a quiet demonstration in Moscow's
Red Square.

On October 5, CNVA participated in a debate at Moscow University

I/lith professors and students. After two hours, the professors called an end
to the meeting, to be met with cries of "nyet! II from the students.
continued for another hour.

The debate

After an October 6 audience with Mme. Khrushchev.

the walkers returned home. arriving in New York on October 16. 37
Press coverage of this spectacular third camp event was conspicuously
absent.

qnly upon their demonstration in Red Square did CNVA attain f ront page

coverage in the New York Times, and that story was slanted to the Cold War point
of view.

"Soviets prohibit Speech,1I read the headline of the story which spoke .

especially of the 1imits put on the demonstrators, not the magnitude and physical
hardship of their journey.

In all, over 307,000 pieces of literature were

distributed in many languages on a journey of 306 days.

The debate at Moscow

University also received front page coverage. but again. the article dwelled on
the failure of CNVA to convince the students away from the Soviet line. A letter
to the editor just prior to the Moscow demonstration complained of this lack
of coverage in the United States compared to relatively extensive exposure in
Europe.

Thi s reader was impressed by the action and wished to see al l forms
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of media devote some time or space to it.

Unfortunately, after the excite-

ment of the Red Square action and the appearance at Moscow University, the
demonstrators were relegated once again to the back pages.

Their arrival

and subsequent press conference received only miniscul e stories in the
Times. 38
Other newspapers exhibited simil ar level s of interest in the story.

The

. October 4 issue of the Cleveland Plain Dealer featured front page coverage
of a photo and a brief s tory, noting especially the refusal of Soviet official s
to allow CNVA to "address" the crowd in Red Square. A small story on October 6
related the occurrences at Moscow University with the protests of the students
being roughly translated, "let lem ta1k!" After this coverage, no further
news'of the walk appeared in this paper.

In a survey of other newspapers,

the Wall Street Journal ventured four sentences on the Red Square action, the
Christian Science Monitor was devoid of coverage, and the Times of London
featured a small story and a photograph in the back pages.

Jhe English paper

emphasized the role of the four Britons in the march and the Soviet refusal
of speaking rights to the demonstrators. 39
In retrospect, it seems that the lack of media coverage afforded to the
San Francisco to Moscow Walk for Peace was due to the unilateralist stand of
CNVA and their recent estrangement from the

mainstre~

SANE coalition.

Even if

the action was too dangerously political to cover, the human interest side
of the march, which included two marriages along the way, should have given
the march some pUblicity.

CNVA was rapidly losing support of persons of

influence and means.

The Everyman series of expeditions was an attempt to
regain the glitter of the Golden Rule. 40
Everyman I, II and III were three different l arge trimaran sailing vessel s
that sailed a total of four times--three times toward the Pacific testing
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zone, and once to the Soviet. Union . Support for these projects, which came
in response to the renewed testing of the Soviets and eventually of the
US in the atmosphere, was raised through the effo·rts and reputation of
A. J. Muste.

Letters went to a wide range of contacts, including Norman

Cous ins a nd Steve Allen of Na ti ona 1 SANE.
raising money for the CNVA, whose image

\'/as

The ro 1e played by Mus te in
decaying in the minds of reliabl e

contributors to pacifist causes cannot be overstated.

"It's very difficul t."

wrote one contributor, "virtually impossible, to ignore an appeal over your
name.

The enclosed .isnlt much , but I do hope it will help,"

Norman Cousins

replied with the heartwarming offer, "please put me to work.,,41
Despite thi s sterling effort by Muste. the Everyman journeys did not
enjoy the same notoriety or success of their ideological ancestor, The Golden
Rule.

CNVA's financial difficulties were becoming aggravated as one member

of the executive board decried the lack of "badly needed office space" and
the Everyman campaign ran up a $12,000 deficit . The action phase of the
project was equally disillusioning . . Everyman I was boarded by the Coast Guard
just outside of San Francisco en route to th.e Marshall Islands . Anattempt
to sail this vessel again yielded identical results.
a similar fate after sailing from Honolulu.

Everyman II experienced

Everyman III attempted to sail

to the Soviet Union via the northern route through Scandinavia in order to
protest the resumption of the Russian atmospheric tests.

Refused permission

to land in Leningrad, the ship was towed out of port by a Soviet ship, as
the crew unsuccessfully attempted to scuttle their vessel . With results like
these, and no Reynolds family to bail them out, CNVA would remain in dire
straights. Even A. J. Muste could appeal only so often. 42
CNVA was, by the end of this period, in a bad way.
)

Not only did they have

virtually no exposure to the publi c and no influence on the peace

movem~nt

or
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the sources of national or international power. they were losing the support
of many pacifi sts.

The problems of limited exposure was a familiar one and

remained handled in much the same way by the new CNVA leadership as it had
been by the old.

"I do not worship Imass

l

as an end in itself," wrote Brad

Lyttle in January of 1962, IIbut believe that a mass following i s one of the
elements a movement should work for if this can be done without basically
sacrificing greater ideological and spiritual values.

1I

The problem of losing

support, especially from the pacifist community, was new and troublesome to
CNVA.

Not willing to sacrifice his ideals of pacifist action and particularly

the uses of civil disobedience. to the ousted philosophy of the old guard,
Lyttle and CNVA looked for new issues and 'sources of support.

The next period

in the history of CNVA would concern itself more with civil rights and young
activists. 43
CNVA was not alone in thi s period in its activism on the left.
other groups, some old. some new. were active in the field.
the Tucson Direct

A~tion

Several

Examples include

Peace Project (TDAPP) which staged a civil di s-

obedience action at Davis Monthan Air Force Base in early 1961 .

"Our ' project,

read their newsletter, "is dedicated to God. the perfection that is within
us.

1I

A brief period of activity by an organization known as Women's Direct

Action (WDA) was a forerunner to the current Women' s Pentagon Actions in its
reliance on civil disobedience as a tactic.

There is no evidence to show that

either TDAPP or WDA was associated in any way with existing peace groups,
i ncluding CNVA, or that TDAPP was involved in any other actions.

Yet what

i s clear i s that radical pacifist action was not limited to a single organi zation or philosophy any longer.

A negative consequence of this sp'reading of

radical pacifist action was a concurrent spreading of the financial base of
such action.

Hence the centralized action group, CNVA experienced a further
dimini shing of its already dwindling support. 44
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Lawrence Scott, after leaving CNVA in 1959, did not cease hi s tirel ess
work for peace.

Founding the Peace Action Center (PAC) and initiating a

two year vigil at the Fort Detrick, Maryland research center for chemicals
bacteriological, and radiological weapons, Scott attempted to continue
the work of NVAANW and the old CNVA.

Programs of PAC, which was "open to

all who share with us a religious belief in pacifism, regardl ess of their
personal or formal religious affiliation," included continued efforts to
obtain a halt on nuclear weapons tests of any kind, anti-civil defense
programs, and a leading role in the movement of peace groups in 1962 to
eliminate the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Coalition activity

was still at the forefront of Scott's strategy, exemplified by his support
for the early "Acts for Peace" organization of Robert Pickus, the ancestor
of TTP, and the "fast for peace, JI in which he enl isted the he1 p of CNVA,
FOR and WRL in 1961.

PAC began to malfunction in early 1963, with Larry

Scott concerned over the concurrent trends of establishing "communal peace
action centers " and heading in the direction of a "centralized national
organization.

II

PAC was formally disbanded in late 1963, with leader Scott

lamenting that IIfor the first time in twenty years he has no definite plan
or project for others to carry out. ,,45
The W
.ar Resister 's League was fortunate to have as its field secretary
David McReynolds, an energetic and quite literate pacifist who embarked
on a massive speaking tour in the spring of 1962.

Causes he espoused during

thi s tour included pacifism and unilateral action toward peace . . McReynold's
tour included audiences as disparate as the Americans for Democratic Action,
the first Unitarian Church and the Bridgewater Raritan High School.

It seems

that more groups were willing to hear out the pacifist theory, even if
financial support for their witness was not availabl e to back up the initial
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curiousity.

WRL was also involved in the TTP campaign . which in the period

of 1962-1963 which will fol l ow, will take a primary spotlight .

Individual

padfists were often able to influence audiences more profoundly than group
actions, which were sometimes viewed as the desperate work of fanati cs.
McReynolds' appeal is well demonstrated by a note of thanks from a General
Strike for Peace representative after a speaking engagement at Columbia
University .

"Bless you for not letting the differences in our political

notions, and even our approaches to the same notions, prevent you from supporting ~s with your wisdom and eloquence." 46
Pacifist activism in this period closely fol l owed the pattern predicted
by minimal closed range theory . Disillusioned by the civil liberties abominations of post-Dodd SANE, the pacifists rediscovered their niche on the left
of the political spectrum.

Here they could join other radicals in orde'r to

formulate a new plan of activism which could not be subverted by liberals
\'/ho paid too high an allegiance to the American security state.

Although

this choice would effectively isolate them from t he liberal peace coalition,
the turn to the left would help encourage the radicalization of the nation ' s
students, who would grasp the movement and send it forward through Vietnam.
IV
The interest of high school s and col l eges in hearing McReynolds i s but a
small indication of the swelling of the s tudent branch of the peace movement
during the early years of the 1960s.

One writer noted "thesymptoms of the

shaking of student apathy," in a 1962 article, but SPU demonstrated its
vitality at an earlier date . By 1961, SPU had thrown off all ideological
shackl es of the adult grou ps , instead taking the lead in bolder policy.
Their program statement of 1961 was extremely critical of the United States
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government, accusing it of extending the conditions of the cold war in order
"to maintain her interests in Europe, South America, Africa and Asia. 1I

Still

confident that "America can 1ead,1I SPU called for "unilateral initiatives
toward di sarmament. II

To show that such demands were not made without a base

of support, SPU staged a 1962 march on Washington which drew over 7000 student
demonstrators. 47
Though not a leftist organization) SPU's ties with WRL and some of their
pol icy statements show a real "third camp" approach to peace work.

Contact

with SPU through David ~1cReyno1ds from the US Sociaiist Party indicates what
some leftist groups thought of the possibilities of that group.

Furthermore,

SPU showed a kind of maturity toward coalition-formation that could have
inspired a floundering SAN E and an isolated CNVA.

"We distinguish between

as effective uni ty and a fa1 se unity, II read an SPU reso1 ution.

IIA unity in

the student peace movement that is not based on certain methods and goal s
common to these organizationsinvo1ved i s a false unity.1I

These methods and

goals included an equal criticism of eas t and west and an emphasis on II a free
society in which there is individual human dignity.1I

SPU's openness for allies

is demonstrated in their statement of purpose which does not commit lIany member

to a precise statement of po1icy.48
These statements of strategy and policy were revealing of the liberal
assumptions still underlying the work of SPU.

The primacy and importance put

on US morals was a common strand in all of the American peace groups active
at the time.

The IIhuman dignity" plank in their platform was as much as

reference to black civil rights in the US as it was to Russian and Peopl e ' s
Republics totalitarianism.

The east coast establishment elitism which

chara c terized SANE and UWF was also apparent in SPU, with much of its membership drawn from selective eastern colleges and universities.

Also revealed

I'las the tacit assumption that s tudents can work only within the student peace
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mo'vement.

Yet despi.te these 1ibera 1 and subordi nate assumptions, SPU was

drawing many s tudents (estimates range from 3000 to 5000 members in this
period) into a movement that would soon feel free to lead the adult movement,
a movement that would be the driving force of the Vietnam protest of later
years. 49
But these events were in the future, and many sources indicate the growth
pains associated with the early SPU . For all their maturity and the fluency
of their policy statements, SPU was in financial trouble from the very start
of their work.

A letter to WRL field secretary McReynolds, who often held

the purse strings of SPU ' s outside support, from a National Chairperson of
SPU bemoaned lithe really grave financial situation of the SPU at the present
t ime," adding, "If we were a business concern, we would have to declare
bankruptcy.

II

A personal plea from National SPU secretary Donald t4cKelvey to

HcReynolds put the deficit of SPU at $1500 and urged him to contact A. J.
Muste, who had helped SPU in 1961, and who was an expert fund raiser, as
demonstrated by his appeal for CNVA's Everyman seri es.

McKelvey described

SPU as lIa real mess," indicating the need for "substantial, ongoing support
from the adul t community ... 50
McReynolds' reply to the SPU contained , in addition to a $400 loan granted
by the WRL, some insights into the fiscal and policy problems within SPU.
~1cReynolds

expressed distress at SPU's use of telephone call s of "intolerabl e

length and cost."

Concerning policy, McReynolds points out that SPU had a

hard line on communism which he feared was harmful (as it had been for SANE)
while at the same time fearing a "neo-Trotskyist influence via a wing of
YPSL. " Nathan Glazer, in his 1963 analysis of the student peace forces,
warned of SPU's leftism, explaining it as a rebellion against anti-communism
which ignored what he saw as the very real dangers of that ideology.51
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Student SANE , meanwhil e , was getting away from the grasp of i ts parents.
The results of their third National Convention sent a shiver down the spine
of the staff of National SANE.

Apparently, leftist leadership had been

elected by delegates that the national office termed "unrepresentational. "
Adult SANE' s analysi s of the student wing indicated good reasons for pessimism:
Politically. student SANE seems to be divided into three
groups: Ca) a liberal, independent-minded group with its
main base in the high schools; (b) 'a large "middle" group
which is strongly marked by the attitude that criticism of
Communist action is automatically red-baiting; and (c) a
small, hard core which is close to the Communist Party in
outlook and motivation and which is extremely adept at
manipulating the middle group.
With all their cards stacked in the nation' s high school s , it i s apparent that
SANE-style student activism was becoming a thing of the past as col l ege students
became more experimental politically.
The recommendations of the National Committee were not surprising in light
of their continual patronization of both their local committees and their
student wing.

Actions to be taken included the declaration of the results of

the Third National conference as "inval id, a demand that all Student SANE
II

groups apply for charters. which had not been required previously, and the
creation of a new, adult SANE appointed, leadership body for the student wing.
These moves were made with the realization that SANE would be "misunderstood
and accused of red-baiting," yet the Committee felt action was necessary in
order that SANE not "abdicate responsibility on the campus, which today represents a most hopeful sector of the peace movement.

II

Despite the National

Committee's attempts to salvage their campus group, student SANE was formally
disbanded in 1962, with their members joining the ranks of SPU and the fledgling
Students for a Democratic Society,52
The evolution of SDS demonstrates the dilemma facing the liberal peace forces
in the early 1960s.

The choices, in retrospect, were clear--either radicali ze
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or be quelled under the imminent reaction tothe new wave of lefti s t activism.
Hence the pressure on SANE in this period was from both the left and the
right.

On the left, pacifi sts tired of compromising their ideals only to

be red-baited in their activities, while students saw SANE's weary emphasis
on - ?l?esQectabi1 ity" as an anachronism.

On the ri ght, conti nued demands for

SANE to purge itself of subversive forces kept the National Committee on
its guard.

Although hindsight is clearer than most visions, it is clear

tha t SANE made the wrong choice in opting to meet the cha 11 enge of the ri ghtists.

For in the future, it would be the students who would organi ze circl es

around the "squares."
SDS was the true harbinger of future student activism.

Its leaders were

from virtually all the important s tudent groups of the period, all of whom
joined together in a more radical approach to politics.

Peace was not the

primary focus of SDS before Vietnam, yet the techniques and analyses used
by SDS in the formulation and implementation of its programs succeeded in
radicalizing a large portion of student activists . The Port Huron statement,
drafted cooperatively during the 1962 SDS National Convention, has become
the classic early statement of the "new 1eft." Based on the ideology of
humanism, the document stressed the inter-connectedness of all of society' s
ills.

SDS, aware of the privileged position of the university student,

planned to reform thos'e institutions and then, through the universities,
implement real social change.

Despite these ideological leaps, SDS did not

come to the forefront of student activism until 1963.

In a 1962 meeting of

CPC, for example, SDS was not even mentioned in a review of the "student
peace scene."

Donald Keys' synopsis of peace activiti es also overlooked

the budding group .

Finally, David

~1cReyno1ds,

while "heartened" by SDS's

commitment to non-violence, sent his regrets in response to an invitation
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to attend the 1962 SOS National Convention, the very birthplace of the
new 1eft!53
SOS finally gained national prominence in the mid-1960s through its
work on economic conversion and civil rights.

Yet it seems that SOS's

power of attracting students into radical activism was not due in large part
to the issues it chose to emphasize, but in its techniques.

Characterized

by the politics of the "new insurgency," SOS was able to capture and
implement the helplessness felt by many youths in the 1960s.

SANE, continuing

its campaign against "beards and banjos,1l and working closely with the
democratic administration and the security state, lost both the students.
and as a result of its reaction to the Dodd investigation, the radical
pacifists.

The pacifists felt required to radicalize in order to maintain

a powerful message and not to be enveloped in the numbing peace rhetoric
of the Kennedy adm3nistration.
all usefulness.

The peace movement was now fragmented beyond

Some sort of new organizational framework was needed to
re-muster the peace forces into an efficient activist unit. 54

)
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Chapter V.

Back to Chaos--A Full Circle?

The resumption of atmospheri c nuclear weapons testing by the United
States in the spring of 1962 brought on despair among many advocatasof
peace.

For the first time in more than three years, both superpowers were

testing without restriction in the atmosphere.

In fact, the United States

detonated nearly one-third of all its bombs between the years 1945-1962 in
the final year of that span alone.
half.

For the USSR. the ratio was nearly one-

In all, the US had exploded at least 249 nuclear weapons and the

USSR at l eas t. 111 in the seventeen years following the bombing of Hiroshima.
England lagged behind with lIon1y" 22 tests and France, the newcomer, had
exploded 5 atomic weapons, all IIscrawny shots, two of which were near
fizzles," in the Sahara.
broken was astounding.

The pace of testing once the moratorium had been
From September 1 to November 4 of 1962. the Soviet

Union exploded some 50 thermonuclear devices, including an enormous 58
megaton super-bomb.

In a similarly short period, the US tested 26 bombs,

mostly in the megaton range, from April 25 to July 11 of 1962.

These
detonations followed 45 underground shots in the first half of 1961. 1
These events, bringing with them a predictable cloud of radioactivity
which hovered worldwide for months and created a leve,l of Sr-90 double that
of 1960, did not serve as an incentive for united peace action as did the
tests following Bravo of the Castle series in 1954.

Each peace group, in

its own way, took drastic action, but attempts to coordinate the actions
J

were generally unsuccessful.

Despite the fact that "some official s argue

that both the US and USSR will have reached the point of diminishing scientifi c
returns" upon the termination of the 1962 series, SANE joined an electoral
barrage with both old and new groups in an effort to co-opt the governmental
process before the reverse reaction occurred.

CNVA meanwhil e, went further
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toward civil disobedience than ever before. chal l enging not only nuclear
testing, but the deterrence sys tem itself.

An organi za tion arose in 1961

which sought to coordinate the increasingly diverse peace organizations.
Turn Toward Peace (TTP), as it was known, was a massive effort to institutionalize peace work in order to achieve better financial backing and more
unified purpose. 2
I

The idea of coordinating the noticeably unorganized peace movement was
not a new one.

In a personal effort by Theodore Roszak. historian at Stanford

University, for example, letters were sent to SANE, ADA, FOR, FAS, AFSC and
individuals such as Norman Thomas and Linus Pauling outlining hi s plans to
rejuvenate the American peace movement in 1960.

Roszak, citing the May Day

demonstrations of 1890 which had had some success in gaining an eight hour
work day for American laborers, called upon all groups working for peace to
stage s imultaneous demonstrations on an agreed day.

"Such a demonstration,"

wrote Roszak, "woul d be only the 1ogi ca 1 outgrowth of the scattered peace.parades and rallies that have broken out in the last few years."
Roszak's plan was designed to be legiti·mate in the eyes of the established
instruments of power.

The first indication of this desire was his recommenda-

tion that the principl es set down as the basis of the mass demonstration be
those of SANE.

Furthermore, Roszak was apologetic for his technique:

be sure, a demonstration does not solve everything .
a display.

"To

It i s only a gesture,

And it is admittedly a naive and unsophi sticated thing to do."

Yet Roszak was convinced that his idea was vital and new.

He referred to

the successes of eND's Aldermaston marches in Great Britain, but did not
mention that these marches were based on a program of unilateral disarmament.
The i ntracacies and detail s of policy and technique which might have seemed
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petty to Roszak were not discussed, but it was these omissions that had
foiled such plans in the past.

Someone on the inside of the peace movement

was needed to forge the proper all i ,anc-e. 3
Robert Pickus fit the bill.

One of the major authors of the infl uential

Quaker pamphlet, Speak Truth to Power, Pickus was an experienced pacifist
activist.

In Speak Truth to Power, written in 1955, a case is made for an

alternative to war--nonviolent resistance . The treatise speaks not only of
spiritual witness and applied Quakerism, but also of hard political rea l ities
and the national defense implications to the US.
or submission in this primer of activism.

There is no trace of inaction

"Where commitment and readiness

to sacrifice are lacking, non-violent resistance cannot be effective .
the contrary,

II

1I

liOn

reasoned the final section of text, "it demands greater dis-

cipline, more arduous training, and more courage than its violent counterpart. 114
Pi ckus eventually relocated in Californi a and founded, in 1959, a local
organi zation known as "Acts for Peace ." Realizing the importance of local
ac tivi sm, Pickus limited his activiti es to coordinating peace work in the
San Francisco Bay area.

Under lIinitial goals" for Acts for Peace, Pickus

included a 3000 person mailing list in some 30 communities closest to San
Francisco, a financial bas e of 2000 persons, each contributing one dollar
per month, lIa core of pacifi sts whose understanding and commitment keeps
steady and coherent a program involving all kinds of people,

II

and finally

visibility and recognition throughout the area of a vital
factor in public life: an organized peace movement, which
addresses itself to the whole community; a peace movement
marked not by membershi p cards, but by peopl e who share a
common set of values, seek to give concrete expression to
these as they relate to the problem of war, and feel themsel ves tied to others through "Acts for Peace" in a common
endea vor .
--
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Pickus was apparently trying to recreate through a master plan the winning
combination of NVAANW (the pacifist core) and SANE (the movement) in the
1958-1960 honeymoon period.

The Acts for Peace campaign was limited to

California in its scope, but attained some prominence among national peace
organi zations, especially FOR which provided publ icity services for Pickus '
However, a request for a $1000 grant wa s denied by FOR. 5

group.

Pickus was critical of national efforts, since not enough attention was
paid to local creativity, sentiments or values.

Listing through the established

peace organiztions, he notes that WILPF and FOR were primarily national organi zations which would not "even consider addressing the whole community,1I and
whose local work "with few exceptions, is feeble when measured in terms of
effective peace action."

Pickus described AFSC as having strong constituenci es

in a number of areas, but unable to develop "leaders or participants in peace
action." He dismissed WRL as a narro\'J New York City group .

"There is little

understanding," worried Pickus, "in most parts of the peace movement of how
to proceed. "
Pickus had a plan.

Together with Sanford Gottlieb, political action

director of SANE, he founded Turn Toward Peace in September of 1961.

What had

started as a Bay area idiosyncrasy had been transformed into "a national
effort.

II

More than seventy-five organizations were solicited to cooperate

in the TTP campaign.

Included on the list were major labor unions, veterans

groups and the usual roster of peace groups.

liThe Central Idea" of TTP, stated

an early call, "i s a seri es of concrete steps the US coul d take whi ch are not
dependent upon protracted negotiations and prior Soviet agreement, but which
are actual steps toward a disarmed world under law. " Hoping to avoid the
anti-communist attack which had battered SANE, TTP was quick to point out
that its program was not to be based on "an optimistic appraisal of Soviet
intentions.,,6
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Most importantly, "the Campaign has purposely rejected the lowes t common
denominator approach, and is not asking for agreements on specific proposal s.
Rather, it makes clear that there is agreement on

d;rection~

and beyond thi s

that many different policy proposals are needed." The program of TTP was
very s imilar to the SPU-based student coalition of 1960-1961.

Unilateral

initiatives are urged, all types are welcome, given an interest in peace,
and "false unityll is avoided in order to attain a working peace movement.
If the approach could be agreed upon; if the range of
peace organizations (which are not Soviet apologist
in their political orientation) related their work and
acted together to organize the largely unorganized
American peace public we would have a base--which we
should have built years ago--for an effective American
peace movement.
The master plan was underway .?
Pickus prepared a blueprint of the plan which spelled out what had to be
done and which individuals or organizations were most qualified to undertake
the tasks.

The plan was remarkable for its casting of the right group in

the right role.

SANE, of course, was on the forefront of legitimate influ-

ential activism.

Homer Jack was responsible for organizing regional conferenc es and planning "large public meetings ll in major US cities. Norman
Cousins, always the editor, was responsible for developing the mass media
campaign, while Sanford Gottlieb was implanted as a thorn in the side of
Capitol Hill and the White House.

The best parts of SANE were to be

effectively utilized while the organizational work was out of their hands.
CNVA was responsible for "dramatic public action'lI
)

Possibilities

enumerated included 24-hour vigils in front of the offices or homes of the
most influential government decisionmakers concerned with Berlin and the
weapons tests.

The established organizations such as FOR, AFSC, and WILPF

were scattered around the other chores, which included seeking public personalities to speak. sponsoring a national petition, preparing a newsletter,
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and es tablishing some kind of IIcommunity focus."

A s tudent branch of TTP

was es tablished by October 1962 in an attempt to coordinate rapidly accelerating campus activism. 8
The program and polici es advocated by TTP are not spelled out in the
~ar1y

documents, nor were they by Pickus' Acts for Peace, nor would they

ever be.

The point was that TTP was strictly organizational, trying to

coordinate the various efforts toward peace by groups with vastly different
means toward that common end.
offered, however.

Some themes on IIcampaign content ll were

TTP was founded during a time of crisis (specifically

in Berlin) but was not an lIemergency campaign."

Concrete policy proposal s

were to be made in order to avoid the pitfalls of IIsurviva1ism, morality and
negotiatism . 1I

Unfortunately, the provision made for those not willing to

accept TTP as more than a temporary entity for cdsi s management among
peace groups would be invoked too often, resulting in the indefinite postponement of the formation of IIconcrete pol icy. II

Even during severe cri ses,

the reaction of TTP was often less than effective .

Norman Thomas, for

example, described the peace coalition's reaction to the Cuban crisis as
IIsmall dogs barking at an express train rushing toward war,1I adding that its
response was IIbe1ated and largely irre1evant. 1I9
At the start of the TTP campaign, limited and qualified enthusiasm was
the order of the day.

Speaking of world conditions, Pickus wrote, IIIf

only things would stay this bad (and not get worse) for six months, we might
be abl e to build a coherent peace movement. 1I
the peace effort we ,have needed for so 10ng. 1I

Norman Thomas agreed:

"It i s

But soon, almost immediately,

the problems of coalition building, so familiar to SANE, would beset TTP. 10
In September of 1961, a IIbasic l eaflet" was prepared and sent to all
potential cooperating individual s and organi za tions.

Alfred Hass l er,
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executive secretary of FOR. reported hi s own \'fairly necitral response"
to th e li.terature.

Hassler sensed problems in building an organization

;'without having adequately developed the substance of its message." an
indication that Pickus' plans of "concrete policy" were not taking shape.
Specifica lly, Hassl er objected to the 1eafl et 1 s references to the "present
fragmented s tate of the peace movement" and its claim that IIpersonal,
bureaucratic and ideological obstacles" had prevented a successful peace
coal ition.

Al though Hassl er did not wholly disagree. he felt that such

comments were better·left to lIdiscussions among ourselves" rather than
worsening the already tarnished image of peace activism in the eyes of the
public.
Ha ssler went on to raise a key point of debate.

He disagreed that

organizational miscues were the s'ources of the peace movement's ills, but
rather IIhistorical circumstances."

Interested in protecting "whatever prestige

and effectiveness the existing organizations have now," Hassler was willing
to join the TTP campaign, but entered with a stated reluctance.

Under such

conditions of hesitancy, the vital parts of the TTP coalition seemed unlikely
to meld together as a vibrant whole. ll
The recurring problem of the power of a national organization over its •
local affiliates took on ~n analogous yet twisted form in TTP when cooperatlng
groups were implicated by the coordinating agency's words or policies. ' Examples
of this would occur often s ince many groups with extremely different and often
strongly held beliefs lent their names and reputations to TTP.

An early con-

)

troversy -of this type arose over a comment made by Pickus quoted in the
New York Times characterizing TTP as cooperation

between "non-Soviet apologist

groups . " Stewart Meacham of AFSC quickly telephoned Pickus to protest "'language
of this sort:>" but was not satisfied with the TTP organizer' s hurried reply.
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A letter of December 8, 1961 made r1eacham' s complaint more lucid.

"In

light of the exclusion of such language from the written document," Neacham
pointed out, referring to an Executive Council decision,
avoided it in speaking for TTP. II

~1eacham

'~ou

should have

questioned Pickus I freedom to

speak for TTP without first consul ting the Executive Council.
sider it your right and duty,1I concluded Meacham, "not to be

"If you conbound by the

Executive Committee in the exercise of your TTP duties I feel a very serious
question has been raised.,,12
Despite such initial difficulties, TTP was able to gather fairly substantial support from influential organizations.

"Because of TTP's great

potential," many of the groups were able to overlook the initial and inevitabl e
personality and organizational conflicts.

Cooperating agencies, those which

contributed time and money as well as their names, included members of the
political spectrum from the Catholic Worker, WRL, and CNVA .on the left,
through the religious organizations of AFSC, FOR, Friends Committee on
National Legislation (FCNL), centralist SANE and WILPF, and on through the
American Veteran's Committee and the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.
Student participants at the cooperating 1 evel were SDS and SPU.

On the

communicating level, those organizations which were involved essentially on
a name-only basis, participants included The Church of the Brethren, CCCO,
and several AFL-Cra unions including United Auto Workers.

In all, by March

1962, TTP was composed of no l ess than thirty cooperating or communicating
agenci es. 13
)

II

The gathering of the various groups, some of which did not have peace
as their primary goal, under the aegis of TTP was seen as a potentially progressive event for the peace movement by some observers and participants.
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Some radical s felt that the inclusion of organi zed labor could place more
e~phasis

on societal and economic conversion as opposed to elaborate

schemes designed to patch the existing order.

However, two controversies

arose that would complete the end of the TTP fantasy. and a new wave of
peace activism would prove unable. to take hold.

The first controversy

concerned the so-called TTP handbook, which attempted to spell out those
elusive concrete policies which had been sought while also instructing loca l
groups how to organize themse1 ves.

The second disagreement withi n TTP con-

cerned that group's roles as national organizer versus the initiator of
local activist groups.
The publication of a handbook which 'would describe the major substantive
goals of TTP," was urged by cooperating agencies since their support of an
agency with no set policy seemed a waste of personnel and funds as well
as being politically risky.

During the summer of 1962. a handbook was

drafted by a TTP committee and then handed over to Alfred Hassl er . (FOR)
and Homer Jack (SANE) for revisons, checks for accuracy with the results of
Executive Committee meetings, clarity of prose. and other fine points . 'In
general. summer is a hard time for peace activism since many peace workers
and target citizens are away from their homes.

This condition helped lead

to confusion and controversy over the "much-debated handbook." Stewart
Meacham (AFSC) was extremely upset about the final results which. in his view.
misrepresented the decisions made in Executive Committee. His objections
included (1) the fact that such a handbook had never been authorized, only a
"kit" to distribute to TTP community

coordinator~;

(2) that the handbook

set up a previously undiscussed central control system over the local centers;
(3) That the concept of Community Peace Centers was "an unwarranted extension
of TTP purposes , "
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Al Hassler replied to each of Meacham' s objections, claiming indirectly
that Meacham had either not been listening at Executive Committee meetings
or did not read the minutes or handbook carefully enough.

Referring to

Committee minutes, Hassler claimed that the omission of references to a
handbook per se was not hard to understand since lithe kit was to include
the handbook.

II

"If Stewart was not present during that part of the dis-

cussion,1I wrote Hassler, "then thi s of course is unfortunate and doubly
unfortunate if nobody thought to tell him what had happened during that part
of the meeti ng from which he was absent.

II

Replyi'ng to Meacham 's second

objection concerning central hierarchical control, Hassler indicated that
the minutes of a different Committee meeting laid out the decided policy
that community councils were to be highly autonomous. 14
The issue of the primacy of community peace centers in the overall plan
of TTP was the source of a second major controversy_ Although Meacham
questjoned this policy, Hassler pointed out that Pickus' purpose in founding
both ' Acts for Peace and TTP was to develop local activism.
of Minutes from June 1961 said so directly:

In fact, a set

liThe primary purpose of TTP

is to establish Community Peace Centers ,.11 The centers were to be di stribution centers for the literature of the cooperating agencies as well as a
location for organizing local activity.

Contributions to the locals would

be distributed as one quarter to the national office, one quarter to the
region (of which there were seven in the US) and one half remaining at the
local peace center.
J

The importance assigned by the Executive Committee

to the peace centers was not shared by many, including Raymond Wilson of
FCNL who considered the peace centers as a plus, but of lesser priority than
the seeking out of new affi'i a~S and "stressing substantive material." 1S
Even some local peace centers themselves were concerned with the umbrella
effect of TTP over all other considerations.

Mary Holmgren, coordinator of
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Ba ltimore TTP, wrote:
For a time TTP seemed to give us some real hope of
reaching out to mass membership groups and bringing
them into relationship with the pe.ace movement. But
the emphasis for the past months has been on selling
and building support for the local peace center-an entirely different kind of program--and virtually
abandoning the efforts to enlist the help of national
organizations in the cause of peace~ or to help the newly
enlisted groups to strengthen this relationship and reach
their constituencies.
The problem with the local peace group concept, as Holmgren saw it, was
competition for funding among "peace groups' field organizing efforts. "
Furthermore, the "pacifist image!! of TTP, which tended to isolate the
campaign from the broader community would be furthered at the local leve"l .
How ironic that TTP should desire a local base and be criticized for its
lack of centrality while SANE was ruined because of its over-emphasis on
the National Office.

Now. with the focus of TTP in question and the original

limited pefiod of enthusiasm over, personal

c~nflicts

and self-serving

organizational maneuvers would be revealed. 16
Stewart Meacham, in early 1963, wished to review the manuscript of the
TTP handbook before it went to

p}~ess.

Due to a lack of, communication with
.

Joyce Mertz, 1i a i son with the coopera ti ng organi zeit; ons, Meacham's comments
were received too late to be taken into consideration . Their communication
following this incident showed signs of personality conflicts blistering
to the surface of their stationaries. Stating that "I shall not attempt to
deal with the

~ubstantive

questions" of the handbook, Meacham explains that in

his attempt to revise the ha"dbook "I was not trying to be tricky. . .

I am

sorry this occurred but what you suspect about my motives just is not correct. ,,1 7
Looking out for ones organization first was a tactic used by not only
I

Meacham of AFSC, but by WILPF . This phenomenon i s no coincidence since both
organi za tions had specific moral and political reputations to uphold.

National
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Administrative Secretary

of~~ILFF

Mildred Scott Olmsted stated her case

concerning a 1963 Committee meeting.
I am disturbed by the minutes of the June 12 meeting.
On the first page, third paragraph, beginning liThe
Council approves and also suggests": this seems to
me quite inaccurately reported. It was my motion and
it was not a suggestion but a direct instruction . . .
Olmsted had another complaint concerning the language of the minutes.

Since

TTP was to sponsor the World Without War Fund Drive, Olmsted wanted assurances
that the drive was not an "anti-communist" affair since the support of such
an event would not be condoned by the WILPF. 18
These valid, yet uncompromising stances taken by several of the cooperating agencies was not so much a cause than a symptom of the malai se of TTP
in 1963. Some felt that the national aspect of the campaign was not going
fa r enough whi 1e,others felt it was too broad a nd all-encompass i ng.

Some

felt that the local activity should be stepped up, while others felt it
should be discontinued completely.

The TTP campaign was born with great

hopes, but the inability of the cooperating organizations to subordinate
their individual goal s and ideals to the whole, to the concept of the movement, made them uneasy parti cJpan~ts from rthe: start. And despite Larry Scott' s
optimistic assessment of TTP's potential in early 1963, by that time, the
idea was torn and frayed. 19
An assessment of the peace movement in 1963 by James R. Flynn , a political
sc ientist, noted that TTP did "not even approach the effectiveness of the old
National Council for the Prevention of War (a 1930s umbrella organization)"
)

and indeed its lack of activities by that time show Flynn' s assessment to be
true.

SANE's announcement to the locals of the 1963 spring peace walks

makes only passing reference to TTP, whereas the previous two years had
relied on TTP sponsorship.

Although TTP would remain an entity until 1967,
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when it was reorganized as the

\~orld

Without War Council of the United States,

Inc., and despite some fleeting anti-Vietnam work in 1964, TTP was finished. 20
A page of what amounts to satiric epitaphs was distributed by Joyce
Mertz in September of 1962.
Peace?"

Mertz's hypothetical query, IIWhat is Turn Toward

was self-answered in the voices of an influential cast of characters.

"A front for the gradualists. 1I answered pacifist David Dellinger; IIA Front for
the unilateralists/' replied sociologist and electoral activist Amatai Etzioni.
Stewart

~1eacham

characterized TTP as Ita rigid centralized structure," while

Robert Gilmore, executive director of TTP disagreed. offering the comment
"a monstrous conception of Byzant:ine complexity.11. The self-serving attitudes
of certain organizations were demonstrated by the reply of Homer Jack of SANE,
who descri bed TTP as "a p10t to eat SANE"; and by Emily Parker Simon of WILPF
who said,

II

some thing we do things as an aid to. 11

Al though this page was

typed by Mertz in jest and probably in haste, it is revealing of the inner
conflicts which crippled TTP as an activist organiztion.

Despite the sad

fact of TTP's demise that Mertz's comments reflect, the document is refreshing in its humor and unusual self-deprecatory tone.

Perhaps a lesson could

have been learned by the established peace organizations, which, with the
weight of the world on their shoulders, maintained a constant guard of
seriousness. 21

III
The rise and fall of TTP was a startling realization that the coalition
)

peace movement could not simply be willed into existence by creating a coordinating body_

Needed and missing elements were clear definitions of local

as opposed to national activism, organizational commitment and subordination,
and some kind of ideological framework within which to work. TTP's specific
dO\'Infall s included its attempt to form too wide a coalition and its
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redirecting of traditional sourc es of peace activism support to .its own coffers
leading to "increased financial competition in the peace movement. II
minimal range theory states that, in

principle~

The

a coalition is unlikely to

"win" if its members are drawn from vastly distanced positions along the
political spectrum.

Furthermore~

policy distance theory predicts that a

potential coalition member will join
roughly match his or her own.

a group

only if the views of the coalition

A group such as the United Auto

~Jorkers

must

have had second thoughts about teaming up with the radically pacifist Catholi c
Worker.

An issue, such as nuclear weapons tests, was an immensely helpful

device for achieving a sense of unity.

But in 1962, the issue of testing

was muddled and confused through a fear of Soviet supremacy in missile technology . The issue that was used became the electoral process itself . Striving
for new heights of legitimacy, the coalition, in a new gui se , entered an
electoral phase. 22
. SANE, of course, was involved in thi s new trend of legitimacy, as were
AFSC, WILPF, and even SOS.

TTP was often miscast in the role of an agency

with a primary emphasis on electoral politics.

~1ore

significant than the

involvement of the established groups was the purpose of' engaging in electoral
peace activism.

Political Action for Peace (PAX), a New England group,

Leo Szilard's Council for Abolishing War, Platform for Peace in the Pacific
Northwest, Voters for Peace in the Midwest, Lobby for Peace in the West, and
Voters for Peaceful Alternatives at Cornell make up an incomplete list of
national and local organizations which originated during the 1962 campaign
)

alone. ActiVities of these groups ranged from issuing position papers for
candidates to direct sponsorship of "peace candidates,

II

Hughes, a Harvard hi storian, for Uni.ted States Senator.

most notably H. Stuart
Even pacifists debated
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the merits of electoral work during this period in which peace groups
experienced a temporarily renewed confidence in the democratic process . 23
SANE, in the election of 1960, never actually sponsored or endorsed
candidates, but did give its tacit nod to the candidacy of Kennedy for
President.

In 1962. the debate over giving actual endorsements was raised.

Hilliam J. Butler, former director of the ACLU. explained to SANE the reasons
against the endorsement of political candidates.
The stated goal of Sane (sic) is disarmament not by the
Democratic Party, not by the Republ ican Party. not by the
United States, not by the Soviet Union, but by all governments regardless of their political inclinations .
Sane can be more effective in bringing pressure on all
governments if it does not participate in political
controversies .
Butler was concerned not only with maintaining SANE' s third camp orientation,
but also with the' possibility that disagreements over candidacies could
"drive a wedge into the present effectiveness of the National · Board. " Finally,
Butler argued that endorsing a particular candidate's peace position was an
indirect endorsement of all that persons policies, some of which might have
been contrary to SANE's program and goals .
Norman Thomas, a political veteran, presented the case in favol' of SANE ' s
endorsement of political candidates in the 1962 election.

Thomas! argument

was based on the principle of legitimacy over a guaranteed tent in the third
camp:
The principle of endorsement, carefully given at the request
of a congressional candidate, would make possible wiser and
harder efforts by our members in his district . In some cases
it might have a prestige value of consequence . Even short of
success in electing a SANE-endorsed candidate a strong
campaign and substantial vote would add to, not subtract from ,
our weight at the Capitol and in the White House.
Thomas saw a venture into electioneering as a possible reviving influence on
a sagging SANE committee.

Thomas goes on to express an interest in a "Peace
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Party " for the 1964 el ec ti.ons .

Finally, that eternal and effective nentfs i s

of National SANE, i.ts locals, were present in the thinking of Thomas, who
felt that without the entry of National SANE into the endorsement business
"runaway local organizations . . " will act on their own.,,24
Although SANE did not directly endorse any candidates in the 1962 elections,
local committees were given

encou~agement

to do so, first clearing their

choices, of course, with the national office.

In addition to SANE ' s work in

th i s field. both WTLPF and SOS made a ttempts to work with i n the e1ec tora 1
proces s.

At a WIlPF sponsored "Peace Action Conference," efforts at letter

writing and questioneering of candidates were described, with no mention of
direct sponsorship or endorsement of candidates.

However, WILPF was interested

in working with- the many groups that were involved in this type of activism.
SOS establ ished a "Peace Elections Program" in the summer of 1962 which sought
to "provide every student group that shows an interest in political action
for peace with full information on what other groups are doing and what they
could do under conditions prevailing in their communities.,,25
The real action in electoral politics was not in the established groups
with concernRfhow new forms of activism might effect them organizationally,
but in new groups established especially for the purpose of electioneering.
The group with the most monolithic reliance on the electoral method was New
England's Political Action for Peace (PAX).

This group, founded in 1959,

reasoned that through political campaigns the issues of peace and disarmament
would get greater and more respectable media coverage than through other
methods.

PAX's first candidate was William K. Hefner for one of r1assachusetts'

U. S. Congressmen in 1960.

"Although Hefner lost," read PAX literature, "hi s

efforts reopened the dialogue on foreign policy long quiet in hi s district,
and aided i n locating many new workers for peace. 1I26
..,
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PAX was not a membership organization, explained Marshall R. Kaplan,
executive director,
SANE.

II

because of the "similarity with our work and that of

PAX' s tactics included solicitation and sponsorship of peace candi-

dates, acting as a clearinghouse for news of peace politics, affording
financial support for campaigns ·of interest, undertaking research, and performing other services in the interest of peace politics .

PAX' s interest

in coalition activity is well documented, especially in financial matters.
A communication to New England CNVA, the most active branch of that group
at this time due to Polaris Action , asked for a mailing list of potential
supporters.

PAX chairperson Kaplan personally appealed to A. J. Muste to use

hi s fund-raising talents in favor of PAX, a request Muste refused, citing
hi s busy schedule.

In 1962, four campaigns were supported by P,AX:

Boardman, Democrat for U. S. House in

~1assachusetts,

for U. S. House in Massachusetts, Helen Bliss,

Elizabe'th

vJi1liam Hefner, Democrat

~mocrat

for U. S. House in

New Hampshire, and H. Stuart Hughes, Independent for U. S. Senate in Massachusetts.

Although PAX listed some 18 candidates worthy of support, the

campaign of H. Stuart Hughes was the race which would give an indication of
whether or not peace politics had a future at al1. 27
Hughes, professor of history at Harvard University, announced hi s
candidacy on March 27, 1962, stating his intention to gather the 75,514
signatures required to place his name on the ballot , as an independent bypassing the primaries.

To the amazement of many observers, Hughes amassed

over 118,000 signatures in support of his candidacy.

PAX,I'IHid<! convinced

Hughes to run, had great hope in this Senate race since it received national
coverage and also since Hughes had a slight chance of making a respectable
showing at the poll s.

Hughes, who was "so youthful in appe.a rance he almost

seems to be a graduate student,1I ran on a platform of unilateral initiatives
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toward disarmament, the US 's disavowal of first use of nuclear weapons.
the abandonment of overseas US missile and bomber ba ses , the permanent
cessation of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests, and the admittance of the
People' s Republic of China into the United Nations.

His lack of political

savvy was indicated by the publication of a book just prior to his candidacy
which clearly advocated unilateral disarmament.

Another indication that

Hughes was a stranger to pol itical campaigns was his announcement at his
first press conference that "I am an agnostic," inspiring one well -seasoned
reporter to rema rk, "There goes the ba 11 game. 1128
The August primaries decided the opponents of Hughes.

Edward Kennedy,

the thirty year old brother of the President, who admittedly had been expelled
from Harvard for cheating, but who eventually graduated from that ins titution
in 1954, and Henry Cabot Lodge, also of influential descent and a Harvard
graduate, were the Democratic and Republican nominees, respectively.

The

election was analyzed throughout the country .. The Hughes campaign, which
received donations primarily from Massachusetts, but also substantially from
New York and California, claimed that lithe Hugh es candidacy has put more
people to work for peace in this state than any time since World War IL"
Hughes himself claimed that he would be happy with as

feltl

as 5000 votes at

the final count since his objective was to bring the issues of peace and
disarmament to national prominence.

William F. Buckley

Jr., from whom a

negative diatribe is sufficient endorsement for many liberal candidates,
predicted Lodge as the winner of the race since Hughes would draw away
from Kennedy the "neu trali s t-pacifist-collaborationist vote."

His views

of Hughes' thoughts on unilateral ism were similarly negative. despite the
candidates Meet the Press explanation of hi s plan as "unilateral initiatives,"
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as opposed to hi s absol ute unilateralist plan in Ali APproach to Peace. "All
of those of Mr. Hughes' persuasion," Buckley

surmised~

"must be prepared,

if necessary, to subvert American foreign POlicy.,,29
Hughes' views on foreign policy came to light during the Cuban crisis,
when instead of contributing ..to non-partisan unity, he issued a .I'war.ning" not
to invade Cuba.

As the polls began to pour in, Hughes was faring noticeably

well, with above 5 per cent of the electorate.

In a poll taken among the

student body of Harvard, Lodge was the clear winner, with Hughes in second
position.

A similar poll taken among the faculty of the Harvard Law School

yielded the same results.

But on election night . Kennedy emerged victorious

and the Hughes campaign, which had attempted to demonstrate "the deadening
similarities of the two major parties" failed, with Hughes receiving only
52,000 votes, or 2.7 percent of the vote.

Although well above the 5000 vote

minimum for satisfaction Hughes had stated in the summer, it was a di sappointing showing for peace politics activists. 30
PAX was not alone in its quest for peace through the electoral process.
Another newly founded electoral peace group worth mention here is the Hungarianborn physicist Leo Szilard's Council for the Prevention of War.

Founded on

June 16, 1962, Szilard's Council was committed to performing research in the
electoral field, based on support by strongly devoted citizens willing to
contribute 2 per cent of their income to the cause.

The campaign, as described

by Szilard, was based on faith in the American democratic process:
There are many intelligent men in Congress, who have
insight into what goes on; the movement could help
these men to have the courage of their convictions.
There are others in Congress who are not capable of
such insight; the only thing to do with them is not
to return them to Congress and to replace them with
better men.
.
The Council for the Prevention of War was the most financially successful of
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the new electoral groups, surpassing even the respectable amounts raised
by the Hughes campaign. 3l
Despite claims by peace-pol itical activists that these campaigns brought
new workers into the coalition, the electoral phase of the peace movement
effectively widened the rift in the once united front.

The debate within

SANE itself is an example of the difficulties this issue raised.

Further

evidence i s found within the pacifist community, where despite their characteri zation by one writer as "anarchists as well as pacifists [who] eschew pol itics
as a matter of principle,1t the pressure to move in the electoral direction
was building. 3la
Jerome Grossman, pacifist and campaign manager of the Hughes campaign ,
argued that lithe nuclear age i s no time for politics as usual,"

Claiming

that news coverage was received which \'lOuld have otherwi se been impossibl e.
Grossman enumerated the reasons to continue electoral work despite the
peace candi da tes I devas ta ti ng defeat in 1962. As a 1ever of power, entering
the electoral process was unrivaled, Grossman argued.

Through the two major

parties (Grossman was opposed to further independent candidacies), a peace
candidate might be elected, affording "real" power to the peace movement.
The most important advantage of pacifist witness in electoral politics , continued Grossman, was to learn how to organize, to decrease the steady rate
of the pacifists'

journey into isolation.

Finally, Grossman appealed to

the pacifists to regain some sense of legitimacy, lost through the desperate
civil disobedience of the past two years, in order to provide peace witness
)

"in a manner traditionally acceptable to the general public."
A. J. Muste, whose name was often written in on political ballots, including
one fo r the governorship of New York and the US Presidency, argued the case
against electoral activity by pacifists, stating "I am a skeptic.

1I

Muste
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pointedly i.lluminated the frustrating dilemma faced by the pacifi s t between
getting a hearing and maintaining one's ideal s.

The support of political

candidates was not an efficient form of education for the public said Muste,
since "it is only if a peace candidate presents a radical analysis and a
radical program that education worthy of the name actually goes on .1I

Muste

described the temptation of a candidate to alter their true views so as to
present "what people 1 ike to hear, what they will 'buy, I how much they can
'take . '"

t1uste's major ca se against pacifist or even peace movement involve-

ment in electoral politics was the danger of furthering the "mystique" of
elections.

Disputing the validity of the vote as a symbol of free society,

Muste hoped that peace activism could provide alternatives to thi s and other
myths of American democracy.
Muste gave practical arguments against the efficiency of electoral peace
work, citing the extremely high financial requirements and the exhaus tion
and possible frustration of peace workers faced with the. unlikely task of
getting their candidate elected .. As alternatives to electoral activity,
Muste offered strikes, s it-ins, Gandhian action, tax and draft refusal as
other examples of "real " political action.
to have been the general aceeptance of

The result of the debate seems

~1uste's

critique among the pacifists.

This can be seen by following the activities of Brad Lyttle's Committee for
Non-Violent Action, which, in the turbulent period being discussed, was
far from electoral in nature. 32
Employing coalition theory to analyze the electoral efforts of the peace
movement is helpful, s ince most theories were developed in order to deal
with voting patterns.

The campaigns of PAX were never truly expected to

win an election, but only to demonstrate the future viability of peace
candidacies.

Hence, they were asking citizens to cast their ballots as

symbols of discontent rather than as an expression of their electoral pm'ler.
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According to the axioms of minimal winning coalition theory , this strategy is
doomed to failure since votes must be case in order to elect a winner, not to
demonstrate a point.

A.J. Muste was insightful in his fear that the goals of

the electoral peace movement would further a fal se mystique concerning the power
of the populace through their voting rights.

Muste and other radical pacifists

urged that alternate forms of power, which were in the .hands of the radical s,
should be employed in the struggl e for influence.

IV
Concurrent with thi s new evaluation and emphasi s on el ec toral methods by
peace groups was a bri ef but noti ceab 1e glance to the 1eft by many organi za ti ons
and individuals . Joining SANE in the call for un i1atera1 steps toward dis lI

armament" were the re 1i gious coa 1ition group CPC, the Committee of Correspond dence and the ADA.

Although this type of plan was far from radical, it is

notable in its similarity to the unilateral rhetoric of the pacifists.

ADA went

so far as to call for an "uninspected ban" in nuclear weapons tests in the spring
of 1962.

SANE issued many statements which seemed to indicate at least a flir-

tation with more radical ideas and language.

Newly elected national co-chair-

person Benjami n Spack went on record as bei ng in favor of "any and all forces
for peace" while Homer Jack insisted that "the ri sks of a test ban, even with
imperfect inspection, are far less than the risks of continuing the arms race. "
More directly, a full page newspaper advertisement published by SANE urged the
public: "Raise hell--it ' s time you did." However, SANE appeared unprepared to
take the steps necessary to radicalize the remnants of the coalition it once led .
)

Homer Jack reminded the members that SANE was "not paranoid.
we mean to continue to be heard.

We are heard and

We do not feel hopel ess ." Polster' s evidence

shows that the public went through a similar phase, with the popUlation slightly
against the resumption of US atmospheric testing until March of 1962, when testing did resume and public opinion swayed over to support the president ' s decision . 33
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One group that continued to radicalize was CNVA . The work of this
organization in the period of renewed testi'ng by the four nuclear powers and
electoral activity by the liberal wing of the peace coalition was marked by
isolation and demonstrations relying heavily on civil disobedience.
Everyman voyages have been described.

The

In their reference to the Golden Rule

days of NVAANW, they were unique in this period.

r·10re typical were the

New York sit-ins at the AECoffice in protest of US resumption of atmospheric tests, civil disobedience at the White House, a Pentagon demonstration,
and a week long vigil and 100-hour fast at the White House.

An indi ca tion

of the trend toward isolation was the establishment of a communitarian
living situation at the Polaris Action Farm.

Located near Voluntown,

Connecticut and comprising some 40 acres, 10 arable and 30 wooded, the Farm
was home for between ten and fifteen full time New England CNVA members and
was financed lar.gely by contributions, although the arabl e acres were beginning to be cultivated.
Based on the success of Polari s Action Farm, Brad Lyttle theorized that
the nonviolent direct action wing of the peace movement could be more successful
if based on similar enterprises.
"religious."

Lyttle's reasoning was both economic and

Rent for office space and residences for staff would be greatly

reduced, food costs could be slashed by gardening and other needed faciliti es,
for example a printing press, might be located in the communities.

Lyttle

further suggested that, once a location is settled, small business enterpri ses
such as printing, woodworking, or construction could aid in contributing
)

toward community self-sufficiency.
Far more important to Lyttle were the "religious values

inherent

in communitarian life on a farm . " Since civil disobedience often resulted
in prosecution, members in need of financial and emotional support could be
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he1 ped by fell ow communitarians.

Furthermore. since lIa person who engages

in civil disobedience and goes to prison soon realizes that he cannot hold
his job if he keeps up that behavior, " the community could offer employment.
Lyttle was aware of the possibilities of isolation in such a olan, but
disputed that a separation from the "real world!! was necessarily implied by
hi s pl an.

Referring to Israel i kibbutzim and Gandhian ashrams as exampl es

of isolated communities which were "strongly extroverted in their outlook, "
Lyttle insisted that a community can choose to be involved rather than
iso1ated. 34
Despite Lyttle's theory that CNVA could be an integral part of the peace
movement through its own intention, signs were appearing that the isolation
of that organization was very real and approaching the point of irreversi bility.

In early 1962, Ted Olson, a CNVA member, warned the National Committee

that the "lack of communicat!on between us and them

~

the problem, and one

not surmountable from either side of the impasse."

"If a movement is to be

built," predicts Olson, lIit will be a movement of ordinary family men and
women, not monks.

II

Missing from Olson's analysis i s the long-held conviction

that CNVA monks formed a non-compromising core of an effective peace coalition.
The time had come, as Olson saw it, to truly integrate radical pacifi st action
into the greater peace community .35
Clarence Pickett, pacifist co-chairperson of SANE, indicated a second
sign of danger in CNVA, one that had been developing since the emergence of
Brad Lyttle as guru of the group.
J

In a letter to A. J. Muste, Pickett expressed

his fear of the institutionalization of civil disobedience, preferring that
such action should be taken individually.

As if to answer Pickett's rhetorical

question in that letter," are we hairsp1itting?"

with a resounding No, Ted

Olson resigned from CNVA in June of 1963, citing CNVA' s institutional nature
as his reason.

The loss of Ted Olson, a Eaptist minister and charter member of

14'3

NVAANW, was the first major resi gnation from CNVA during Lyttl e ' s undisputed
leadership.

Witho.ut a semblance of unity among the pacifi sts and members of CNVA,

there lay little hope in CNVA' s goal of leading a unified peace movement. 36

v
Many similariti es exis ted in the conditions affecting peace activism
between the period of renewed atmospheric testing and the period of the
great fallout scare of 1957-1958 .. International crises that threatened to
be resolved in thermonuclear exchange occurred in both periods.

A constant

poisoning of the atmosphere with low-level radiation and harmful isotopes
\'Ias undertaken by both superpowers.

Government s growi ng fearof nucl ear
I

proliferation and the shortcomings of deterrence strategy led to a sense
of legitimacy for responsible spokespersons seeking moves toward disarmament.
I

In the earlier period of atmospheric testing, as we have seen in Chapter II,
a coalition of liberal s, pacifists, and world federalists was born which ,
functioning as a unit, was abl e to mobilize opinion regarding the singl e
issue of nuclear weapons t ests .

In the latter period however, despite the

similar exterior conditions, the peace movement was shattered into small
groups, each competing for already limited financial assets , each with a
different focus on the various issues. 31
Although the differences in the situation of the peace movement in the
two apparently similar periods seems to stem from internal divisions, upon
closer investigation, various external factors can be discovered in the latter
period which were missing earlier.

One example is the conservative back1ash

of 1962 that was felt and widely described by peace activists.

This trend

was manifested in a Congressional investigation of some peace groups, the
most publicized of which was Women Strike for Peace (WSP).

A second exampl e
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of external differences between the two peri ods was the embracing of
certain key issues by established power.

This tre.nd was manifested in the

anti-civil defense movement first in the peace movement and then in local
and federal legislating bodies.

Both these developments would greatly hamper

the abil ity of the peace coal ition to reorganize in a period of dangerous
internatiorial tensions and health-threatening fallout.
The renewed power of Robert Welch1s John Birch Society in .1961 was seen
as the first sign of an extreme right resurgence by observers with as different
outlooks as Life magazine and A. J. Muste.

In an article entitled liThe

Unhelpful Fringes," Life attacked both the John Birch Society, described as
lithe IWW of the right," and the uni1aterialists on the left.

Muste, fearing

"hard-core ultraconservatism," urged the editors of the pacifist periodical
Liberation to devote space aimed at unveiling the new menace.

The meeting

of the WILPF-sponsored National Peace Conference in February 1962 devoted
part of its activities to a discussion of "Meeting the Attack from the
Right. II

Citing a New York Times report that over 2000 rightist

organizations

"not including the far right," were currently in existence. Mildred Scott
Olmsted insisted that persistence in pursuing the program of WILPF would be
the only way to withstand the attack.

She acknowledged, however, that

"threats to children, to husband's jobs, splits within families and a cold
shoulder treatment from church and friends--this is hard to take." 38
An analysis by Sanford Gottlieb, political action director of SANE,
explained that right-wing resurgences in US history have often come with
)

crisis situations. , Remembering Gerald L. K. Smith and Father Coughlin during
the depression and Senator McCarthy during the Korean War, Gottlieb felt that
a "complex stage of East-West relations" allowed the current upsurge to occur .
liTo the extent that the grotesque bl ack-and-white vi ew of the
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world now prevailing in right-wing quarters takes hold of the American
public, our task becomes impossible.

1I

Gottlieb recommended that SANE

undertake the job of revealing the differences between Russian and Chinese
ideology and tactics in order to demystify the communist "menace.1I39
One of the first clear signs to the peace coalition that the radical
lI

right" was of immediate and direct danger was the challenge of the tax
exempt status of FOR by the Internal Revenue Service in 1961"

FOR soon

issued a "statement on the rise of right-wing movements which reaffirmed
Jl

their 46-year fight against totalitarianism "whether of the right or of the
left." The threatened organization called on churches of all creeds and
denominations to offer "forthright condemnation of such trends, specifically
ll

against HUAC and the John Birch Society.
was, after 30 years, revoked ..

FOR

In January of

1963~

FOR's status

IItook a very serious view of this develop-

ment and felt that this action may well be an opening move against the peace
movement in general.

1I

WRL, for one, promised to support FOR in every way

possible.
The revoking of FOR' s tax-exampt status brought a wave of protest from
the media, including editorials by the New York Times .. Village Voice, New
York Post, and the Progressive.

Senator Gaylord Nelson of W;scensin and

Senator George McGovern of South Dakota spoke against the IRS action on the
floor of Congress in May of 1963. On June 24. 1964. FOR was re-granted its
status, but the incident alerted the peace movement to the real dangers of
right-wing opposition. 40 The student groups. too, were under attack, with
Advance, an independent socialist student organization, being placed on the
Attorney General Robert Kennedy's list of IICommunist front organizations.
SPU. in i.ts 1963-1964 program statement, ominously protested the oncoming

)

1I
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repression by government, indicated by HUAC activites, the McCarran act,
and a "general reduction of civil 1iberti es . ,.41
A further indication of the reaction of the peace movement to their
vision of a right-wing attack was a newly potent clarification of their
generally anti-communist views.
active in thi s field.

David McReynold of WRL was especially

While affirming that WRL would not actually exclude

a Communist, he emphasized that such a potential . member "would find it hard
going" due to WRL's third camp

orientaUon.

McReynolds explained.to

another correspondent that Itthe theory of communism as stated by those
who began the movement (Lenin, Trotsky. Stalin, et a1) is very basically
incompatible with the pacifist philosophy. II Th e anti-communist affirmation
was not only harmful to peace movement-public relations, but also within
the movement itself.

For example, a controversy was caused within CNVA in

1963 by a report of one member calling another "communist or "commu.nistic."
ll

"Unfortunately,1I wrote Robert Pickus to an AFSC spokesperson seeking the
facts, "your senSible suggestion that these matters should not be blown
up beyond their importance has not been followed."

Of course, CNVA was

having problems other than right wing attacks during this period, but
this imbroglio is neverthel ess good evidence of the effect that the new
'. emphasis on anti-communism had on the machinations of the peace movement. 42
The most startling and far reaching result of the renewed anti-communist
hysteria which was perceived by the peace movement to be symptomatic of a
right-wing backlash was the Senate investigation of Women Strike for Peace
(WSP).

This organization was initiated by Dagmar Wilson. a woman who wanted

to take some action against the renewed atmospheric tests.

Spurred on by

news of the jailing of Bertrand Russel in England. Wilson summoned together
her friends in order to organize a nationwide demonstration on November 1,
1961.

Around 50,000 citizens participated throughout the country.

The group
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gained instant prominence and some legitimacy as a result of its mention
by

President Kennedy in a press conference.

HI think these women are

ex tremely earnest,1I said President Kennedy in January of 1962.

III under-

stand what they are attempting to say, and therefore , I consider that their
.

message was recelVed. II

43

Using advertising on televi s ion. radio and published media, WSP spread
messages deal ing especially with mothers

I

rol es in peace activism.

1100

not use fresh milk for at least four weeks after a nuclear test.1I read one
such ad.

This type of approach brought on the ire of many feminists who

felt that all women, not jus t mothers, should work for peace.

Margaret Mead

responded to SANE ' s request for an endorsement on a IIfeminist pamphlet
ll

in 1ate 1962:
The iss ue is not the individual children of individual
mothers; in the end such a position leads quite clearly
to war because mothers who are willing to work only so
their children can grow up change very easily into mothers
who are willing to sacrifice their own and other women's
children for something they value, as against what other
people value.
Such internal divisions within a single constituency of peace workers certainly
was not rare, and in the case of WSP, was dealt with by a lack of policy _
Denying that she was the IIleader" ofWSP, Wilson claimed that "nobody is
controlied by anybody in the Women Strike for Peace." So loose was the
organi za tional framework of the group, explained one writer, that Wilson
IIsees no threa t of a Communi s t takeover. ,,44
HUAC Subcommittee Chairperson Clyde Doyl e thought otherwi se.

Citing a

speech by Nikita Khrushchev which s tated the Communist Party' s desire to
agitate for peace and U,S. Communi s t Party leader Gus Hall

IS

statement that

"it is essential to give full support to the existing peace bodies," Doyle
and the HUAC feared serious infiltration in the US peace movement.

The sub-

committee called numerous witnesses , mostly members of WSp, an organization
)
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that was al so known as "Women for Peace " in the West and "Homen International
Strike for Peace" for a short while in New York.

These witnesses were

allegedly connected in some way with the Communist Party, either presently
or in the past.

The most frequently used pieces of evidence used by the

government were s ignatures on petitions in support of Communi.st candidates
for office, articl es in communist publications either written by or referring
to the witnesses, and past membership in the CP, USA.

The witnesses, with

the notable exception of Dagmar Wilson, invoked fifth amendment privil eges
in response to the major of the subcommittee's questions. 45
J

The hearings put WSP and the entire peace movement on the defense against
anti-communist attacks.

The final part of Wilson's testimony was only fodder

for hungry mediapersons and Subcommittee members;
Mr. Nittl e:

Would you knowlingly permit or welcome Nazi s
or Fascists to occupy 1eadershi p positions
in l~SP?
Mrs. Wilson : Whether we could get them or not, I don't
think we could.
Mr. Nittle: Am I correct then. in assuming that you plan
to take no action designed to prevent Communists from assuming positions of leadership in the movement or to eliminate Communi s ts
who may have already obtained such positions?
Mrs. Wilson : Certainly not.
Es pecially damning were the news reports, confirmed by subcommittee members,
that Wilson ' s actual reply to the first question above was "If only we could have
them on our side."

The stand that many pacifists had felt SANE should have

taken to the Dodd Committee was now demonstrated by WSp, but the situation
was different.

WSP did not have the legitimacy of pre-Dodd SANE, it was
not a keystone to the engineering of a peace coalition. 46
SANE did, however, take note of WSP's stand and supported it in their

publication of a cartoon in SANE World which pictured the committee members
in sess ion.

One whispered to the other, III came in late, which is it that

i s un-American, women or peace?" A public radio broadcast by Jack was
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entitled liThe Will of the WISP versus the Humiliation of HUAC. II

It praised

the non-cooperation of WSP in the hearings and their "bitterly sarcastic"
treatment of the lIinquisitors. 1I

However. Jack spoke against

I~SPts

of open membership as revealed in the testimony of Dagmar Wilson.

policy
SPU also

came out on record against the hearings and against the existence of both
HUAC and the Senate Internal

Security Subcommittee,but was IIregretfu1

IoJSP'S lack of political distinctions.

tI

at

Even during a unity in the face of

adversity, the under1yi ng differences between the various groups i.s most
noticeable in their statements. 47

VI
Perhaps even more devastating than the internal divisions within the
peace movement was the coalition's blindness to and denial of these divisions.
Optimi s tic reports of the future abounded.

IIIn January 1963," wrote Lawrence

Scott, then involved with the Peace Action Center, "the American peac e
movement is in good condition to move forward."

One author spoke of the

peace movement of the period in the following way:

"All in all. it has

everyth i ng men need to bu i 1d a strong politi ca 1 movement if they ca n fi nd
enough people receptive to their message. II

Mildred Scott Olmsted had similar

hopes: III think that there is an excellent partnership possible between the
organi za tions. II

Yet, despite such favorab1 e impressions of the coal iti on by

contemporary observers. it is clear that at thi s point in time. the peace ,
coalition was badly fragmented. 48
J

True. the breadth of action taken by the various groups was impressive.
Projects underway in 1962-1963 included legislative lobbying, literature
distribution. demonstrations which could be called instantly upon a move
on testing by the government. petitions of phycho10gists, nuclear physicists
and physicians, 1etter writi ng campaigns, marches to Wash; ngton, a speakers
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bureau at SANf. civil disobedience, even a 53 minute silence in Iowa City
called by the mayor. each minute representing a billion dollars spent by
the government on defense.

Barbara Reynolds and her yacht Phoenix sponsored

a Peace Pilgramage by two Hiroshima survivors.

In light of all these actions.

however, Homer Jack of SANE could ask, HWhy can't the peace organiztions
coopera te more closely?,,49
The simple fact of the large number of peace organizations i s certainly
one factor in their lack of effective cooperation. as was the desire for
individual organi za tional autonomy. but one cause of their own downfall that
the peace coalition could not change was the co-opting of their policies
by established power.

Donald Keys of SANE noticed this trend in early 1963,

likening the government ' s interception of peace issues to their similar
handling of socialistic ideals and programs.

By slowly accepting these

changes, Keys surmised. the government was able to avoid drastic change. We
have already taken note of the "peace race" rhetoric of President Kennedy
and the resulting attenuation of the peace group's programs.

Turn Toward

Peace joined the ranks of those organizations hoping to work with the President
in his "peace" plans.
check:

TTP suggested what seems to amount to a blank policy

"We will seek to build support for the constructive proposal s the

President had advanced and would like to advance.,,50
An excellent case in point of this period is the issue of civil defense.
In 1954, any individual or organization which advocated the abolition of
the United States civil defense program wouldhave been dismissed as either
J

)

subversive or uninformed.

But by 1961 ,anti-civil defense programs were in

progress by a11 the 1egitima te peace groups and eventually by sta te and
federal legislatures, with the New York Times headlining:

"shelters validity
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widely doubted. " SANE undertook its anti-shelter program with support from
Eleanor Roosevelt who said, ,tWe had better bend our efforts to preventing
nuclear war and not worry about how we can preserve our skins."

Norman

Cousins editorialized in the Saturday Review that "life will not be resumed
as usual," noting that the firestorms associated with a
attack would leave no oxygen for those in shelters.

thermo-nucl~ar

FOR initiated a "Shelters

for the Shelterless" campaign in 1962 which attempted to reroute money for
fallout shelters toward needy communities worldwide.
emphasi s to civi l defense issues early in 1962.

CPC switched its major

Yet this type of critique

failed to be piErcing in light of the legislator' s simultaneous attack on
the US shel ter program.

New York State Assembly member, r1ark Lane, for

example, spoke vehemently against that legislative body's pending civil
defense appropriation, charging that Speaker Joseph F. Carlino stOOQ to
gai n from his interest in the "Lancer Survival Corporation," a home shelter
installing company.

"It was one of the rare occasions when we mourned success,"

wrote Al Hassler when "the CD Campaign collapsed too soon" under pressure from
the US Congress.

Although Hassler was mourning the end of the Shelters for

the Shelterless campaign, there was also reason to mourn the
co-opting of the "easier " peace issues. 51

government~s

It is ironic, yet painfully real, that moves by the government to co-opt.

or intercept issues of importance to the peace movement has hurt, not added
to the momentum of, the coalition.

Too often the government' s reasons for

i ts moves were all wrong to the moral s of the peace workers.
.)

Yet once

the policy change the peace movement had called for had been achieved, a
milestone had been reached, usually resulting in at least a temporary stalling
of activities. In the history of the coaltion up to 1962, due to the immediacy
of the issues, popular sentiments, or a particularly strong cooperative spirit,
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the peace coalition had a bumpy road, but survived the co-opting event.
Yet in 1963 the fatal IIconc es sionll by the government would arrive.

The

tes t ban--the reason for the formation of SANE and the liberal peace
coalition--was to be signed in treaty form in Moscow in the summer of 1963.
This was an ironic blqw from which there was to be no recovery. When the
peace movement did reemerge, it was no longer liberally based, no longer
seeking to influence through legal or moral suasion.

)
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Chapter VI.

The Peace Movement Without an Issue

Although all the peace groups made efforts
to expand their programs
.
.
beyond the test ban issue in 1958, the coalition peace movement remained
very much attached to the pattern of weapons testing.

Because of the mora-

torium on tests which began in November of 1958, the organizations were able
to advocate wider issues of disarmament, a stronger United Nations, and a
freeze on nuclear stockpiles.

Yet the major support for these groups was

gained through activity concerning the immediate and real danger in the
public's minds--the tests.

Using pictures of milk bottles bearing the skull

and crossbones, pregnant women with confused expressions of fear, and
equally confused men standing atop their fallout shelters armed with machine
guns to ward away neighbors from their limited supply of food, organizations
such as SANE, WILPF, and AFSC were able to mobilize a sizeable public voice.
The radical pacifists, too, attempted to move. away from the single issue
of weapons tests, beginning with CNVA's Omaha Action.

Despite protests of

the originators of NVAANW, the reorganized CNVA staged an assault on the
deterrence system of the United States.

This sort of issue failed to attract

a large public following, increasing the movement toward isolation by the
pacifist wing of the coalition.

Turn Toward Peace attempted to reconcile

SANE's dependence on legitimate public support and CNVA's insistence on
morally pure activism, yet organizational conflicts between various groups
seeking influence doomed the campaign.
Despite these setbacks and the fragmented qual ity of the peace movement
in 1962, the coalition was still able to work, sometimes effectively.

For

example, a poignant joint demonstration was held on Hiroshima Day of 1962.
Even in the fi rst half of 1963, the movement was abl e to pull together in a
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push toward the test ban, although opposition ralli es were common.

But

when, in th.e summer of 1963, a limited test ban treaty was initialed in
Moscow by the three major world powers, the remnants of the peace coalition
drifted apart permanently.

In the face of government IS co-opti ng of the

testing issue and a ban achieved for reasons of maintaining United states
nuclear supremacy, the movement lost the issue that had originally given it
life.

Th.e Hberally based coalition would disappear for many years. l
I

When the Geneva conference for the Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Tests
finally recessed permanently in January. 1962. it had been two years since
any progress had been made there.

The breakdown of the Paris Summit con-

ference over the U-2 incident had cast its failure across Europe to the
negotiations in Switzerland. Attempts to start anew at test ban negotiations
were undertaken by a UN-sponsored eighteen nation disarmament committee,
comprised of five countries from each power bloc and eight unaligned nations.
Commencing its work on March 14, 1962. the conference was disturbed five
weeks later by the first US atmospheric tests in over three years,
l ess, the committee continued its work under UN ausp;ces. 2
The next major step toward reaching

a~

Neverthe-

agreement was made in August, when

two draft treaties were tabled at the. conference by the United States. One
draft was concerned with a comprehensive ban.

The US called for 12 to 20

on-site inspections per year, a figure considerably lower than demanded at
)

the Geneva conferences, but still unacceptable to the Soviets, who rejected
the on-site inspection system as a form of disguised espionage.
treaty was rejected.

This draft

The second draft treaty, authorized by the US Committee

of Principal s as a "fall-back position. was an arrangement for a limited ban
1I
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i n need of no inspection system whatsoever . Thi s draft, too, was rejected
by the Soviets as a "legali zation of underground testing,
which the US was more sophi s ticated.
1962, making no recommendations. 3

II,

a field in

The subcommittee recessed in September,

The seventeenth General Assembly of the UN did make some speciftc
recommendations concerning the test ban, however.

Resolutions were passed

that called for an end to all tests by January 1, 1963.

Nevertheles s ,

the unprecedented rate of testing that marked 1962 continued unabated.

A

fal se sense of success was achieved when Khrushchev was led by his advisors
to believe that the US would accept a quota of only three on-site inspections
per year.

The Soviet leader wrote to Kennedy, indicating that he understood

the need for a token number of inspections to receive the consent of the
Senate and would consider reopening the negotiations.

Kennedy was "exhila-

rated. ,A
A number of letters were exchanged between the heads of State, with
Khrushchev indicating his disappointment and feeling of betrayal associated
with his having been misled to believe that the US would accept three
inspections.

Despite thi s, informal talks in New York were arranged between

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director William C. Foster,
N. T. Fedorenko, Tsarapkin. and British diplomat David Ormsby-Gore.
talks did not progress well and ended with the month of January.

The

It was in

these talks, however, that the Soviet Union, for the first time, agreed to
have any foreigners whatsoever on their soil in order to achieve a test ban. 5
As the spring progressed, both the US and the USSR seemed genuinely
interested in reaching some sort of agreement regarding a cessation of testing. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. felt that the decision to move strongly in
the direction of the ban wa s made by President Kennedy based on his realization
that continued testing would lead only to a need for more tests.

A more
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likely explanation is that the scientific advisory system, headed by
Jerome We1sner, felt that, as predicted in 1961, the amount being learned
from each atmospheric test was dropping rapidly . The US could safely stop
all t ests and proceed with laboratory work concerned with delivery systems.
Furthermore, Kennedy' s fear of nucl ear prol ifera tion is well documented .
14hatever the rationale, overtures from the US to the USSR began via
Norman Cous.ins, who was scheduled to interview Khrushchev in April of 1963.
Cousins communicated to the Soviet Chairman, somewhat inaccurately, the US' s
interest in a comprehensive ban with minimal inspection. 6
Receiving a cynical, yet positive response from Khrushchev, the US
and UK drafted a letter to the USSR in which an offer was made to send
"very senior representatives " to Moscow for the purpose of negotiation.
Khrushchev assented on May 8.

The US Senate indicated its favorable mood

toward such a treaty. although one limited to the three environments of the
atmosphere. underwater anct in outer space, in May_

Senators Humphrey and

Dodd co-sponsored a resolution with 34 other senators calling for such an
agreement.

Kennedy put the final preparation of the stage in place in a

speech to the graduating cl ass of American University in Washington, D.C.
on June 10/
"Liberated" of the traditi anal constraints on foreign pol icy by the
prestige of his handling of the Cuba situation, Kennedy chose to emphasi ze
a new phase of Soviet-American relations, not lithe usual threats of
destruction, boasts of nuclear stockpiles and lectures on Soviet treachery."
Referring to peace as "the necessary rational end of rational men, Kennedy
reminded that "enmities between nations, as between individual s , do not
last forever."

Minimizing anti-communist sentiment, Kennedy hailed the
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Russians IIfor their many great achievements,1I going on to praise the
Soviets for their valiant sufferings of World War II, placing emphasis on
the similarities of the two nations.

The President went so far as to

acknowl edge that part of the bl arne for the Col d War belonged to the US.
Finally, Kennedy announced the pending negotiations and the US' s intentions
to refrain from atmospheric testing IIS0 long as other states do not do so. "
This speech helped create a favorable atmosphere in which to negotiate.
Khrushchev called Kennedy' s performance lithe greatest speech by any American
President since Roosevelt. 1I Not coincidentally, the Soviet jammings of
the SSG and the Voice of America, which had been subsiding, were ceased
completely, apparently to reciprocate the US gesture of good faith. 8
The Moscow talks began on July 15, 1963.

Concurrently in Moscow were

the Sino-Soviet ideological talks, which were progressing badly, finally
resulting in a Soviet publi c denunciation of the Chinese regime.

Both the

USSR and the us seemed assured of the success of their meeting, however.
Khrushchev was described by chief US negotiator W. Averell Harriman as
lI,jovial . 1I The original draft tabled by the USSR was almost identical to that
of the1958 talks.

A ban was called for in three environments, with no

i ns pections, no withdrawal clause, with the treaty fully accessionab1 e by other
states.

The first US draft called for a ban iri all environments, but the only

result of thi s draft was to serve asa "requi em for the comprehensive, II with
earnest negotiating continuing only in relation to the limited goal.

After

rewording a preamble which originally gave the impression that the treaty
intended to outlaw nuclear weapons altogether, changing the ti.tle to a
specifi c numeration of the environments affected, and the dropping of the
requirement that all other nuclear powers must sign to make it effective
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(the so-called n-th country problem), the treaty was complete.

Comprised of

five short articles, the draft was initialed on July 25, only ten days after
9
the negotiati'ons had commenced ~
The treaty was hailed as "a first step toward peace, " by President
Kennedy, lIa good begi nning," by Chairman Khrushchev, and lithe basi s for the
poss ib 1e grea t events, It by Prime Minister McMi 11 an. noticeably restrai ned
responses.

Prime Minister Nehru of India,. the most vocal statesperson in

the test ban de.bate following Bravo, was more enthusiastic, calling the
treaty l1a turning point in the history of the modern world."

Adlai Stevenson

agreed that this "first stepll was "an historic day for the world ."

Ex-president

Harry S. Truman indicated that he was J·'for the treaty one hundred per cent. II
Averell Harriman, whose tough stance and ,fami 1 iarity with the Soviet negotia ti n9
style won him the title "the great man of the meeting," was serenaded by "For
He's a Jolly Good Fellow" by his Georgetown neighbors upon his return from
Moscow.

SANE labelled the treaty a "victory."lO

As the treaty now moved to the Senate, debate within the US was intensified.
Opposition to the treaty, led by Edward Teller, lewis Strauss , SAC General
Thomas Power and fOrmer Chiefs of Staff Arl ei gh Burke, A:rthur Radford, and
Nathan Twining, was fierce.

Points of opposition included the fear of Soviet

cheating and the need for further testing in order to perfect older weapons
and create new and more devastating ones to add to the US's deterrent. Admiral
Strauss was more belligerent in his opposition, stating

"I am not sure that

the red uction of tensions is necessarily a good thing. lI · President Kennedy gave
his assurances that the US would keep its "vigilance high" in its pursuit of
laboratory work, underground testing, and satellite detection system.

In

response to . Teller's claim that continued tests were needed in order that
we not "gi've away future safety," Kennedy claimed that the power of our bombs
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was sufficient and their size small enough that delivery system development
vias of primary importance.

Opposition also came from France, which announced

it woul d not enter the agreement, and from China, which called the trea ty
I!

a dirty fraud."

Both these nations were infants in the nuclear society

and must have seen the treaty as an attempt ,to stunt their growth.

11

On August 5,1963, eighteen years after the bombing of Hiroshima, the
"glorious day" of the treaty s1'gning took place in Moscow.
and Home signed simultaneously for the powers.
was present by request.

Khrushchev, Rusk

UN Secretary General U Thant

Ironically, the US delegation. while including several

Senators from both parties, did not include Adlai Stevenson, one of the original
legitimate sponsors of such a n action.
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

~~est

The treaty received qualified support
Germany, strong support from Secretary

of Defense Robert S. McNamara and a slew of scientists, lobbying efforts by
by SAN E and eventually, on September 24, the votes of 80 Senators.
Kennedy s igned the treaty on October 7,
test ban treaty.

196~,

Pres i dent

culminating tbe search for a

The initial joy was dimmed somewhat by the refusal of France

and China to enter the agreement, yet the treaty that many had seen as a first
step toward disarmament and the end of the peril due to radioactive fallout
had been achieved.

Unfortunately for the peace movement, this achievement

took away their issue.

Their response was one of celebration by the liberal s

and indifference by the radical pacifi sts who continued to move out of the
,rna ins tream. 12
II

SANE responded jubilantly to the news of the treaty, despite tha t docu mentis limited nature.
)

Homer Jack was present a t the signing ceremony and

SANE, parti'cipated in the Citizen' s Committee for a Test Ban Treaty ' s lobbying
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efforts in the Senate. A SANE~inanced full page newspaper advertisement
urged citizens to write their Senators in favor of the treaty.

Anticipating

the overwhelmingly favorable vote, SANE announced that lIa celebration is
clearly called for.1I

Recalling its birth as a single issue emergency

campaign , SANE acknowledged the importance of work for general disarmament,
yet "the test ban has remained a major goal . ,t Th e question became IINow
that the test ban treaty is signed, what more ha s SANE to do?'i13
Suggestions for the emphasis of the post-ban SANE included reorganization
of the world economy to a peaceful basis, electoral work and the establishment of the Peace Party, and a solution to the problem of nuclear proi iferation.

The generality of these goals was of concern to some peace

organizers, including Donald Keys, who said, IISANE has been a cri'sis instrument
and now there are no major crises that hold the threat of imminent nuclear
clash.1I And despite Homer Jack' s confident asses sment that IIfew if any-except SANE's detractors on the extreme right and left--feel that SANE1s
work is finished,1I Keys saw a IIlack [of] fundamental and stirring appeal to
the hearts and minds of people. II The National Review was more direct in its
appraisal of post-ban SANE, noting that the organization lI i s headed for
cuckooland and a unilateralist stance. 14
ll

Although SANE did not know where to turn, one thing was certain.
Kennedy's administration had succeeded intaking away SANE ' s issues.

President
It was

clear that although Kennedy spoke o"f the need for peace and was abl e to
achieve a test-ban treaty where Eisenhower had failed. the source of the
treaty's inspiration was not altruism .

liThe continuous build-up in the power

and invulnerability of our nuclear arsenal in recent years, II said Kennedy in
1963, "has been an important factor in persuading others that the time for
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l imitation had arrived. " Charl es Bolton, writing in the Nation, realized
that the treaty was only a IImeans for perpetuating American nucl ear advantage
in the arms race. " Indeed, this analysis was, in part, how the administration
wrangled support from the Joint Chiefs.

Scientific advisor George Kistiakowsky,

writing in retrospect, recalled that the treaty exerted virtually no effect
lI

on the arms race,II15
Despite the nationalistic reasons behind the treaty, SANE and other
organizations celebrated the document as a great accomplishment of the Kennedy
administration.

This trend is noticeable in the suggested slogans of the 1963

SANE peace walks, which included several quotations by the President.

SANE

even entered the world of fashion, a tribue to the "Camelot ll image of the
Kennedy administration, by calling for IIchampagne parties

1t

in celebration of

the test ban treaty which IImight open the door to a story with real content
on the society page. 1I

Finally, although the majority of the nation and

much of the world mourned the violent death of the President in Dallas, SANE
felt the loss as IIparticular1y severe for the peace movement.

1I

In reality,

Kennedy was tbe most powerful foe the peace coalition had, because of his very
interest in peace.

Although the end sought was the same,the methods used

by Kennedy to achieve peace were not in keeping with the highest ideals of
SANE.

Donald Keys quietly called for a return to these ideals by SANE and by

UWF, a return to lithe impul se which gave them birth and kindled their followings. 1I16

III
)

Pacifists, in general, did not share SANE' s enthusiasm for the Kennedy
administration.

•

A. J. Muste, for example, indicated his disapproval with

Kennedy's study of Mao 's g,uerilla tactics. preferring the "more democratic "
method s of Gandhi . And in thi s period, CNVA demonstrated its reliance on
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satyagraha with the most extreme and potentially dangerous action in its
short hi story--the Quebec-Washi ngton-Guantanamo Walk for Peace. 12
Although the 3300 mile walk was undertaken as a witness against US
pol icy in Cuba, with its "major emphasis on foreign pol icy, not civil rights,
the demonstration was transformed into a civil rights actton due to the
\'Ja 1kers' incarcera tion in strictly segregated Al bany, Georgia.

The walk

originated in Quebec on May 26; passing through the Griffin Air Force Base
to protest the deterrence system on July 3.
plan

whe~,upon

All was proceeding according to

arriving in Griffin, Georgia, the site of some recent civil

rights demonstrations, some walkers were cattle-prodded by. local police.
IIThi s is the first peacetime project I know of, wrote Lyttle to fellow
II

pacifist David Dellinger, "which is losing participants because of danger
of death.
Cuba.

II

The walkers, diminished in number, headed southward toward

In Albany, Georgia, they were imprisoned for unauthorized parading by

Chief of Pol ice Laurie

Pritchett~

known throughout the South for his extreme

bigotry.

No violent treatment was received by the CNVA marchers in Albany,
but instead more subtle and systematic silencing was incurred. 18
"There'll be no damn s i ngi n' and no damn prayi n' in my jail,
Pritchett, and each walker was placed in a solitary cell.

II

announced

One participant

of what was later known as Albany Action wrote of his imprisonment:
The front of the cell is of iron bars, rather less than
five inches apart, with a ditto door. The rest is metal
sheet and hence its name the "tank. The cell is crawl ing
with cockroaches, the corners of the four mattresses
stained with unnamable deposits, and the place reeks with
a combination of carbolic and urine. Worst deprevation
of all is the total absence of dayl ight, for the cell is
lit with a bulb in the corridor outside. which throws in
oblique shadows of the bars across thi s page as I write.
It burns all night and all day_
II

)

Led by Bradford Lyttle, the jailed walkers staged a hunger strike demanding
their release from prison and permi ss ion to march through the previously restricted downtown area of Albany.19

II
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Although the national and international publicity received by the
Albany Action might have allowed outside help to free the walkers, Lyttl e
affirmed his bel ief in non-violent resi stance as the only way to bring about
rea l social change.
I prefer thi s kind of moral and reasonable appear rather
to the courts because I believe that Supreme
Court and federal intervention in Albanyts affairs,based
as it would be upon the ultimate coercion of armed power,
would generate resentment and bitterness .
th~recourse

Eventually, through the mediation of AFSC, the walkers were permitted to stage
a limited and highly supervised march through downtown Albany, pamphleteering
freely.

Their exhaustion, disillusionment and inability to obtain vi sas into

Cuba was a disappointing end to the action, which left CNVA greatly weakened,
financially as well as emotionally.

These feelings are demonstrated by a

report on the action, written more than a year later.
not to make it negative, " wrote

~1ay

"I tried very hard

Suzuki to A. J. Muste, "but it seems to

be, nevertheless.,,20
Other sectors of the peace movement also became involved in civil rights
activism in this period when peace issues were monopolized by the administration.
Many students participated in field work in the South, which, despite Charl es
Bolton's characterization as "glamorous and exciting," must have been an
extremely

radica~izing

experience.

Lawrence Scott's Peace Action Center headed

south as well, devoting its energies to the rebuilding of burned black churches. 2l
The extremity of action and the new concentration on civil rights by
)

CNVA and others was criticized by pacifists and nonpacifists alike.

Especially

striking was a poem, "To a t1ilitant Pacifist," published in FOR ' s Fellowship
magazine immediately following the Albany action:
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Put down your fi sts and let1 s be friends:
Take peaceful means to peaceful ends;
I'm inclined to believe in what you say;
Stop beating my head with that olive spray.
A stab came from SANE in the form of a cartoon publ ished in SANE

I~ORLD

which pictured a couple of 'beatniks' sitting on an empty beach next to a
large "ban the bomb" placard.

"$ure t we would have reached more people at

Coney Island," read the caption, "but the ones here at Hyannis are more
influential."

A1though the reference to CNVA' s limited audience was apt ,

SANE was really the group which was lobbying at Hyanni s at the expense of
declining local activity.22
A trend that was occurring within CNVA wa s its shift from a

middle~aged

Quaker membership, to a young, non-pacifist membership . As early as Omaha
Action in 1959, college students were active in the civil disobedience
sponsored by CNVA .

By 1963, CNVA actions had changed in tone considerably,

as described by historian Neil Katz:

"The open smoking of marijuana, petting

and drinking on the Quebec-Hashing-Guantanamo walk agitated traditional
pacifi.sts who believed in the necessity of purity and depth in their nonviolent witness."

It must have seemed to the more traditional members that

the desperate tacti cs advocated by Bradford Lyttle in 1960 had finally reached
their logical conclusion with the attenuation of the CNVA witness. 23
IV
The denouement following the test ban treaty wa s marked by many endings,
but also a beginning.

The organizations with which we are now so familiar,

SANE, CNVA, SPU, TTP, and others would undergo leadership and policy changes
that marked the end of an era,and in the four cases above, ceasing to exist
as organizations all together.

On the other hand, even before the test ban

treaty, rumblings of activity concerning the growing violence in Southeast
Asia are evident.

16.5
Alfred Hassler remembered FOR first becoming concerned with US policy
in Vietnam in 1961.

His paper delivered in 1963 to the International FOR

in Holland was the first major sta tement on the Vietnam issue in that organi za tion.

A SANE memo from July 1962 opposed the arms flow between North and

South Vietnam and by 1964, much of their literature was concerned with Vietnam.
CNVA was alerted at the same time, evidenced by an article written in the
CNVA Bulletin in March 1963 entitled, IIEnd the

l~ar

in Vietnam, No\Ol."

Toward Peace too, held meetings about Vietnam, but in 1964.

Turn

CPC demonstrated

activity in this new issue in the same year, di scussing both "anti-conscription
and Vietnam."

l~RL

\O/as also concerned with the growing conflict in the east as

early as September 1963, cosponsoring a demonstration with SPU.

This student

group continued to evidence its turn in the direction of radical thought
and action in thei'r October 1963 demonstration against the US vi sit of Mme Nhu ,
the si ster-in-law of the dictator of South Vietnam.

By 1965, almost all of

SPU· s literature dealt with the Vietnam issue . Coalition activity would take
en a new importance in the Vietnam era.

/\n

early example of joint activity

was a fall demonstration co-sponsored by Catholic Worker, CNVA, General Strike
for Peace Liberation, SPU, YPSL, and WRL. 26
The discovery of the new issue that would carry a different peace movement in later years was not enough to prevent the .decline and fall of almost
the entire cast of characters in the liberal/pacifist peace coalition.

Follow-

ing the achievement of the three environment test bans, a change in leadership
indicated a new direction and emphasis by SANE.

Norman Cousins and Clarence

Pickett stepped down as co-chairpersons, replaced by Benjamin Spock of child
care fame, and H. Stuart Hughes, the unsuccessfu l peace candidate of 1962 .
Cousins stayed on as a member of the National Board while Pickett maintained
Honorary Sponsorship.

Both Spock and Hughes were more unilateralist than
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the previous two men, prompting one SANE board member to speak of "SANE' s
wayward drift to the left."- Despite this change. however. SANE continued
to live in the past, struggling to maintain a sense of legitimacy.

For

example, the National Committee indicated that "everyone" could participate
i n the 1963 Spri ng Peace Wei 1ks, "provi ded, of course, tha t they 1ea ve the
beards and banjoes at home. ,,25
A second sign of the decline of SANE as an independent legitimate,
coa 1iti on-formi ng organi za ti on was their merger wi th the United Worl d
Federalists in 1964.

The issue of such a merger first arose at the sixth

National Conference in New York.

A decision was made to poll the member-

ship to solicite their response.

The reaction was generally favorabl e and

in January 1964, the National Board approved with "minor reservations,"the
Statement of Intent to consolidate with UWF.

In March the Executive Council

of UWF agreed to the plan "with reservations." A point-by-point comparison
of the policies of the two organizations compiled in 1964 demonstrated the
close similarity of their programs,' yet some, like Donald Keys, questioned
the merger.
If SANE and UWF were at any time to merge, the move should
not bring together two piles of sticks and stones to make
a bigger one. Both organizations need to consider seriously
the reasons for the loss of the sense of excitement and
meaning and the reasons why they no longer stimulate growing
and dedicated commitment.
AlthougH' the" move to consoli da te the often over1 appi ng work of SANE and Ul·JF
was taken as a step to pare down the coalition in order to increase its
)

effectiveness," the combi ned organization which arose ~as pl agued by the same
problems of low membership and limited influence that faced both individually_
SANE still existstoday as "ACitizens Organization for a Sane World," now
centered in Washington, D.C. and functioning primarily as a lobbying and
·
ed uca t 10n
group. 26
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CNVA, too, found itself discussing a merger in 1964 . Talks began to
join with WRL because of chronic financial difficulties within CNVA.

As

the Vietnam protests escalated with the war, more groups were becoming
involved in both civil disobedience on the one hand and violent demonstra tions on the othe.r.

SANE met troubl es when attempting to join multi-

organi zationa 1 marches employing these tactics.

Similarly, CNVA was shaken

to the core when Bradford Lyttle advocated that the organization join a 1967
march on the Pentagon, the printed call for which clearly advocated the use
of violence if deemed necessary.

IlCoa1itions must be built around the left,1I

explained Lyttle, "not the liberal s. " Because of the loss of CNVA's role as
the pacifist witness at these demonstrations and the existence of other
groups participating in Gandhian satyagraha, serious talks of a CNVA/L·JRL
merger were resumed in June of 1967.

The plans finalized in January 1968,
with WRL taking on the $8000 CNVA deficit . 27
A third leading member of the peace coalition which experienced its
demise after the test ban treaty was the Student Peace Union.

Financial

and organizational difficulties led to a vote to dissolve the group and forced
the closing of their Chicago Office in 1964, but a new office was soon opened
in New York.

Because of the increasingly radical analysis of the Vietnam

situation by students, SPU moved in the direction of radicalism to maintain
its viability.

For example, the 1963-64 policy statement called for dis-

armament, "unilaterally if necessary," by the US.

Despite these attempts

to move to the left, the embracing of an original and radical politics by
)

SOS rapidly drew membership away from SPU until, in early 1967, a referendum
on dissolution was distributed to the membership.

In a letter to the member-

ship, Joe Kearns, National Secretary of SPU, recommended di.sso1 ution, commenting "we have been passed by and it i s our duty to reali ze this. " Kearns
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further wished that members reorient their efforts to SDS, which he characterized as "a leftish multi-issue organization which i s the real campus activist."
Yet it was not only the evolution of SDS that sapped the strength of SPU.
As one historian of the period has put it, "the signing of the test-ban treaty
effectively ki 11 ed both SPU and the student peace movement."

The peace pro-

gram of the Kennedy administration was the kiss of death to all non-radical
peace groups, including those students not in keeping with the rapidly changing
political climate.

In February, 1967, rather than completely dissolve, SPU

merged with the Campus Americans for Democrati c Action to become the
Independent Student Union,,28
Turn Toward Peace, that stalled coordinating effort, rambled on vlith
difficulty until 1967 when it too, was reorgani zed.

The Horld

~Jithout ~Jar

Council of the United States , Inc.(liJWWCUS), as it was called, was a restatement
of Robert Pickus' desire to put emphasis on local activism.

While maintaining

a National and Executive Board, "metropolitan WWWC's" were given much autonomy,
with the only condition being "regular communication vlith the
recogni zed WWlrlC' s.

II

I~WHCUS

and other

Whi 1e offeri ng endorsement, oersonnel, resource and

material exchange and "other he1pH to fellow peace organizations, the umbrella
effect that was the great hope of TTP was abandoned. 28
The fall of these individual peace organizations was ultimately due to
their failure to cooperate effectively.

Interorganizationa1 rivalries and

ideological differences effectively prevented the coalescence of the various
groups into a true movement.
liberal legitimacy.

SANE was too ins i s tent on ma i nta i ning its

CNVA had become so radical and intent on the use of

civil disobedience whenever possible that they undermined their sources of
support.

SPU was unable to radicalize rapidly enough to avoid major member-

ship losses to SOS.

Finally, TTP avoided the lowest common denominator
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approach only to become an organization with no policy, employing the
efforts of an unrealistically wide spectrum of groups.

The liberal peace

coalition, without a sense of unity or even an issue. had failed to sustain
itself after the limited test ban treaty.
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Conclusion
The history of the liberal ly-based coalition peace movement in the
years 1954-1965 is clearly one of many failures.

When dealing with a negative

assessment it is helpful to analyze what might have been a successful outcome of this movement and how such an outcome might have been achieved.

The

goal of a peace movement should be the eventual end of war, but to aim for
such an ethereal target is unrealistic and self-defeating.

CNVA under

Bradford Lyttle experienced this downfall with their emphasis on protesting
the dete·rrence strategy 9f the US.

The other extreme of activism is to

agitate for a short-term immediately achievable goal.

This strategy also has

major shortcomings, since once the goal is accomplished, the framewor k which
produced the results has exhausted its usefulness.
A more realistic and efficient goal for the peace movement would have
been a combination of the short-term and long-term objectives.

Clearly.

the single-issue approach i s very useful in attaining support and momentum
toward the broader issues . What was missing from the SANE campa.ign was a.'
back-up issue to the nuclear weapons test-ban which could have served to
perpetuate the small success of achieving that treaty.

A larger framework

was needed, one which included a progression of single, related issues
which could insure some longevity to an organization which took many years
to build.

Flexibility in the coalition ' s goals would have been

indispens~bl e

since personnel underwent changes and the societal atmosphere for peace work
J

often changed.

Besides lacking a broad framework, SANE-style activism was

rapidly losing relevancy in post-test ban America . The rise of SOS and the
new left, especially in the civil rights movement, was an indication that
radical activism had a place in the United States . The liberal stance of

,
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of the Democratic administration drained SANE of all its influence. indicating
that the radical route was the direction of the future.

SANE's failure to

recognize this shift. instead meeting the challenge from the right, hastened
its demise.

Perhaps the liberal

IS

insistence on maintaining legitimate

methods was in part due to the apparent unfavorable societal atmosphere for
radical ideas and action.
The assassination of President Kennedy gave the nation a feeling of unity
in their shared mourning.

Alistair Cooke. for example, spoke of the sudden

discovery that "he was more famil iar than we knew " and all persons can remember
where they were upon hearing the sad news.

In this atmosphere of national

unity and purpose, furthered by Lyndon Johnson's continuation of the Kennedy
program and his announcement of the Great Society, those who spoke against ·
the US consensus 'did not receive a serious hearing.

Combined with the loss of

the test ban issue, these setbacks caused the coalition to lose much of its
immediacy, relevance and legitimacy.

Sensing these trends. members of the

peace movement urged all those involved to continue their work with continued
vigilance.

A meeting of the Consultative Peace Council, for example, warned

of "relaxation on the part of those interested in working for peace and disarmament" and "some organizations possible suffering financially."

The Chinese

government reacted to the test ban treaty with the statement that the agreement
"would give the people a false sense of security and relax their vigilance.

1I

Similarly, General t·1axwell Taylor warned of a "euphoria in the west which will
eventually reduce our vigilance."l
)

In addition to feelings of unity, a general acceptance of the fact of US
affluence helped to lessen the validity of criticism of American society and
government policy.

The CPC questioned the continued relevance of a third

camp approach to peace work:

"The

~~arxist-Capitalist

debate may become
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obsolete, s i nce both of these economies are based on scarcity, and now both
the US and the Soviet Union are moving into periods of affluence.

II

Consider-

ing the facts that the composition of SANE, for example, was at least eighty
per cent white collar or professional and the continuing failure of the peace
movement to enlist the support of organized labor, thi s critique of US society
ItJas ul tfmate1y harmful . By focusing its attentions on the broadening middle
cl ass which they expected to soon make up a11 of Ameri ca, the peace movement
was undermining a possible grass roots base. 2
The atmosphere for peace work was also affected by that continuing theme,
the adoption of peace rhetoric by established power.

Although certain

programs seemingly favorable for peaceful causes were enacted as a result of
this phenomenon, the ultimate result was the attenuation of the peace movement ' s
message beyond recognition.

The Consultative Peace Council realized this in

late 1963, pointing out that "100king back at various movements, they always
had something they were distinctly either for or against.

The peace movement

does not have this in sharp contrast to other groups . Almost everyone is for
A column in the Miami Herald in early 1964 gave an indication of just
how acceptable peace rhetoric had become in the United States. 3
peace.

II

"Peace mongers are getting respectable again, " wrote Robert S. Boyd,
enumerating several clues.
Spokesmen for the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy
(SANE), one of the leading peace outfits , say for the first
time they are getting a polite hearing at Kiwanis ' luncheons
and Young Republican Club meetings .
President Johnson on New Year' s Day called for an "unre1enting
peace offens i ve in 1964.
II

Defense Secretary McNamara has told the New York Economi c Club
that more atomic bombs won ' t make us safer.
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At first glance these seem signs of hope.

But, a corresponding l ack of

activity by the liberal peace movement negated whatever small gains might
have been achieved.

liThe most SANE looks for this year," continued Boyd,
"i s a couple of minor agreements on side issues with the Russians." 4
The co-opting of SANE into the government's camp reveals that the liberal

coalition-forming organizations ' primary goal was not the first steps toward
a lasting peace, but an end to the health hazards presented by nuclear weapons
tests.

Most of their literature dealt with the health issue,

a~d

support

1ent to their campa i gn by sci enti sts, doctors, and even the Dentists for SANE
gave the appeal added impact.

The Kennedy administration real ized that the

radiation menace was;atthe heart of the.peace movement' s s trength and took
steps to end that issue.

Kennedy desired a test-ban treaty since the atmos-

pheric tests were yielding less information and had a negative effect on public
opinion.

What resulted was the incredibly weak limited test-ban treaty which

gave the administration total freedom to move forward in missile development,
underground testing, and new weapons development .
. The coalition's single-minded concentration on the test ban issue i s
an example of a final factor which appeared to cast the societal balance aga i nst
radical peace activism--the pattern of nuclear age denial.

Psychiatrist

Robert Jay Lifton deals with this phenomenon of denial, which he calls "psychic
numbing," in many of his works .

In The Broken Connection, Lifton discusses

the nuclear generation: "Now one is, so to speak, born into a double life;
the nuclear world demands it.

There is a psychological cost, most of it

probably in the form of extensive psychic numbing."

Three stages in each

member of thi s new genera ti on •s 1i fe are enumera ted: the fi rs tis one of terror
and acceptance of the bomb, especially i n those chil dren who experienced

174

regular air-raid drill s in school . The second stage is the numbing Qf
early adolescence, although bomb imagery remains in dreams .

The final

reached in early adulthood, is a mixture of numbing and acceptance.

s tage~

The

leaders of the liberal coalition were not immune from the syndrome of
psychic numbing, as their health-oriented program demonstrated. 5
Despite these indications that the atmosphere for peace was unfavorabl e
in the 19605 , other facts evidence the real openness of US society in these
years to peace organizations and even radical programs.

Looking back to

1957, with the appearance of the first SANE newspaper advertisement, "We

are Facing a Danger Unl ike Any Danger that Has Existed Before,

II

such a

tremendous and unexpected response was evoked that we must conclude, as did
Sanford Gottlieb, that SANE filled a vacuum in midcentury American society.
The publ ic seems to have needed a 1egitimate and i'mmediate issue upon which
to act.

The prospect of total nuclear annihilation, which the CNVA under

Brad Lyttl e tri ed to address, was jus t too easy to deny by the average c iti zen.
Some of the organizations were painfully aware of the dilemma of choosing
broad issues over smaller, more immediately addressabl e ones .

CPC held a

prolonged discussion over an essay by Lester Grinspoon entitled liThe Unaccepti bility of Disquieting Facts." The conclusion was reached that the average
citizen would just rather not hear about the dangers of thermonuclear
annihilation.

Better to protest against leukemia in children, genetic damage

to adults and the resulting defects to the yet unborn.

Yet Lifton1s theory

implies that in the period of mixed numbing and acceptance of the realities
of the nuclear age, a new emphasis on the substantial issues of annihilation
was possible . 6
Indeed, some quantitative studi es indicate the growing acceptance of
the reality of thermonuclear dangers and a desire for some kind of peace
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movement.

The results of a 1963 Gallup poll demonstrated tha·t many

Americans realized the immediacy of the nuclear threat.

Sixty per cent of

respondents believed that nuclear weapons would be employed in the event
of a world war. while fifty two per cent felt that they had only a "poor
chance" of surviving such an event.
a "very good ll chance.

Only five per cent bel ieved they had

However. the overwhelming response of Americans that

nuclear war was preferable to communi st domination makes clear that

anti ~

communist beliefs were still a force to be reckoned VJith by the peace
movement.?
An American Social Attitude survey indicated that many more citizens
believed that
than in 1960.
i ncreas i ng .
prob1em

ll

Il

our chances of staying out of war ll were getting better in 1964
Only 17.9 per cent in 1964 felt that the chance of war was

A majority of Ameri cans as ked to s ta te the "mos t important

facing the world in 1964 said "keeping out of war. II

In 1965.

a small percentage of thQse questioned named IIpeace ll as the national symbol
of the United States.

Finally, a 1966 survey conducted by the Journal of

Conflict Resolution in a small Iowa farming community showed that sixty-three
per cent of respondents would either "definitely join" or IImight join ll an
"organi za ti on with a defi nite program for wor1 d peace and di sarmament. "

If

interest was this high in a traditionally conservative rural area, the
probability is high that interes t was even greater in the usually reliabl e
cities, especially those in the east. 8
The coalition peace movement, given these even slightly favorable conditions, could have fared better in its attempts to organize for disarmament
and greater international harmony.

The larger part of causation for its

failure must be placed on internal factors, not on the societal atmosphere
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wi thin which it worked.

In order to reach the goal s as outlined above--

a perpetual progression of victori es on single, yet linked issues--several
reassessments of coalition strategy were necessary.
Primarily~

ment.

the balance between radical and liberal ideology needed adjust-

Due to the enormous power of the government to adopt the easy peace

movement issues, thereby co-opti ng the 1i bera 1
peace movement had to be a more radical one.

~Ji

ng ~ the focus of a successful

Bradford Lyttle realized this

when he decided that CNVA should cooperate with the potentially violent 1967
Spring Peace

~10bi1ization .

However~

too radical a witness left the peace

movement isolated, unable to achieve even the simplest goal in the progression .
Without SANE, the 1957 peace movement would have gone nowhere.

Through their

legitimacy and traditional methods, a large group of US society was mustered
into anti-testing activism.
Coalition theory, specifically the size principle and the bargaining
theory states that the group entering a coal ition wi th the most "weight" wi11
have more influence on policy deci sions.

In the case of the 1957 Committee

to Stop the H-bomb Tests, despite the organizational initiative of the
pacifist groups, the liberals emerged with greater weight.

In order to shift

influence toward radicalism, the pacifi st groups could have coalesced their
own ranks prior to inviting the liberal s into a working coalition.

The radica l

program could have gone beyond the immediate test ban fears to real issues of
disarmament.

A nuclear weapons freeze would have been a logical next step,

followed by a gradual reduction of stockpiles, and perhaps some proposals on
limiting the development of new weapons.

Two obstacles prevented this strategy:

first, the issue at hand was seen as quite urgent; and second, the pacifist
groups often experienced difficulty working out their differences.

The issue

of the immediacy i s difficult, yet the time taken t o organi ze would have been
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well spent and it i s doubtful that the test.ban negoti ations would have progressed any more slowly if this time was taken.

Uniting the radical ranks might

have been a- formidable task, but surely would have been more easily achieved
than the coordination of radical/liberal efforts as in Turn Toward Peace.
Compromise is surely a necess,ity in any coalition process.

Both the

liberal s and the pacifists compromised in 1957 in order to achieve the advantages
of one another's company.

The pacifists gained from the numerical support

and influential voice of the liberals, while the liberals suffered from
inaction before they joined forces with the experienced radical activi sts.
Often compromise implies reducing one's goal s to a lowest common denominator,
yet negotiation among these groups could have achieved a deeper program.

Surely

the pacifi s t groups shared enough common ground to enable them to unite in
order to meet SANE on equal terms in the formation of a peace coalition.

\~ith

a more profound understanding of the ultimate goals and limitations of the
coalition, the movement could have progressed with many of the same programs.
The dual-pronged strategy of liberal education and pacifist direct action
witness seemed a natural strategy, while the division of labor strategy of TTP,
with each group performing tasks at which it excelled was also wise.

A long-

term strategy and increased . communication concerning the basi s of the coalition
could have made the story of the coalition more successful.
Organizing against nuclear weapons was not and is not a s impl e task.
Besides the widespread numbing of the population, a feeling pervades that nuclear
weapons are somehow out of control, even by the policy-makers.

The forces

which steer the development and strategy of such weapons seem too well-established
and anonymous to change.

Although specific issue agitation i s one method used

to reverse this helplessness, the broadening of the activist program to address
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the larger issues i s a very difficult chore . The dilemma facing the peace
movement today i s virtually the same one which faced the revived forc es of
the late 1950s.

On one hand the movement can limit itself to the immediately

s triking issues of health and economy, or on the other hand it can endanger
its relevancy by addressing the broad social issues of the nuclear age.
In the present, the rumblings of a new coalition are audible.

Faced

by a domestic economic dissatisfaction and ever-present international tension,
the external conditions seem as ripe as ever for peace movement activity.
A beginning i s present in the new single issue of a nuclear weapons freeze.
This i ss ue has great potential for several reasons.
clearly one of armaments, not of health.

First, the issue is

If a substantial base of support

is gathered around this issue, it will not be because of immediate concerns
for self and family, but a more long-range support, one which i s slowly
awakening from its psychic numbness.

Secondly, the nuclear freeze. unlike

the test-ban. serves as a tangible first step toward a reduction of grossly
oversized nuclear stockpiles.

Finally. the freeze attempts to halt the

production of a new generation of nuclear weapons which aim to give the .. US
nuclear superiority in the near future.
Despite the promise and hope gtven by the new movement rallied behind
the issue of a nuclear weapons freeze. some key points should be considered.
If the freeze is brought to the level of a campaign issue, as is planned.
care must be taken not to allow the issue to become "gover:nment property.

II

The

constant co-optation of SANE' s issues by the Kennedy administration is a
)

precedent whith would be painful if repeated. Secondly, definite plans should
be forged concerning the movement after the freeze.

Even if the immediate

goal does not appear to be imminent under the present admini stration. long-range

)
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strategy i s es sential for the continued health of a movement which i s difficult
to build.

Finally, in seeking allies for the coalition which will have to be

built, the freeze campaign ought to create a balance of members that is
left of center.

Real social change will come about only through radical

agitation. although legitimate spokespersons are helpful allies for achieving
results .

If the coalition becomes too concerned with maintaining legitimacy,

the radical wing will isolate itself, leaving no coalition.

The fragmentation

of SANE's coalition after its response to the Dodd investigation i s availabl e
evidence of thi s precedent.
Although many activists would not cl ass ify themselves as liberal s, the
reality of the power behind the liberal ideology is overwhelming.

A successful

political coalition must take this potential source of strength into account.
However, as the history just presented so vividly reveals, only radical action
is capable of escaping the inevitable liberal pitfall of accepting l ess than
one wants or needs in order to achieve success.

Only when led by a fo rce out-

side the established order can the sys tem move toward peace .
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the fallout scare was the original impetus
for the liberal peace coalition
(from USN 38 (February 25,1955). p. 36)
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Fig. 1. Rainier seismic signal recorded at Fairbanks. Alaska.
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difficulty of detecting underground
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"I Came Tn Lale. Which Was It ThOll 'Yus
Un-American - WOlDen Or l'cace?"

although SANE was unable to stand up~'to
Senate oppression, they supported the
courage ·of the Women Strike for Peace
(from SANE Wo. . . l d January 1 ~ 1963,
Jack HSS, Seri es VI, Box 61.

the increasing isolation and the beatni~
infiltration of CNVA is satired here in
SANE World, October 15, 1963
(from Jack ~1SS, Seri es VI, Box 61)
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0.

Treaty B~innjng Nuclec~
'Veapon Te§ts in tIle
Atmospllerej in O'tIter
Space and Under ''Vater
Text of treaty done at Moscow
on August 5, 1963,
U.S. ratification deposited October 10, 1963.
Entered into force October 10, 1963.

!. •

The Governments of the United St:1tcs of America, the United
Kingdam of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of
.SoYLe:: SOc!.1list Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original
Parties,"
Proclaiming" as their principa.l aim the speediest possible
achic\'cmcnt of fu'"l agreement on general and complete disarmament
under strict international control in accordance with the objectives
of the Uriitcd Nations which woi.lldputan end to the a.rm~mcnts race
.1nd eliminat~ the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds
of wc:~pons, including nuclear weapons,
Seeking to achieve !he discontinuance of all test explosions of
nuclear . . veapons for all time, determined to contmue negotiations to
this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's
environment by mdioactive substances,
Have agreed as follows:

Article I
1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to
::md not to carry out any nuclcar wcapon test cxplosion, or
any other nuclear explo:;ic/n, at any place under its jurisdiction or
prev~nt,

cootrcl:

"

" {n} in the atmospherei beyond its limits, including outer space;
or underwater, including territorial waters ot high seaSj or
(b) in any other cllvironment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be prescnt outside the territorial limits of the
State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is con- "
ducted. It is understood in this connection that the proYisions of
this subp:lmgraph are without prejudice to the conclusion ofa
treaty resulting in the pcnnancnt banning of all nuclear test
cxplpsicns, including all such explosions underground, the con-.
clusian of which, as the Parties have stated"in the PrcOlmblc to
this Trcaty, they seek to achieve.
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2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undcrt~kes furthcnnorc to
refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, thc
carrying out 'of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other
nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the
environments described, or have the effect referred to, in parlgmph I
of this Article.
'

Article II
1.

! . . ny Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of

any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary
Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty.
Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties,
the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which
they shall invite all the Parties, to consi"dersuch amendment.
2. Any amen<L.-nent to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of
the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of
the Original Parties. The amendment shall , enter into force for all
Parries upon the deposit of instnlI11ents of ra~ification by a majority
of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of ull of thc
Origin~ll Parties.

Article III

'.

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State
which docs not sign this Treaty before its entry into force i;:l Joecordancc with paragraph3 of this Article may accede to it at any ti;:i1e.
2. This Treaty shall ,be subject to ratification by signatory States.
'Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be
deposited ""ith the Governments ofthe Original Parties-the United
States of Americal the United Kingdom of Grcat Britain and Northern
Irelandl and the Union of Soviet Socidist Republics-which arc
hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force aftcr its ratification by .al1 the
Origin'l1 P:1ftics and the deposit of their instruments of ratification:
4. For States whose instruments · of mtific:ltiol1 or acccsshm arc
deposited subs~quent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall
enter into force on the dute of the deposit of thdr instruments of
mtification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly infonn all signatory
and accedingStates of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of
each instrumen t of ratification of an accession to this Treaty, the date
of its entry into force l and the date of receipt of any 'requests for
conferences or other noticeso. This Tn:aty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments
pursunnt to Article 102 of the Charter of, the United Nations.
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Article IV
This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the
right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary
events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized
the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such
withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in adv.ance.

Article V
This Treaty, of which thc English and Russian texts are equally
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary
Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, helve
signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow the fifth day of August,
one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three.

For the Government
of the United
States of America

Dean Rusk

For the Government
of the United
Kingdom of Great
Britain and
Northern Ireland

For the Government
of the Union

of Soviet SO<;ialist
Republics

A. Gromyko

Home

(from Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and
the Test Ban, pp. 302-305
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ESSAY ON SOURCES
The pre-Vietnam peace movement has been largely overlooked by historians,
hence much of the documentation for this study was from manuscript sources,
government documents, and books of a biographical nature.

The Swarthmore

College Peace Collection houses the. collected papers of many of the organizations
of primary importance in this period, the great majority of,which are available
without restriction.

Documents which pertain to the birth of SANE and NVAANW

are numerous, as are the memoranda which detail the transformation of CNVA
under Bradford Lyttle.

Both the SANE papers and the CNVA papers are processed

and \o/ell -ca talogued . The rise and fall of TTP can be traced through the FOR
papers and the papers of WILPF . Feminist peace activities can be

rese~rched

through both the above group and the Women Strike for Peace, although many of
these documents are as yet unprocessed.

A three-year funded project i s under-

way to process the many shelves of documents at Swarthmore.
Student activity within the liberal peace coalition can be traced through
a survey of the Student SANE file of the SANE papers and the papers of SPU.
Further study of SPU can be conducted through the WRL papers and the correspondence of David

~kReynold .

Individuals who deposit or deposited their papers

at SCPC include A.J. Muste , Homer Jack, Lawrence Scott, David McReynolds, and
Bradford Lyttl e .
Government documents were helpful in tracing the progression of the fallout
debate.

See liThe Nature of Radioactive Fallout and its Effects on Man, Hearings

before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., 2nd Ses s. (1955),
"Contro1 and Reducti on of Armaments,

II

Hearings before a Subcommi ttee of the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess, and 85th Cong.,
1st and 2nd Sess.

(1955-1958), and "Technical Aspects of Detection and

Inspection of a Nuclear Weapons Te?t Ban," Hearing before a Special Subcommittee
on Radi ation and the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Joint
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Committee on Atomi c Energy , 86th Cong., 2nd Sess . (1960).

The Department

of State publication, Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, is two volumes
filled with the pertinent documents.

Insight into the government argument

behind closed doors is available in the recently declassified "Meeting the
Threat of Surprise Attack," Report to the PresidentEi: the Technological
Capabilities Panel of the SCience AdvisorY Committee, and the article,
David Alan Rosenberg, "A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours, "
International Security 6 (Winter 1981-82), pp. 3-38.

Finally, the Public

Papers of the Presidents of the United States contains all of Eisenhower
and Kennedy' s public statements and press conferences dealing with the testing
i ssue.
Government sources also pertain to the Dodd i nvestigation of SANE, the
transcript of which is entitled, IICommunist Infiltration in the Test Ban Movement," Hearings before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on
the Judiciary. 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1960).

The right-wing backlash is

apparent in "Testimony of Dr. Linus Pauling," Hearing before the Subcommittee
to Inves tigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Related
Internal Security Laws, (2 Vols.) 86th Congo 2nd Sess (1960) and in "Communist
Activities in the Peace Movement (Women Strike for Peace and Certain Other
Groups)," Hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activiti es , 87th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1962).
The New York Times contains all the full-page advertisements by SANE and
the series "SANE comment."

In addition, the newspaper was helpful in recon-

structing the chronology of demonstrations and other peace movement actions.
Time, Newsweek, and US News gave generally government-biased vie\l/s of the
test-ban controversy, while Nation, New Republic, and Saturday Review presented
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the liberal outlook .

Radical analyses were found in

Thought and the religious

publication~ Fello~ship

D;ssent ~

Ne\'J University

and Liberation .. Christian

Century and Commonweal were also valuable for their coverage of pacifist and
religious peace action.

The voice of the scientific community often came

through in the Bulletin of the Atomic SCientists , a periodical which was
also helpful in its technical treatments of some of the radiation issues.
Several books deal t with the peace movement in general, most notably
Lawrence Wittner, Rebels Against War; The American Peace Movement, 1941.:.1960,
which links the reborn peace movement of 1957 to the activism of the pre-WWII
period.

Charles DeBenedetti, The Peace Reform in American History is a topical

treatment of the peace movement from the colonial period.

Both Charl es

Cha tfi e1d ~ . For Peace a nd Jus ti ce; . Pac i fi sril .:!l!. Arnett ca a rid Peter Broc k, . Pac i fi sm
in the United States ftom the Colonial Era to the' First
with the pacifist ·witness and activism.
of sectarian movements.

Wor1d~!ar

deal exclusively

Brock's text is notable for its detail

Sel ected essays covering topics such as world federal ism,

student activism, conscientious objection, and the peace research movement are
available in Charles Chatfield, ed., Peace

~1ovements

in America.

The most complete and readable secondary source on the test ban controversy
i s Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the VJind:The Nuclear Test Ban

Debate~

1954-1960.

An insider's view is presented in Glen T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and
the Test Ban.

Diplomatic treatments are Harold Karan Jacobson and Eric Stein,

Di plomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The United States and the Nuclear Test
Ban Negotiations and M.V. Subba Rao, "Diplomatic Background of the Test Ban
J

Treaty," United Asia [India].
The scientific community was involved in more than the technical debate
concerning the testing.

See, for example, Daniel J. Devles, The Physicists.
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Daniel S. Greenberg, The Politics of Pure SCience, Stephan J. Dupre and
Sanford

Alkoff~

Science and the Nation:

Policy and Politics, and a JCAE

history, Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal, Government of the Atom: The
Integration of Powers.

Two case studies in the pol itics of science and tech-

nology are presented i n Steve J. Heims, John Von Neumann and Norbert Weiner;
From Mathelilatics to the Technologies of Lifeand ' Death.
~ &iographies

of key figures concerning the peace movement and its

opponents in this period are Jo Ann Robinson, Abraham Went Out;
~f ~.~. ~1uste,

~

Biography

Kenneth S. Davis, The Politics of Honor: !l Biography of Adlai E.

Stevens6n, Theodore Sorenson,Kennedy, Arthur M. Schlesinger , Jr . , A Thousand
Days: John

E; Kennedy in the White House , and Stanley A. Blumberg and Gwinn

Owens: Energy and Conflict: The Life and Times of Edward Teller, all sympathetic
treatments of their subjects.
three scientific memoirs:
Eisenhower:

~

~Jorks

of an autobiographical nature include

James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists and

Memoir of the ,First Special AssiStant to the President for SCience

and Technology, George B. Kistiakowsky,

~

Scientist in the White House: The

Private Diary of President Eisenhower'sSpecial Assistant for SCience and
Technology, and Lewis L. Strauss, Men and Decisions.

For information concerning

the various international crises of the 1950s and the crucial national election
of 1956, see Dwight D. Eisenhower, The

\~~ite

House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961.

The Geneva negotiating process is described by chief us negotiator James J .
Wadsworth, The Politics of Peace.
Personal statements,. especially concerning the tests and the potential
)

dangers of fallout, abounded in the late 1950s.

The pro-testing viewpoint i s

blatantly laid down in Edward Teller and Albert Latter, Our Nuclear Future
Facts, Dangers, and Opportunities, while an 9.nti-testirigappeal is made by
Linus

Pauling~

No More War!

A more technical anti-testing treatment i s presented
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in Robert Schubert and Ralph E. Lapp, Radiation: Hhat it
You.

~10re

~and

Holo" it Effects

general issues of peace and disarmament are the subject of two

intensely personal books, Norman Cousins, Present Tense: An American Editor's
Odyssey, a collection of editorials from the Saturday ·Review and H. Stuart
An Approach to Peace, the controversial pre-1962 election work which advocates
a program of unilateral disarmament.

The attempts to sail into the Pacific

testing area which was the great success of early CNVA are descri bed by the
skippers in Albert Bigelow, The Voyage ·of the Golden Rule: An Experiment With
Truth and Earle Reynolds, The Forbidden Voyage.
Radicalism in theory and action is the subject of several books which
were vital to the treatment of non-violent resistance in thi s study.

The

Gandhian theory is described by Richard Gregg, The Power of Non-Violence.

Con-

cerning the use of non-violent methods is Elliot M. lashin, Civil Disobedience
and Democracy.

Collected primary sources on the use ofsatyagraha and related

methods was compiled by Staughton Lynd, ed., Non-Violence

~

America, !l

Documentary History . The history of the first active new-left group is presented by Kirkpatrick Sale.SDS.

Finally. the working activist is well-advised

to read Saul Alinsky, Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic
Radicals.
Coa l ition theory i s a vast subject which i s extensively treated in various
journal s , but several important books provide an overview of the major currents.
John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, The Theory ..E!Games and Economic
BehaVior is where it all started.
)

The updated theory of n-persons and the

statement of the size principle is in Will iam H. Riker, The Theory of Pol itical
Coalitions.

For an overview of the many theories of the 1960s and 1970s, see

Abram De Swann. Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation: 8.. study of formal
theories of coalition formation applied to nine Eurooean Parliaments after 1918.
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Finally. many different types of appl ications are presented in Svan Groenning,
E. W. Kelley and

r~ichael

Leiserson, The Stud/of Coalition Behavior; Theoreti-

cal Perspectives and Case Studies from Fbur Continents.
Two unpublished sources are
scholar of SANE and CNVA.

~ell

worth seeking out by the interes ted

For a treatment of the liberal groups see Milton

Steven Katz, "Peace, Politics, and Protest: SANE and the American Peace

~1ove

ment, 1957-1972." The hi s tory of the radical pacifist group is available in
Neil H. Katz, "Radical Pacifism and the Contemporary American Peace Movement;
The Committee for Non-Violent Action. 1957-1967. "

